re: "In Other News: Brits Now Helping to Dispose of Iraqi WMDs that Never Existed in the First Place"

Emperor Misha I at the Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler ("HQ of the Rottweiler Empire. An Affiliate of the VRWC.") noted a change in the accepted wisdom that caused nary a ripple.

Money quote(s):

"On a related, but rarely explored (by the DNCMedia) note, we keep hearing concerns about Assad using WMDs against the rebels, concerns based on him threatening to do so himself, yet we somehow barely ever hear about anybody wondering where on Earth he got those WMDs from. It’s as if they just popped into existence caused by an Expert Level “Create WMD” spell or something.

Which reminds His Imperial Viciousness of something that a lot of us “fundamentally unserious” conservatives were harping on about years and years ago rather than just accepting the leftist memes like good “pragmatic conservatives” are supposed to do lest we be branded Visigoths or something, namely that satellite surveillance showed a strange and rather large number of convoys traveling from Iraq into Syria’s Bekaa Valley for no apparent reason during Bush’s 18 month “rush” to war against poor innocent brown people." (Emphasis in original post. - CAA.)

This is something that has bothered CAA for years. WMDs (which chemical weapons most certainly are) don't just conjure themselves into being.

And to see the swift metamorpheses of Assad from axis-of-evil to reliable-partner and back to WMD-equipped-despot evokes echoes of Saddam's similar transmogrifications. WTF?

7/31

re: "Andrew McCarthy: Gingrich Has It Right On Our 'Imperial' Courts"

GW at Wolf Howling commented on some proposed Constitutional tinkering.

Money quote(s):

"Conservatives have been shaking their fists impotently at the Courts for their judicial activism - their Poliburo like unilateral amendments to the Constitution working fundamental changes to our nation - for the past fifty years. Heretofore, the only solution to the problem was thought to be electing Presidents who will appoint judges grounded in originalism. That has been less than successful. Enter Newt Gingrich, who has completely changed the paradigm on this critical issue. He wants to make a systemic fix that will permanently restore the Constitutional balance between the three branches of our government as such balance was envisioned by the Founders."

So, what's this all about?

"Andrew McCarthy, reviews Newt Gingrich's plan to redress the balance."

GW concluded:

"Correcting this vast overreach by our Courts over the past half century, restoring the balance to that envisioned by our Founders, is crucial for the future of our nation."

12/21

re: "More EUro Alarmism"

Emperor Misha I at the Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler ("HQ of the Rottweiler Empire. An Affiliate of the VRWC.") welcomed some remarks by Angela Merkel.

Money quote(s):

"German chancellor Angela Merkel very reasonably warned that if the EUropeon FAIL continues much longer, Europe may find itself in serious shit."

&

"(A)dd one source claiming that Germany has already issued orders to start printing Deutschmarks again instead of the laughably moronic “Euros” in “preparation for a possible withdrawal from the EU” and you have the beginnings of a full court press panic."

CAA still has a few DM (bills and change) rattling around the CAA-cave, come to think of it.

"Merkel is only stating the obvious, after all. If the whole Marxist Utopian nonsense collapses, which is will as inevitably as night follows day, Europe is going to be a clusterfuck and it will be every man to himself" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

EM1 is talking about more than just the unraveling of the "common currency," but then it's not irrational to believe that an Euro devolution would be just that and no more.

What's that rule about "you can't just do one thing"?

(Something to do with "unintended consequences.")

"What’s Germany, or any other European country, supposed to do if that happens?

....go down with the Marxist Titanic or try to fulfill their obligations to their own citizens and do what they have to do to survive?

Just exactly when did Greek public employees become entitled to the fruits of German, or any other workers’ labors?" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

That's the question that Germans (and others) are asking themselves. The answer seems to be (mumble, mumble, mumble) "solidarity"!

"If Europe collapses and the socialist hordes descend like the vermin they are to rape the few remaining European nations who still retain a sense of responsibility and our nation sides with the socialist locusts, I’ll burn my passport and take the next flight out to join the 21st century equivalent of the Escadrille Lafayette.

The only good socialist is a dead one."

10/27

re: "Your masters are not in Brussels, Gen. Dempsey"

Pundita ("US foreign policy for the 21st Century") cautioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Money quote(s):

"If you think a person is crazy, what use is it to attempt to reason with him? However, I don't know whether the chairman is actually crazy, or just doing a good imitation whenever he discusses Pakistan -- a mental blip that seems to manifest in all ranking members of the U.S. military who hold forth on Pakistan whenever they get in front of a microphone.

But despite my discomfort I should like to point out that while the U.S. military is under civilian control, this doesn't mean it's supposed to be under the control of civilians in foreign nations, even NATO ones." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

And yet.... going all the way back to World War I, the U.S. has had to learn to work within alliances, with its allies, even when it's leading said alliances.

Having said that, prior to NATO, all of the United State's alliances were fairly short-term ones.

Perhaps such long-term familiarity blurs our own clarity of mission.

"I can't find a sound rationale for U.S. commanders basing their war planning on the geopolitical machinations and business concerns of European, Turkish and Canadian governments. This, in my view, is taking the 'You gotta have a gang' mentality too far.

I confess I've been particularly concerned about the gang mentality since February 2010, when AFP reported that NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasumssen had floated the idea of NATO becoming "the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues -- even issues on which the alliance might never take action." "

&

"(Y)ou know how it is, when people seek to assure you about something that hadn't even occurred to you before. Not to be unkind, but NATO demonstrated in Afghanistan that it can't fight its way out of a paper bag. All that NATO seems to excel at in the military sphere is carpet bombing. So I certainly hope it's not entertaining the idea of becoming a global constabulary -- one that takes its political guidance from Brussels, no less."

7/30

re: "The Scourge of Clientitis"

CAROLINE GLICK re-posted a Jerusalem Post article at Big Peace.

Money quote(s):

"For many years, observers of the US State Department on both sides of the American political spectrum have agreed that State Department officials suffer from a malady referred to as "clientitis." Clientitis is generally defined as a state of mind in which representatives of an organization confuse their roles.

Rather than advance the cause of their organization to outside organizations, they represent the interests of outside organizations to their own organizations."

As Ms. Glick correctly observed, the accusation of "clientitis" is not exactly new.

CAA was just a young(er) junior FSO, still in orientation, the first time he heard the story of the "Schultz test."

("Twenty years ago, the then Secretary of State George Schultz used to welcome the Reagan administration’s ambassadorial appointments to his office and invite each chap to identify his country on the map. The guy who’d just landed the embassy in Chad would invariably point to Chad. ‘No,’ Schultz would say, ‘this is your country’ — and point to the United States." - Mark Steyn via Ed Driscoll.com)

That's a very good point to make to new FSOs. In intelligence work, the caution is to "don't fall in love with your source." In other words, keep your objectivity and remember who you work for.

The hazard is especially pernicious because part of a diplomat's job is to serve as a conduit for communication from the client (or target).

"Diplomats who speak to foreign government officials on a daily basis often simply ignore the context in which these foreigners operate. They become friends with their interlocutors and forget that the latter are also agents of their governments tasked with promoting foreign interests in their dealings with US diplomats."

It can happen. Part of the context in which a diplomat operates is that the whole point of face-to-face diplomacy is establishing personal connections and relationships with foreigners, official or otherwise.

"Since the scourge of clientitis among diplomats is widely recognized, governments are often able to consider its impact on diplomats when they weigh the credibility or wisdom of recommendations presented by their professional diplomats.

LESS WELL recognized and therefore largely unconsidered is how clientitis has negatively impacted the positions of military commanders.

Clientitis first became prevalent in the US Armed Forces and the IDF in the 1990s. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Clinton administration began transforming in earnest the US armed forces' role from war fighting to nation building."

&

"Since September 11, 2011, the US military has vastly expanded its nation building roles around the world. US military commanders are promoted more for prowess in acting as diplomats-in-uniform than for their capacity to train and employ soldiers to kill and defeat the enemy. Commanders deployed to train the al-Qaida-infested Yemeni or Afghan militaries; liaise with the Hizbullah-dominated Lebanese Armed Forces; or train the Iranian-penetrated Iraqi military have little personal incentive to warn against these missions.

So, too, in working with their local counterparts on a daily basis, like their State Department colleagues, these US military officers have a marked tendency to ignore the broader context in which their local colleagues operate. And so, like their civilian colleagues at the US embassies in these countries, military commanders have a tendency to become the representatives of their foreign counterparts to the Pentagon and to Congress."

Again, concomitant with their "diplomats-in-uniform" role, military commanders working with local colleagues are supposed to serve as conduits for information, and communication, between those local colleagues and their own governments.

(Of course, that shouldn't be their sole function.)

"THE IDEA that governments gain leverage over other governments by assisting them is not a new one. And it is certainly true. However, in all cases, the leverage gained by assisting foreign governments owes entirely to the other governments' understanding that such assistance can and will be ended if they fail to meet certain benchmarks of behavior that are dictated from the outset.

Once a government's threat of aid cut-off to another government is removed or is no longer credible, then the leverage the provision of aid afforded that government is lost."

Ayup. Just like negotiating a treaty or other agreement: if you're not willing to walk away from the table, then you're a hostage, not a diplomat.

"Proof that a state's ability to leverage its foreign aid owes entirely to the credibility of a threat to cut off that aid came earlier this month in the aftermath of UNESCO's decision to grant full state membership to "Palestine." Due to US law, the Obama administration had no choice but to cut off all US funding to UNESCO in response to the move. As a consequence, the PLO's bid to gain full membership in other UN institutions has floundered.

Not wishing to suffer UNESCO's fate, no other UN institutions are willing to repeat UNESCO's action. And so the Palestinians' great victory at UNESCO has become a Pyrrhic one. "

The U.S. doesn't pay for as much of the UN as the average American citizen probably thinks (75-100 percent?), but it's still a very significant amount, somewhere between 20-30 percent. The threatened withholding of which would certainly tend to focus the attention of UN staffers whose salaries are paid from member countries' assessments.

"(B)ecause the law is not subject to interpretation, US leverage over the UN actually increased in the aftermath of the UNESCO vote. Recognizing that actions have consequences, other UN agencies have buried plans of granting membership to "Palestine.""

Bureaucracies can learn. (Just like mules.)

"Governments must give due consideration to the positions of their professional diplomats and military commanders as well as to those of allied countries when they weigh various policy options. But while doing so, legislators and policymakers must also take into account the built-in biases influencing the judgment of these professionals. Clientitis is a serious impediment to good judgment. And it is found wherever professionals are charged with building relationships, rather than achieving concrete goals."

That's true as far as it goes, but policymakers and other elected/appointed officials would do well not wholly discount the counsel of their on-the-ground representatives.

11/23

re: "State Spreads Obama Book Plague Worldwide"

Jack Cashill at American Thinker (" a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans ") noted a State Department procurement.

Money quote(s):

"(W)e learn that out State Department will be spending $70,000 we don't have to stock "key libraries" around the world with copies of Barack Obama's books, most notably his 1995 memoir, Dreams from My Father.

There are problems with this scenario beyond the fact that we will have to borrow the money from the People's Republic to pay for them. For one, Obama gets a cut out of that action. This has to violate some law, if not lots of them."

Not being an attorney, CAA can't comment on the legality of the thing.

CAA would note having seen, as the Washington Times article described, copies of one or another of the president's books being given as gratuities (i.e., gifts).

That sort of thing makes me cringe at least as much as hearing otherwise sober and thoughtful diplomats blather on about global warming, &tc.

10/26

Remembering SSG Rick Eaton

About Staff Sgt. Richard Eaton Jr:

Staff Sgt. Richard Eaton was awarded the Bronze Star for his service during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to numerous other medals and citations, Staff Sgt Eaton received the Thomas G. Knowlton Award from the Military Intelligence Corps Association which recognizes those individuals who have significantly contributed to the promotion of Army Intelligence. For more information about Staff Sgt. Rick Eaton, please visit: http://www.chinapost1.org/divisions/korea/Eaton.htm or

http://www.militarycity.com/valor/256727.html.

re: "Is the United States a Militaristic Imperialists Nation?"

TOWNIE 76 at OP-FOR examined the continued usefulness of regional combatant commands.

Money quote(s):

"Several weeks ago, Tom Dispatch published an extended article on the shadow war in Africa. In part it questioned why the United States military has divided the world into six fiefdoms or Combatant Commands."

Note to State Dept. readers: don't click on any of the Tom Dispatch links since you'll just get one of those scary "wikileaks" warning notices.

"The short answer is they are a continuation of our division of the world during World War II into Theaters of War. In fact they are often referred to as Theaters by today’s military. But that is not the sole reason. The United States being the dominate Western partner in our Cold War against global communism required the ability to establish priorities for the employment of our military. Lastly, today’s Combatant Commands and the defined power of the Commander[1], is an outgrowth of the debacle that was Grenada and Lebanon in the early 80’s. In the case of Grenada it was each service Chief adding their forces to the mix resulting in a Cluster Firetruck. In the case of Lebanon it was the failure of United State European Command to accept responsibility of the bombing in Beirut that left countless Marines dead. As a result in the Goldwater-Nichols Act the power of the services over operational matters was severely constrained and the Combatant Commanders were ultimately responsible for determining which military capabilities were required for a specific operation."

Townie76 noted three consequences of the above, including these two:

"(T)he Combatant Commanders have become de Facto Pro Counsels (sic) for their respective Regional Commands. In many cases they are the representatives of the United States Government who have the most exposure in their particular Theater. As such Military Power has become the dominat (sic) element of the United States National Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.)

Second, the Department of Defense regional division of the world differs from the Department of State regional division of the world. Thus the Department of State Regional Director for Near East must coordinate diplomatic activities in two Combatant Commanders Areas of Responsibility (Africa Command and Central Command). More importantly, while attempted with Africa Command, there is generally no high ranking member of the Foreign Service within the Headquarters of the Regional Combatant Commands. The only presence in the Regional Combatant Commands is the Political Advisor who is a Senior Member of the Foreign Service but from my experience has little influence inside the State Department."

The morphing of military commanders into imperial proconsuls is a criticism that's been leveled before, going back many years. Combatant commanders used to be called commanders-in-chief until the point was made, forcibly, that under the Constitution there is only one commander-in-chief.

Political advisors, despite their relatively high rank within the Foreign Service (i.e., flag or general officer equivalents) encumber positions which are, not surprisingly, advisory. They exist within the combatant command's headquarters, without bringing any non-DoD resources to the table other than their own expertise, as staff officers.

(This is not meant as a criticism, only to realistically define their role.)

"The question that should be debated not only by the military but also by an informed citizenry is the organization of the Regional Combatant Commands making the United States imperialistic in the execution of its foreign policy?

I have believed for a long time that there is a need for a new National Security Act for the 21^st Century.[2] Among the provision I would like to see is the common alignment of Regions across the entire federal government. While there may be arguments for different divisions it seems that a whole government approach would benefit from all the players reading off the same script. I think it also time to consider rather than having the Department of Defense Combatant Commanders being the lead that perhaps it is time of the Department of State to take the lead."

7/29

re: "Shadow of the Past"

Richard Fernandez (the blogger-formerly-known-as-Wretchard) at Belmont Club connected Andrew Breitbart's last video with a narrative undercurrent.

Money quote(s):

"The period concerned is not just Barack Obama’s college days, but more generically what happened after 1968. That’s what Breitbart really seems to want to talk about, what he means when talks about “vetting”.

In that period, if we’re to believe people like David Horowitz, a prominent radical from the New Left, what called itself the Peace Movement was actually a totalitarian conspiracy with possible links to foreign intelligence agencies, which eventually set out to control the Democratic Party, if it has not already."

Silly conspiracy theory, right?

("The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist.")

"(I)t’s the stuff of conspiracy theories all right, equal in scope if not greater than those of the Kennedy assassination, which argue that to truly understand things one has to go back to 1968 and what followed. Because that’s when it all began.

What began, you might ask? Well it. And the indication of its subterranean existence is the narrative. One measure of how famous narrative has become, even when it does not supposedly exist is when it becomes a staple of detective fiction."

Wretchard proceeded to reference Stephen Hunter's latest Bobby Lee Swagger novel, I, Sniper, with some juicy popular culture.

His conclusion included the following:

"The narrative is all powerful. And to understand where the narrative comes from, Hunter argued one needed to go back to 1968 and follow the links to that era, the Silver Pony Tails and their Soviet contacts. In some sense, Breitbart was claiming in his last video that here was a rock that was at least worth looking under."

3/3

re: "Budget axe may kill our military’s edge"

McQ at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") explained why defense cuts are fraught with peril.

Money quote(s):

"One of the things that concerns me with all of the talk about huge budget cuts to defense is the distinct possibility that such cuts will take away the edge our military now has and has enjoyed for decades.

That edge, or advantage, is something that has helped make our military successful in every sort of combat imaginable. But developing and maintaining that edge are both time consuming and expensive. Research, development, testing, field and support don’t come cheap.

Yet that seems to be what is being demanded in an increasingly technologically advanced and dangerous world. The edge we’ve developed technologically over the years is what makes our military so exponentially lethal. We’ve provided combat multipliers to our warriors and they’ve used them expertly.

But to maintain such an edge, we must also be willing to spend the money necessary to do so.

There are numerous examples of cuts being considered that are dangerous. They will not only make our military much less capable, but also threaten our national security. Not only that, the cuts could end up actually costing us more than they save by sticking the military with outdated equipment that requires more maintenance, has more down time and will need continued parts and support."

That last might seem counterintuitive, but really isn't. To those with any military experience whatsoever (which exempts most of Congress), it's obvious. Older stuff breaks more often, is offline or "deadlined" longer, and requires replacement of broken or wornout parts with greater frequency. It's why military logisticians go with 150 percent "redundancy": in essence, if you need two trucks, you'd better have three because one is always going to be "down" for maintenance.

McQ concluded:

"These are the things that should concern us all as we watch a group of politicians with vested interests in other areas, many of whom look at defense spending cuts as a way to pay for other programs they are interested in, get ready to swing the budget axe.

Do we keep and improve the technological edge which has made our military the most powerful and predominant military in the world for decades? Or do we refuse to pay the price necessary to keep our military’s edge and continue to make it the most powerful and flexible force in the world and risk our national security?

No one knows how many wars and conflicts our military has been able to avoid simply because we’re as powerful as we are. But if history is a teacher, as soon as we’re perceived to be in decline militarily, there are those who will test us. This is one area of the national budget with which we must be very careful. Budgetary fat is always fair game, but the systems that will be the heart and soul of our national defense capability for decades to come should not be cut heedlessly. To do so would be a tragic mistake."

10/26

re: "Another (Almost Completely) InstaPundit-Driven Assortment"

Francis W. Porretto at Liberty's Torch ("For Americans who still understand and love freedom") relied heavily on Prof. Glenn Reynolds' Instapundit, as should we all.

Money quote(s):

"It's difficult to imagine the blogging world without Professor Glenn Reynolds, a.k.a. InstaPundit. For my part, on those days when I find myself without inspiration, he's a reliable source of things about which to vent my spleen that I might have overlooked in the national news. And on those days when I have an inspiration, the way the rest of the DextroSphere employs him as an aggregator makes him a handy source for material to supplement whatever has already become the focus of my ire."

CAA often finds that Instapundit has wittily summarized blog posts and news items he's already read in the original, but far more often than not Prof. Reynolds has gotten there first.

"I shared the widespread fears that an arms trade treaty would be used as a tool by the Obama Administration to cut deeply into Americans' rights to keep and bear arms. It appears that, for the moment, those fears can be put to rest... But for the moment, only.

All governments, no matter how constituted, are implacably hostile to their subjects' possession of the means of resistance. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is words on a page. It is not self-enforcing...no more so than any of the other rights Americans cherish. The one and only way to keep our rights alive is to exercise them vigorously...and to stand ready at all times to punish the arrogance of men in positions of authority who presume to infringe upon them.

In other words, keep your powder dry."

Sometimes, despite the earnest efforts of American diplomats to negotiate a consensus agreement on one or another of many international issues, the best actual outcome for America and for Americans is no agreement at all.

"DaTechGuy notes a relationship many of us would be slow to recognize:

I have heard a lot of people on the left self righteously complain that conservatives are unwilling to agree to "common sense gun control" that we are unreasonable fanatics who would oppose restrictions on the ownership of Sherman tanks.

Most of all, we are totally wrong to believe that the left is after our guns just because of the proposed assault weapon ban.

Why would we have such a belief, how can the folks on the right even think we on the left are after their guns, all their guns?

The answer: Chick-Fil-A.

We in the Right know perfectly well about the Left's tactic of gradualism. DaTechGuy cites a number of interesting examples as reminders, and for the edification of those who might disbelieve in it. Please read the whole thing."

Read the whole thing. The DaTechGuy makes a lot of sense, he's speaking from where a lot of conservatives and even moderates are living these days. It's a realworld example of something you should have learned from watching Star Trek.

7/28

re: "Darwinian Tourism Still Thrives In Egypt"

DMartyr at The Jawa Report ("Sand people: get it?") accounted for two American tourists who went missing in Egypt.

Money quote(s):

"Many parts of the world are not a safe place for foreigners. We, living in America, tend to take security for granted. Travel the world, enjoy your life. Just use a little common sense."

Many places in the world are no more dangerous than your home town. The dangers in those places, however, will often take forms different from the hazards you routinely avoid in your everyday life.

Of course, some places are way more dangerous than your home town.

Americans planning overseas travel would do well always and everywhere to take a lot at the Country Specific Information that the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs takes such pains to compile and update.

2/3

re: "Drug Cartels Have No Fear Of CBP"

The blogger-formerly-known-as-Federal-Agent-86 at Federale ("That Is The Sound Of Inevitability") examined a vulnerability in our border security.

Money quote(s):

"A top Mexican drug cartel leader was recently busted by the Port Isabel Police Department, a small town, population 5,000, agency on the Texas gulf coast near the party town of South Padre Island.

Rafael Vela, who is also the nephew of a former cartel leader, apparently entered the United States by the simple expedient of using someone else's passport."

That happens.

What should also happen is that if the passport holder has a current U.S. visa, there should be a biometric record (photographic and fingerprint) on electronic file from the time of their visa interview.

"CBP uses US VISIT, the biometric system for aliens who apply for visas, apply to enter the United States and who are arrested by DHS. Except that CBP, because of pressure from the Mexican government, illegal alien advocates, border merchants,Texas politicians, and drug cartels, does not use US VISIT at land Ports-of-Entry, e.g. land border entries. If US VISIT had been in use at the port where Vela entered, he would not have been arrested by an overworked small town police department, but by CBP itself. But CBP is not interested in doing its job of stopping drug dealers and terrorists, it is more interested in fostering cross-border commerce and enabling the Regime's Administrative Amnesty"

US VISIT works. But you have to actually be using it for it to work.

10/26

re: "Dudes! Misinterpreting DoD's strategic guidance repeats mistakes, ignores emerging trends, and leads to failure"

Janine Davidson posted at Thomas E. Ricks' The Best Defense blog ("Tom Ricks' Daily Take on National Security"), read the "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense and Defense Budget Priorities and Choices" documents (so you don't have to).

Money quote(s):

"The fact is, whether we call it "COIN," "stability operations," "peacekeeping," or "irregular warfare," such frustrating, complex, population-centric, and increasingly urban operations against and among savvy and networked non-state actors are simply a modern version of an age-old phenomenon. And they are here to stay."

&

"(N)ot sizing the force for large-scale operations like Iraq and Afghanistan is a responsible and prudent strategic approach. As these two huge wars wind down, of course the force will be down-sized. This is what we do after every war, no matter the type. It would irresponsible, and in fact unconstitutional, to do otherwise. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States clearly indicates the power of the Congress to "raise and support Armies..." but to "provide and maintain a Navy." This language is deliberate, as the founders did not want to maintain large expensive standing ground forces in peacetime. The Congress is empowered to appropriate money to expand the force as needed to fight wars. And that is exactly what happened during the past decade. Our force planning can and should account for our ability to do this again when needed.

For operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the army grew from just over 480,000 soldiers in 2001 to a peak of 570,000 just a couple of years ago. Likewise, the marine corp grew from approximately 170,000 to 210,000. Following redeployment from these wars, the new strategy calls for downsizing back to about 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines by 2017, (assuming we manage to disengage in Afghanistan) which is slightly larger than the what President George W. Bush inherited eleven years ago. And still, it is nearly four to five times the size of the ground forces of any of our NATO allies."

Strategy (as outlined in the document being reviewed by Prof. Davidson) is one thing: the meat ax of sequestration is another. The downsizing she posits may be the best case scenario.

"(L)et's not confuse size with competency. Not sizing for Iraqs or Afghanistans does not, and should not, mean forgetting how to conduct such missions -- no matter the size."

&

"Throughout its entire 250-year history, coin, stability operations, and nation building have been far from an "irregular" occurrence. The U.S. has conducted such missions -- on a large scale -- about every 25 years since the Mexican War in the 1840's. U.S. ground troops conducted nation-building, peace-keeping, and a series of counter-guerilla wars against American Indians on the western frontier throughout the 1800's. They conducted a bloody counterinsurgency in the Philippines (1898-1902), a number of "small wars" in the Caribbean (1930's), and occupation duty after the American Civil War and the two World Wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has deployed every 18-24 months in response to complex crises of various size, with the average duration of these endeavors becoming increasingly protracted.

From the beginning, these missions have been frustrating and ill-defined, and they have always been controversial. Repeatedly, after each painful episode, the military has sought to avoid having to do them again by forgetting its doctrine and failing to plan, leaving the next generation to re-learn on the fly.

The U.S. army was so fed up with counterinsurgency after its bloody and protracted experience in the Philippines that it eagerly -- with the support of the secretary of War -- managed to turn the whole mission set over to the marines in the early 20^th century. While the army focused on "real" war, the marines were sent to the Caribbean for the "Banana Wars," where they had to re-learn all the hard-learned lessons from old U.S. army manuals that were being discarded. The marine corps did allow a small team of officers to capture this Caribbean experience in the 1940 Small Wars Manual; but the mainstream corps had little appetite for these missions and was already trying to reinvent itself as specialists in amphibious operations. Once WW II began, the marines discarded its doctrine, training, and education for small wars in order to focus intensely on amphibious operations. This left the Vietnam generation to re-invent relevant doctrine once again."

&

"Today we face a global environment characterized by transnational criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and myriad illicit and violent bandits and traffickers. Some of these "bad guys" are aligned with nation states, but most operate in the gray space between what we consider crime and war. Importantly, our future enemies have been paying attention to our struggles against low-tech, high-impact fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and have been sharing their own "lessons learned" across global social networks. One lesson is clear: Go asymmetric and "irregular" against the U.S. military, because taking it on head to head conventionally would be just plain stupid. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Demographic trends such as urbanization, the youth bulge, resource scarcity, and radicalization ensure that future conflicts requiring ground forces will occur in cities and slums and among populations, where differentiating friend from foe, and victim from "combatant," much less just trying to navigate through the crowded urban "battle space" will continue to plague traditionally-minded and conventionally trained ground forces."

&

"The military should continue to develop special operations and civil affairs capabilities as key components for security force assistance, conflict prevention, and crisis response. Army modularity, which allows ground units to be scaled and tailored for various operations should continue to be developed, and competencies in foreign languages, interagency coordination, and human intelligence collection and analysis should be sustained and enhanced." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

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"So how then, do we size this new more enlightened and capable force to ensure success in future coin or stability operations missions? With 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines on active duty, plus the forces in the selected ready reserve (560,000 in the army and 39,000 in the marine corps), America's ground forces will arguably be large enough for stability operations of significant size even without needing to add to the force once a crisis hits. Still, there is no crystal ball to predict the exact scenario our military might face. Moreover, despite much debate, there is still no consensus over the question of how many ground troops are required to bring stability to a country of a given population. Clearly neither sizing the peacetime force for the largest imaginable stability operation, nor down-sizing and hoping we won't face another large-scale mission of this sort, is no way to plan. Because we have the demonstrated ability to grow the force and adapt once a war begins, the trick is to find the right size that allows us to conduct smaller and medium scale operations and to initiate an operation while scaling up for something larger if and when needed."

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"(W)e need to be confident that we can access the capable and ready forces we need, when we need them. Being able to grow the force for large-scale missions if required means having a reserve component that is ready for mobilization and an active duty-training cadre that can deliver the expertise on demand. The DoD's plan to, "... leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization," is aiming in the right direction. On the active duty side, the army and marine corps are both planning to retain a greater percentage of mid-grade NCO's and officers even as they downsize, reflecting their understanding that a slightly more senior force is not only required in the conduct of these complex missions, but is also the seed corn needed to train and grow a force if required."

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Janine Davidson is assistant professor at George Mason University's Graduate School of Pubic Policy. From 2009-2012, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Plans, where she oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans and the review and assessment of plans. Before all that she was a pilot in the air force.

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