Benghazi thoughts

The Benghazi story certainly seems to have heated-up again this week, with three “whistle-blowers” reportedly coming forward to testify before Congress.

CAA has a few thoughts and observations, but first the caveats and digressions.

Caveat #1:  CAA has neither personal involvement nor knowledge about the Benghazi attack, events leading up to it, and the aftermath/cover-up (beyond, that is, what’s available to all from what we like to call “open sources”).

CAA has read the (unclassified) ARB report on Benghazi; CAA assumes there’s (at least one) classified version.  If I can ever allocate some free time and share some thoughts on the ARB report itself, I’ll do so.

There are so many aspects and questions left begging by the Benghazi attack that it’s hard to know where to start.  DiploMad provided a handy list of some of those here.  

--What was that facility meant to do?--Why was it so poorly protected?--Why did the Ambassador go there on September 11 of all dates?--What was he doing there on that date that was so important?--Why did he meet a Turkish diplomat there of all places on that of all dates?--Why was political hack Susan Rice sent out to do the Administration's cover up?--Why was it so hard for the media to "discover"who wrote Rice's talking points?--Why were the people present during the attack not made available for the press or others?--Where was Hillary Clinton throughout this mess?--Where was the President?--What was the President told? What did he say? 

But I have some thoughts I’d like to meander though a bit.

Leading up to the attack, there are several issues.  WTF we were doing at a facility in Benghazi is certainly a relevant question, given that it was not a consulate (no consular services were being provided there so far as anyone can tell) and the U.S. embassy had re-opened in Tripoli subsequent to the fall of Qaddafi’s government.  It’s a good question; what were we doing in Benghazi that was sufficiently important that we had U.S. personnel in a risky security environment, but since I don’t know myself beyond educated guesswork I’ll only address that in a general way.

“The Gee” (or U.S. government) has more than 260 diplomatic posts open abroad at any given time.  Countries with which we have full diplomatic relations generally merit a U.S. embassy headed by an ambassador (although some smaller countries make do with having a U.S. ambassador accredited to them who is actually resident in a neighboring or nearby country).  Important inter-/transnational organizations such as the UN, NATO, or the EU get a U.S. mission, also headed by a U.S. ambassador.  Within quite a few larger countries, or where there are particular economic or historic reasons to do so, there are various consulates and consulates general that fall (almost always) under the authority of a particular U.S. embassy (and U.S. ambassador).  (The differences between a consulate and a consulate general are technical and mostly seem to have to do with a post’s size.)

Many embassies (or consulates/consulates general) will also have consular agencies at locations remote from them where it’s useful to have a sort of branch office to offer consular services to U.S. citizens in that location.

Speaking of branch offices, those sometimes exist, as do “liaison offices,” and a host of other odd facilities mostly having to do with what State likes to call “tenant agencies.”

“Tenant agencies” are simply those U.S. federal agencies which operate overseas under the umbrella (and authority) of a chief of mission (COM; i.e., a U.S. ambassador in charge of a country mission).  In larger missions those can be a virtual alphabet soup as quite a few federal agencies have one international focus or another.  To give some common examples, the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Marshal Service (USMS) are all law enforcement agencies with a need to station their people abroad, as are several of the agencies which comprise DHS such as ICE or CBP or even USCG (the Coast Guard).

Much of the time, these folks work out of their embassy’s chancery or other office facility on or near the embassy compound.  In other instances, it’s not unusual for a “tenant agency” to have a building or compound of its own.  One example of that is U.S. Embassy Cairo, which has (or used to have) not only a group of folks from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) keeping an eye on potential epidemics but some representatives of the Library of Congress (LOC), presumably on a permanent book-buying mission.  Both of those “tenant agencies” had their own building or compound nowhere near the embassy itself.

So after all that explanation, let’s just say it’s a reasonable enough assumption to make that the “facility” in Benghazi was housing one or more tenant agencies.

(Digression #1 - A detour of thought:  CAA has had a Top Secret clearance or the equivalent for more than 30 years.  It was over 20 years ago when I realized that, on certain subjects, even my educated guesses on certain subjects were, themselves, classified.  So don’t hold your breath waiting for me to get all speculate-y about the purpose of our Benghazi facility.  It either was or was-not a classified activity.  CAA doesn’t work that part of the world currently, isn’t read-onto anything related to the Benghazi facility, and reads many of the same open source articles that you do.  In the absence of any actual knowledge, I’m not going to guess in a public forum.).

Caveat #2 - CAA doesn’t know what the Benghazi facilities’ purpose was.  It might have been classified in nature, but that’s not terribly remarkable by itself either, even in a diplomatic facility.  Classifications and classified activities have to do with national security, which is not limited to military secrets but extends far beyond that to include much of the inside work of diplomacy and international relations.

Digression #2 - Another digression, this one about security classifications, national security, and diplomacy.  In the U.S. government, information is classified at one of three levels, depending upon the degree of damage to national security that its compromise or inadvertent release would cause.  “Unclassified” means simply that and isn’t, technically, a security classification.  The three levels of classification are Confidential. Secret, and Top Secret.

When it comes to deciding who gets to know what about classified matters, there are two principles employed:  level of access (i.e., security clearance) and need-to-know (NTK).  The second principle, when applied in a formal and regulated manner, is what gives us things like “codeword access,” “special access,” and “compartmented information.”

Backtrack a moment to the bit about damaging national security.  CAA isn’t going to go out on a laughably long limb and suggest that national security and security classifications have never been misused to avoid political embarrassment.  That assertion would be silly.

So let’s talk, briefly, about what security was provided in Benghazi before the 9/11/2012 attacks.

Physical security measures (walls, alarm systems, &tc.) required for U.S. diplomatic facilities are fully specced-out by existing law and regulation, in this instance Volume 5 of the 5 series Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH) or 12 FAH 5.  Whenever physical security doesn't meet those standards, someone at a very high level is on the hook for having signed a waiver or exception, either temporary or permanent.  Hindsight being 20-20, CAA isn't going to sharpshoot those decisions if the procedures themselves were followed, as the ARB (IIRC) suggests they were.

(For those interested in the topic of physical security as it applies to U.S. embassies, I recommend regular visits to The Skeptical Bureaucrat.  TSB worked in that field long before I ever came to it and remained in it long after CAA went off to the consular salt mines.)

But I will suggest that the standards and procedures, if they haven't been already, might need a fresh going-over in light of the Benghazi experience.  And here's why:

Back in the time period leading up to the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, physical security standards at individual embassies were different depending upon the security threat levels for terrorism in that particular country.  So, since Kenya was at that time a Low or Medium Threat (for terrorism) country, our embassy in Nairobi was only believed to require the security measures for a Low/Medium threat.

Nature abhors a vacuum, water flows downhill, and bad actors will seek out more vulnerable targets, whether they are pickpockets, rapists, or international terrorists.  The thing we hadn't yet internalized about international terrorists was just how international they were prepared to be.

So we changed how did things; security standards became more uniform and applied broadly around the world.  This made sense in a couple of other ways too.  Embassies and consulates are big-ticket items with working life-cycles many decades long.  I think a modern office building can expect at least a 60 year life cycle (figure on at least one renovation/refurbishment in that timeframe) and the sort of robust, purpose-built security architecture involved in our embassies probably extends that lifetime to something closer to a century.

So during a 60-100 year building life, it's not unreasonable to predict that security conditions and threat will fluctuate some, and it's really hard to make a building more robust and security decades after you built it.

CAA won't be around to see it, but I fully predict that many of our recently-constructed "fortress embassies" will outlast the countries in which we've built them.

Getting back to Benghazi, the DS bureau is probably taking a serious look at how physical standards were applied in Benghazi and considering whether it's time for another paradigm shift.

That's the physical security piece, in a nutshell.  As for requests for additional security officers (DS agents), DoD security details, and the like, clearly (in hindsight) some of post's requests for additional security should have been approved rather than disapproved or ignored.  Easy to say in hindsight and we've already seen a systemic change within DS as to how those sorts of requests are going to be handled in the future.  Greg Starr, the likely next DS assistant secretary is a retired RSO with long experience in this area and is someone who can, if others don't get in the way, be trusted to make needed changes.

As for those who made the wrong calls, I wouldn't want to be on the receiving end of the sort of Employee Efficiency Rating (EER) they're likely to get this year.  But a mistake in judgment is not the same as a crime.  Transfer or retirement may be the appropriate sanctions.

Now, today's testimony before Congress may have answered some questions (and raised even more) about what happened when, who made what decisions to act or refrain from action, and so forth.  The testimony went on for several hours so I expect the transcripts will amount to a considerable vein of information that will be mined extensively, and blogged-to-death, over the next few days.

Some CAA opinions:  First, CAA was never so embarrassed as an FSO as when then-SecState Clinton said:

"What difference, at this point, does it make?"

Up to that point, CAA (no Clinton partisan he) would honestly state that Sec. Clinton's tenure at the Department had not been so bad as he'd feared, that she had done some good things (her positive interest in the welfare of American citizens abroad was widely known and remarked-upon in consular circles), and that while some of her policy focus went beyond what's passed as traditional diplomacy (women's issues, LGBT, &tc.) that shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone.

That was then.  After her it-just-doesn't matter rant, I couldn't really say that anymore.  The true Clinton colors had been unfurled from mothballs and political viability and presidential electability was again the name of the game.

We shall see what we shall see, in the coming months and years.

re: "Ros-Lehtinen defends MEK as State Dept anger grows"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") provided an update on the unfolding PMOI/MEK situation.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department is growing increasing frustrated with the MEK and its American lobbyists, and now with two leading lawmakers who are injecting themselves into the cause of the Iranian dissident group.

Tensions between Foggy Bottom and supporters of the Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization opposed to the Iranian regime, have been building for months. The plan to relocate 3,200 members of the group from its compound in Iraq to a former U.S. military base appear stalled as the group lobbies to be taken off the list of terrorist organizations.

A federal court has ordered the State Department to make a decision on delisting the MEK by October, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has indicated that the group's willingness to complete the move to the former base, Camp Liberty, will be a key factor in the department's decision. State Department officials, however, now believe the MEK is stalling."

Stalling or otherwise playing for time is something the PMOI is very good at.

"Administration officials believe the MEK is getting bad advice and unhelpful support from its team of American advocates, some of whom are paid handsomely to advise the MEK and lobby the administration on its behalf (though all insist they are promoting the MEK's cause out of sincere conviction). The Treasury Department has opened an investigation into the funds paid to these activists, which often come from Iranian-American groups in the United States and are paid through a speakers' bureau."

That these Iranian-American groups are acting as proxies for the PMOI and other NCRI-related groups should be obvious.

"The MEK seems to believe it can keep control of Camp Ashraf, its longtime compound near the Iran-Iraq border, and Clinton will still be under pressure to delist the group, this official said."

Camp Ashraf is where they have their own facilities, radio station, museum, cemetary, and probably weapon caches as well. Moving to somewhere they haven't had years to prepare, and during which movement they could be searched or otherwise molested, is not on their list of preferences.

"This week, the MEK got the support of two new powerful Americans, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA). The pair are circulating a letter this week to Clinton asking her to improve the conditions in Camp Liberty for the MEK."

&

"(L)awmakers are requesting that the MEK residents in Camp Liberty be connected to the Iraqi main water system, be given more power generators, and be given new cars and trucks and other supplies. The administration official said that some of the requests are valid but the characterization of the conditions in Camp Liberty as "dreadful" is unfair.

"Really, are new cars a basic human right?" the official said."

Nice snark, but are they asking for new vehicles (note that they included both cars and trucks in their request) to replace old, wornout, destroyed, or confiscated ones? Just thought I'd ask....

7/18

re: "The exit is the strategy"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") judged by actions, not words.

Money quote(s):

"(B)oth the White House and Pentagon had been repeatedly emphasizing that negotiations with Iraq were ongoing, that no decision had been made. In truth, the decision was made even before Barack Obama was president: he got elected campaigning that Iraq was the wrong war, not worth the lives and money.

He did what he said he was going to do. He set an end date for combat operations so that he could show "progress" before the midterm elections. Progress not toward consolidating our gains in Iraq, but toward being out of Iraq. Having appointed special envoys for every problem he considered important, there was no special envoy for Iraq, to help build fostering regional relationships and coordinate our policies. He appointed an ambassador who knew nothing about Iraq."

Knowing "nothing about Iraq" is quite an achievement in itself, given the circumstances.

"(T)he withdrawal of troops is a lagging, not a leading indicator of the administration's indifference.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton continues to affirm our commitment to Iraq. The QDDR says "in Iraq, we are in the midst of the largest military-to-civilian transition since the Marshall Plan. Our civilian presence is prepared to take the lead, secure the military's gains, and build the institutions necessary for long-term stability." State grandiosely imagines a wholly civilian mission of 17,000 personnel most of whom will be "third country nationals" supporting 1,750 diplomats and other USG government personnel. Eighty percent of the mission will be contractors. Current plans call for them to operate at five consulates around the country, costing $6 billion a year.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting (including Shadow Government colleague Dov Zakheim), the Government Accountability Office and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee all take a dim view of State's plans for Iraq. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee assessed that "fundamental questions remain unanswered," including whether the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including State Department capacity. They question whether the State Department can sustain its proposed presence without military support and the cost effectiveness of consulates requiring 1,400 security and support personnel for only 120 diplomats. They recommended that if a complete withdrawal occurred, "given the prohibitive costs of security and the capacity limitations of the State Department, the United States should consider a less ambitious diplomatic presence in Iraq." This is likely to end badly."

CAA's formula for right-sizing the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq is akin to what most after-action-reviews of the RMS Titanic's sinking would include: only have as many passengers and crew as you have lifeboat capacity for.

"Members of Congress could be forgiven for wondering why should we provide $5 billion to Iraq in a time of austerity when the Iraqis are so ungrateful. The Wartime Contracting Commission's conclusion that "significant additional waste -- and mission degradation to the point of failure -- can be expected as State continues with the daunting task of transition in Iraq," will also tighten Congressional purse-strings, as it should."

10/22

re: "Clinton asks Kerry for help on budget"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") was following the back-and-forth at budget request time.

Money quote(s):

"Clinton called the Senate's allocation of $42 billion for State and USAID in 2012 "reasonable," but warned that deeper cuts in the House's proposal would force State to shutter some overseas posts and reduce the number of civilians working in conflict areas, as well as result in the U.S. government "turning our backs on the world's hungry and sick."

The State Department and the development NGO community have been focusing on the idea that the diplomacy and development budgets comprise less than 1 percent of federal spending."

Bearing in mind that foreign affairs is one of the powers and responsibilities for which the federal government is specifically charged by the U.S. Constitution, it can reasonably be asked by this is such a small percentage of the budget.

Setting aside percentages and pretending that this budget sufficient to the task, a reasonable person might question what the other 99+ percent of the budget entails, and if it's going for things that are appropriately the duty of the federal government to fund.

10/17

re: "Reclaiming State Department Clarity on Jihad and Sharia"

Andrew G. Bostom at American Thinker ("a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans") had harsh criticism for the State Department.

Money quote(s):

"Islam's defining doctrine of jihad war against non-Muslims, and resultant 14 centuries of sanguinary imperialism, and accompanying acts of terrorism, through the present, notwithstanding, ad nauseum contemporary State Department pronouncements re-affirm what Muslim propagandists insist--that the creed is an enlightened pacifism.

Glaring examples of this corrosive State Department apologetic on Islam have been provided by the two most recent Secretaries of State, Condoleeza Rice, and the current Secretary, Hillary Clinton." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Mr. Bostom provided some examples before continuing.

"(O)bsequious pandering to Islam--despite the daily confirmed, abject failure of these efforts to provide any strategic benefit to the US--was not always enshrined State Department "policy."

Edward A. Van Dyck, then US Consular Clerk at Cairo, Egypt, prepared a detailed report in August 1880 on the history of the treaty arrangements (so-called "capitulations") between the Muslim Ottoman Empire, European nations, and the much briefer US-Ottoman experience. Van Dyck's report--written specifically as a tool for State Department diplomats--opens with an informed, pellucid, and remarkably compendious explanation of jihad and Islamic law (Sharia):

In all the many works on Mohammedan law no teaching is met with that even hints at those principles of political intercourse between nations, that have been so long known to the peoples of Europe, and which are so universally recognized by them. "Fiqh," as the science of Moslem jurisprudence is called, knows only one category of relation between those who recognize the apostleship of Mohammed and all others who do not, namely Djehad [jihad[; that is to say, strife, or holy war. Inasmuch as the propagation of Islam was to be the aim of all Moslems, perpetual warfare against the unbelievers, in order to convert them, or subject them to the payment of tribute, came to be held by Moslem doctors [legists] as the most sacred duty of the believer. This right to wage war is the only principle of international law which is taught by Mohammedan jurists; ...with the Arabs the term harby [harbi] (warrior) expresses not only an unbeliever but also an enemy; and jehady [jihadi] (striver, warrior) means the believer-militant. From the Moslem point of view, the whole world is divided into two parts--"the House of Islam," and the House of War;" out of this division has arisen the other popular dictum of the Mohammednas (sic) that "all kinds of unbelievers from but one people." "

Jihad and Islam aren't something new, after all. Pres. Jefferson found it necessary to educate himself as to the facts due to the depredations of the Barbary pirates against U.S. shipping (and naval vessels).

"We are in desperate need of a strong new Secretary of State willing to purge the State Department of all those dogmatically inculcating such counterfactual, delusive Islamophilia. Diplomats possessed of--or at least receptive to learning--Van Dyck's unapologetic wisdom, must be recruited and installed if we are to survive the violent and non-violent jihad being waged against the US. America employed such informed, clear-eyed patriotic diplomats in the past; we need them now more than ever before."

Sec. Clinton has indicated at least once that she intends her tenure to last no longer than the current president's first term. So regardless of the electoral results this November, we can expect a new secstate sometime within the next 12 months, give or take.

5/12

re: "Freedom vs Slavery: Ros-Lehtinen vs. Clinton"

Pamela Geller at Atlas Shrugs (" Evil is made possible by the sanction you give it. Withdraw your sanction. ") remarked on the chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Money quote(s):

"The UN is, at best, the collective negation of humanity. The reality is that it has become the headquarters of the modern universal caliphate, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The American people are funding this supremacist monster. The backroom drama over this funding is heating up between Hillary Clinton and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is trying to get Bill H.R. 282 passed in Congress to de-fund the parasitic world body"

The U.N. encompasses quite a bit of programmatic territory, some good, some not-so-good, some downright counter-productive.

"Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is one of the great unsung heroes in what is otherwise a cesspool of spineless, feckless political hacks. She is unmatched in her pursuit of freedom."

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen has been making her mark with her outspoken support of various foreign policy objectives for quite some time. And now she's in a position to really do something about them.

10/17

re: "The kind of world Secretary Clinton wants to see"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") dissected the SecState's remarks on soft power.

Money quote(s):

"America's Secretary of State gave a stunning interview this week, in which she defended the Obama administration's foreign policy choices and claimed that soft power was working to reshape America's image in the world. It was a deeply discouraging insight into the philosophy that guides the administration."

Naturally enough, the Secretary supports the administration's "foreign policy choices." That is, after all, part of her job. If she didn't support them, then she's not the right person for the job.

"Clinton is right that the United States has allowed responsibilities to accrue to us that many states benefit from, and that a more evenly distributed burden sharing arrangement would be preferable."

The catch is that some of those who are best-positioned to share "a more evenly distributed burden sharing arrangement" may be either uninterested in doing so or have different notions of their national responsibilities (and interests).

"(A)dvancing America's cause in the world has always been hugely enhanced by the view that whatever our national failings, we stand for freedom and believe ourselves safest when other people also live in freedom."

That view has the utterly charming (and refreshing) virtue of being based on the truth.

"When pressed on whether the administration should demand that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad step down, Clinton replied: "where we are is where we need to be, where it is a growing international chorus of condemnation...I am a big believer in results over rhetoric." But what are the results of our Syria policy? Is what is happening in Syria really the outcome we should want? "

This was written last August. It could have been written yesterday.

"(I)f American soft power were working, wouldn't attitudes toward the United States be improving? Favorability ratings -- especially in the Middle East and South Asia -- have actually declined from where they were during the Bush administration. Wouldn't governments be more inclined to support our policies? Crucial test cases should be Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq -- all of which are less cooperative with the Obama administration than they were with the Bush administration."

&

"That's quite a breathtaking world view for the chief diplomat of the world's most powerful country. We are unimportant in the global debate about freedom and governance, but Saudi Arabia and Turkey have standing.

On one issue Secretary Clinton was unmistakeably correct: "it's not going to be any news if the United States says Assad needs to go." Yesterday, the White House finally issued a statement that Assad should go. And it appears to have exactly the impact Secretary Clinton anticipated: nothing. But doesn't that refute her assertions that soft power and the Obama administration's approach are working?"

8/19

re: "A Humanitarian Catastrophe at Ashraf Spells Political Catastrophe for the White House"

Henrick Hermansson at American Thinker ("a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans") outlined the problem.

Money quote(s):

"U.S. troops are set to completely withdraw from Iraq on the 31st of December. That is also the date for another more ominous deadline: al-Maliki's government has ordered what looks to be a bloody attack on innocent political refugees on that very same day, despite strong condemnations from human rights groups, parliamentarians, and journalists from around the world. Maliki's order to empty Camp Ashraf, which will no doubt lead to a massacre, came after his meeting with the Iranian leader Khamenei. Dispersion of the camp residents no doubt will resemble what happened to the Jewish community during the Second World War.

The attack will target the 3,400 residents of Ashraf, or "Camp New Iraq," who are Iranian political dissidents hated by Iraq's powerful neighbor. The camp has been attacked by Iraqi forces twice before, once in April this year and once in 2009, and in total more than 47 of the civilian residents were killed -- either shot or run over by armored vehicles. At present the camp is inhumanely blockaded by Iraqi troops who prevent medical and other vital supplies, journalists, human rights groups, and parliamentarians from entering."

The deadline has obviously passed, without (yet) tragic results for Camp Ashraf's inhabitants.

Sec. Clinton has deputized Amb. Daniel Fried to lead U.S. efforts on resolving this issue and in a U.N.-brokered compromise with the al-Maliki government, the residents of Camp Ashraf will be moved to the former Camp Liberty, where their situation can be monitored by both UNHCR and U.S. Embassy personnel.

See Amb. Fried's presser here.

"The residents of the camp have a complicated history. They fled Iran after tens of thousands of political dissidents were executed by the Khomeini regime in the eighties. They were welcomed in Iraq, which, with the support of Western governments, was at war with Iran. Most of the residents have lived in or near Ashraf now for a quarter-century and have built lives, schools, and a beautiful mosque there. They were also integral in revealing the Iranian secret nuclear facilities. As a source of inspiration, they are important to the "Persian Spring." All in all, this is more than enough to put them on the regime's death list.

The residents also have a complicated history with the U.S. In 1997, as a gesture of goodwill to the "moderate" Khatami government in Iran, the U.S. put the residents (or rather the organization many of them belong to) on the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations, without any factual basis. In the EU and Britain, courts have declared terror designations of this organization "perverse" and removed them. Despite a federal court ruling ordering the designation to be reviewed, the removal process is being stalled for political reasons in the U.S. by the State Department. At the same time, the residents of Ashraf have been protected by and had very good relationships with U.S. troops, been designated as protected persons by the U.S. under the fourth Geneva Convention, and have been declared U.S. allies by chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FBI directors, and other prominent members of the intelligence community."

With all due respect to Mr. Hermansson, some of the above isn't exactly the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

1. "They fled Iran after tens of thousands of political dissidents were executed by the Khomeini regime in the eighties." They fled Iran after the Revolution (which they participated in as allies of Khomeini, including, possibly, the U.S. embassy takeover) and the mullahs started purifying the new regime (as one does). They may even have started the fighting between the Khomeini regime and their particular faction, being rather fond of explosive and other violent forms of assassinations at the time.

2. "They were welcomed in Iraq, which, with the support of Western governments, was at war with Iran." They were welcomed by Saddam Hussein's regime, which used them as loyal shock troops to put down revolts by, among others, the Kurds. With Saddam gone, they don't have a lot of friends left in Iraq.

3. "As a source of inspiration, they are important to the "Persian Spring." " That's wish-fulfillment fantasy talk. There was never any indication that the protesters who filled the streets took any inspiration from the PMOI/MEK. If anything, the mullahcracy seems to have been successful in painting the PMOI/MEK as traitors to Iran, due mostly to the PMOI/MEK's own actions in fighting against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

4. "In 1997, as a gesture of goodwill to the "moderate" Khatami government in Iran, the U.S. put the residents (or rather the organization many of them belong to) on the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations, without any factual basis." While CAA takes a backseat to none in questioning the timing of the decision to list the PMOI/MEK, they have done what they have done, fully meriting their place on said list.

5. "Despite a federal court ruling ordering the designation to be reviewed, the removal process is being stalled for political reasons in the U.S. by the State Department." Placement, and removal, of an organization on the State Department's terrorist organizations list follows a protocol, subject to periodic review. CAA had a chat, last year, with one of the people who had previously been charged with conducting that review and didn't come away thinking that the process had been politicized.

6. "At the same time, the residents of Ashraf have been protected by and had very good relationships with U.S. troops, been designated as protected persons by the U.S. under the fourth Geneva Convention, and have been declared U.S. allies by chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FBI directors, and other prominent members of the intelligence community." Camp Ashraf's PMOI/MEK inhabitants took great care and pains with what we used to call their "charm offensive" to ingratiate themselves to the U.S. troops assigned to their protection. This doesn't by itself make them bad people (assassinating U.S. personnel in Iran before the Revolution will suffice on the organizational level to earn that classification), nor does, necessarily, being enemies of America's enemies (i.e., the "evil mullah regime" in Iran) make them good people. Their entitlement, based upon my own close reading of the Laws of Land Warfare, to Protected status doesn't hinge upon them good or bad people. Lastly, the JCS, FBI, and the IC don't get to decide who are U.S. allies (or not).

"The residents of Ashraf enjoy as wide bipartisan support as any issue in Washington today."

True enough. And CAA would view them much more sympathetically, given how long ago the PMOI/MEK's anti-U.S. violance took place, if they'd simply own up to it (at long last) and stop with the denials.

12/18

re: "Honduran president: America is our No. 1 ally"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") brings us up to date on Honduras.

Money quote(s):

"Back in 2009, the State Department sided strongly with former President Manuel Zelaya, who was seized by the military and taken out of Honduras in what some called a coup. Zelaya snuck back into Honduras in September 2009 and holed up in the Brazilian embassy while the Obama administration worked to restore him to power.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even met with Zelaya in Washington, suspended aid to Honduras, and revoked the visas of Honduran officials. Later, Honduras was cut off from Millennium Challenge Corporation assistance.

Eventually, it became apparent that the de facto regime in Tegucigalpa, led by Roberto Micheletti, was winning the internal struggle and that new elections would take place. The administration began shifting its position in October 2009 and finally threw Zelaya under the bus when Lobo won the election and Zelaya rejected a deal that would have returned him temporarily to power."

Thus demonstrating that even U.S. foreign policy has a learning curve and can, eventually, recognize a mistake.

"Most U.S. trade and assistance to Honduras has been restored, although they are still not able to receive grants from the MCC."

10/5

re: "Hillary Clinton has serious concerns about Russia's parliamentary election vote. I have serious concerns about State."

Pundita ("US foreign policy for the 21st Century") enumerates her concerns about the State Dept.'s polities in Afghanistan.

She lists six concerns.

Her damning conclusion:

"If State argues it can't be held responsible because it doesn't write U.S. foreign policy and military strategy -- what kind of policy is it, what kind of strategy can it be called, when you're aware that your government knowingly pays another to murder and maim the very troops sworn to protect your life and your nation? This is not a policy or strategy issue. This is about demonstrating baseline human decency, as did the British military officers who resigned their commands to protest their government's betrayal of British troops in Afghanistan.

So I'd say that at this juncture the Secretary of State should be less concerned about human rights abuses in Russia and more concerned about the conduct of the agency she heads. The conduct has helped make a mockery of human rights in Afghanistan and the United States and specifically in the treatment of Americans serving tours of duty in Afghanistan and the Afghans serving in their country's military. And that's not even mentioning the mayhem that State has helped unleash on Pakistan."

Frankly, CAA would be reluctant to credit mayhem unleashed in Pakistan to anyone other than the Pakistanis themselves.

12/5

re: "Can Kerry save the State Department on the “supercommittee”?"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") asked a very important question.

Money quote(s):

"Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA) will be on the "supercommittee" that's charged with slashing government spending, but will he use that power to rescue the State Department from its looming budget nightmare?"

The world waits.

"Kerry, who always denies he is jockeying to replace Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she steps down (probably after the 2012 election), certainly looks like the leading candidate for the post. He has traveled frequently to hotspots like Afghanistan and Pakistan on behalf of the administration, led the push for Senate ratification of New START nuclear arms reductions, and is beginning a new push to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. He even toed the administration's line that the war in Libya does not amount to hostilities.

The State Department, meanwhile, is preparing for what could be its worst budget year in a very long time. After two years of budget increases during the Obama administration, the dire fiscal situation has placed diplomacy and development funding on the chopping block. In April, the Obama administration voluntarily cut $8 billion from the State Department budget as part of the deal to avoid a government shutdown."

Sen. Kerry certainly seems, at least in the major media, to be a leading candidate to succeed Sec. Clinton if and when she decides she's spent enough years heading-up the State Dept. But presidents sometimes surprise with their appointments. And by "sometimes" I mean most-of-the-time.

(Well, at least I'm always surprised.)

"Whether Kerry is able to stand up for diplomacy and aid funding, in opposition to his GOP counterparts, will determine the functionality of the State Department he one day hopes to lead. "

(8/9)

re: "Is Obama doubling down on a risky gamble in Iraq?"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") had questions about that murky interface between military and national strategy, where political leaders do their decision-making.

Money quote(s):

"According to several unnamed sources, military commanders are "livid" with President Obama's decision to authorize a plan that is resourced at a fraction of the level that the military considered to be the minimum -- and even that minimum would only work "in extremis." Obama's approach appears to involve several multiples of risk beyond what the military consider prudent. Reportedly, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for a level of resources above what Obama appears to have authorized.

Reasonable people can disagree whether it makes national security sense for Obama to adopt such a risky path. For my part, I wish he had invested more effort in the Iraq file, especially working more closely with Prime Minister Maliki to push the process towards an outcome that is more favorable to American (and, I would argue, Iraqi national) interests.

The part that mystifies me is why his team thinks it makes political sense to have taken this course. His administration has already pocketed as much political benefit as there is to be wrung from Bush's surge -- and the media has generously refrained from pointing out that whatever positive developments came in Iraq came because of policies Obama and Biden tried strenuously to thwart in 2007. Given that the administration has already claimed Iraq as a great achievement, why take so risky a course now, one that could result in a great unraveling during the presidential campaign?"

The subtext here is the assumption that elected political leaders (or at least this elected political leader) make their big decisions based upon their personal calculus of electoral politics; rather than, say, the national good.

"The cost savings of denying the military the resources they say they need is trivial compared to the stakes. For that matter, the amount of time and effort it would have taken Obama to invest in Iraq policy so as to achieve greater progress with Maliki was probably trivial, too. Yet it seems that when it comes to Iraq, Obama is determined to do whatever is less than the minimum. "

Bug? Or feature?

9/7

re: "Obama to reduce Iraq strength to 3,000, lose election… "

Moe Lane at RedState ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") is crystal-balling some crystal-balling.

Money quote(s):

"(S)et up the bank shot in 2016 for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton"

Since this post, the target troop strength for the end of this year has dropped another couple of zeros, to (essentially) nothing. The primary official U.S. presence by 2012 in Iraq will be the State Dept. mission there. This actually would seem to put the "blame line" firmly on Sec. Clinton's desk, should anything not go spectacularly well.

(Does anyone actually, seriously, forecast things going spectularly well in Iraq after our withdrawel?)

This would seem to defeat the purpose in setting up a bank shot for her.

(Unless it was a double bank shot intended to sink her.)

"(T)his would work as a long term strategy. Accept that the election’s lost, set up a disaster for the Republican President to inherit and take the blame for, and put the one brave truth-teller in position to come over in 2016 and save the day. It’s not optimal, but then it’s going to take a couple of years for the Democrats to fix everything that Obama’s done to their party. They might as well sabotage things for the GOP in the meantime."

It's not that political strategists can't/don't plan this far ahead, but this is shading past strategizing into the realm of conspiracy.

(Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity and incompetence.)

(9/6)

re: "Hillary Clinton Questions Congress’s Patriotism Over Libya"

Jeff Emanuel at Redstate didn't think much of the secstate's question either.

Money quote(s):

"As the two houses of Congress debate resolutions that run the gamut from authorizing and limiting President Obama’s Libya action to defunding the Libya war altogether, and as the NATO begins to complement its ineffectiveness with internal discord, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is questioning her former legislative colleagues’ patriotism.

“Who’s side are you on?” she demanded today, lashing out at Congress while on an official visit to Jamaica"

Read the whole thing here.

re: "Hillary Clinton to Libya skeptics: ‘Whose side are you on?’"

Bryan Preston at The PJ Tatler ("To pull off the disguises of cunning, vanity, and affectation.") has some criticism of our secstate.


Money quote(s):


"(T)he Secretary of State is asking Congress, which is mostly just trying to remind the administration that it doesn’t have imperial powers to go to war whenever and wherever it feels like and no matter the cost or implications to national security, “Whose side are you on?” Way to bring people together, top diplomat!"

Politics ain't bean-bag. And this is/was politics.

_____

Hat tip to Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit ("the intersection between advanced technologies and individual liberty").

re: "Errors Were Made"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") posted as good a recap of why this is important as any I have seen.

Money quote(s):

"In the era of the Soviets, reforms were quietly enacted by bureaucrats with the concession that “errors had been made” by their predecessors. It was a nifty way for current party apparatchiks to distance themselves from policies that had resulted in the death of millions, while attempting to reassure citizens that things were now in good hands.

Of course, the new gang would end up being pretty much the old gang, and errors would continue to be be made by the nomenklatura."

All that studying on the habits and habitats of our onetime enemies is still paying off. Nomenklatura indeed!

"(T)he Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms – which many wags have said ought more to be a privately owned convenience chain than a federal office – allowed the sale of AK-47s through known gun runners to Mexico in order to round up the “big fish” south of the border, irrespective of how many “little fish” had to pay with their lives." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

"(T)hings got serious when US Border Patrol agent Brian Terry was killed by a weapon sold to southron drug cartels by agents of the US government.

It’s hard, in modern times, to imagine a policy more deliberately amoral."

As they say, it's all fun and games until somebody (on our side) gets hurt. Of course, if your agents and employees are just pawns, you know, the sort of people who didn't go to the right schools, then eggs and omelets, right?

"(S)enior US officials – including SecState Hillary Clinton – were using the reality of such activity as an ostensible reason to burden the legal purchases of firearms to law abiding US citizens.

Hanlon’s Razor applies: “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.”"

Hard to believe Sec. Clinton, who is way too smart to be tarred by this brush, would have been stupid enough to become incriminated, er, involved. If you follow the embedded link you find that her statement had much more to do with drugs than with guns.

re: " diminished president, a diminished global power"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") shared some observations from Singapore.

Money quote(s):

"Traveling abroad is a great opportunity to look at American foreign policy and politics with fresh eyes. And this time, with the debt ceiling debate receiving prominent attention in every corner of the globe, the effect was especially vivid."

How so?

"(W)hen I talk with government insiders, people with actual experience dealing with the U.S. government (as opposed to watching it on BBC and the Daily Show), there is often a quietly expressed nostalgia for earlier administrations -- even, gasp, the Bush administration. A grudging consensus appears to be emerging"

How can this be?

"(Interestingly, my interlocutors are much quicker to give Secretary Clinton strong marks. They seem to attribute any good things to her and any bad things to the president.)

Yet the parameters of the debate were further damaging to our global leadership. The choice appeared to be between, on the one hand, joining the ranks of bankrupt failed states who default on their financial obligations or, on the other hand, drastically slashing those parts of the government budget that are most crucial to our global role (defense and international operations). There were few voices, on either side of the aisle, making the case for adequately funding these key pillars of American power and the inference that many would draw seems inescapable: Americans are heeding the siren song of isolationism and global retreat. No one I talked to wanted to see the United States walk any further along this path. But few were confident we could or would reverse course soon."

It's fascinating how Sec. Clinton (or "S" in FSO-speak) has politically managed to both be part of the administration and not tarred with the brush of its problems. My admiration for her political chops increases nearly daily.