re: "Is the United States a Militaristic Imperialists Nation?"

TOWNIE 76 at OP-FOR examined the continued usefulness of regional combatant commands.

Money quote(s):

"Several weeks ago, Tom Dispatch published an extended article on the shadow war in Africa. In part it questioned why the United States military has divided the world into six fiefdoms or Combatant Commands."

Note to State Dept. readers: don't click on any of the Tom Dispatch links since you'll just get one of those scary "wikileaks" warning notices.

"The short answer is they are a continuation of our division of the world during World War II into Theaters of War. In fact they are often referred to as Theaters by today’s military. But that is not the sole reason. The United States being the dominate Western partner in our Cold War against global communism required the ability to establish priorities for the employment of our military. Lastly, today’s Combatant Commands and the defined power of the Commander[1], is an outgrowth of the debacle that was Grenada and Lebanon in the early 80’s. In the case of Grenada it was each service Chief adding their forces to the mix resulting in a Cluster Firetruck. In the case of Lebanon it was the failure of United State European Command to accept responsibility of the bombing in Beirut that left countless Marines dead. As a result in the Goldwater-Nichols Act the power of the services over operational matters was severely constrained and the Combatant Commanders were ultimately responsible for determining which military capabilities were required for a specific operation."

Townie76 noted three consequences of the above, including these two:

"(T)he Combatant Commanders have become de Facto Pro Counsels (sic) for their respective Regional Commands. In many cases they are the representatives of the United States Government who have the most exposure in their particular Theater. As such Military Power has become the dominat (sic) element of the United States National Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.)

Second, the Department of Defense regional division of the world differs from the Department of State regional division of the world. Thus the Department of State Regional Director for Near East must coordinate diplomatic activities in two Combatant Commanders Areas of Responsibility (Africa Command and Central Command). More importantly, while attempted with Africa Command, there is generally no high ranking member of the Foreign Service within the Headquarters of the Regional Combatant Commands. The only presence in the Regional Combatant Commands is the Political Advisor who is a Senior Member of the Foreign Service but from my experience has little influence inside the State Department."

The morphing of military commanders into imperial proconsuls is a criticism that's been leveled before, going back many years. Combatant commanders used to be called commanders-in-chief until the point was made, forcibly, that under the Constitution there is only one commander-in-chief.

Political advisors, despite their relatively high rank within the Foreign Service (i.e., flag or general officer equivalents) encumber positions which are, not surprisingly, advisory. They exist within the combatant command's headquarters, without bringing any non-DoD resources to the table other than their own expertise, as staff officers.

(This is not meant as a criticism, only to realistically define their role.)

"The question that should be debated not only by the military but also by an informed citizenry is the organization of the Regional Combatant Commands making the United States imperialistic in the execution of its foreign policy?

I have believed for a long time that there is a need for a new National Security Act for the 21^st Century.[2] Among the provision I would like to see is the common alignment of Regions across the entire federal government. While there may be arguments for different divisions it seems that a whole government approach would benefit from all the players reading off the same script. I think it also time to consider rather than having the Department of Defense Combatant Commanders being the lead that perhaps it is time of the Department of State to take the lead."

7/29

re: "Abu Muqawama: State, USAID Must Learn From Afghanistan Errors"

Andrew Exum wrote an article for WPR ("World Politics Review") that anyone in a position of leadership at State Dept. really ought to read.

Money quote(s):

"No one escapes criticism in Chandrasekaran's narrative, this columnist included, but the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Marine Corps come under especially heavy fire.

The reaction from the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. military as a whole has been to add the book and its criticisms to the list of lessons that need to be learned from the disastrous U.S. experience in Afghanistan. The State Department and USAID, by contrast, have reacted angrily to Chandrasekaran's account, blaming the messenger rather than looking into what they might learn from the message."

&

"Since at least the First Gulf War, American society has raised the U.S. military onto a pedestal, constantly praising the military, even when its performance has been, by objective standards, not terribly great. Is it any wonder U.S. military leaders feel they have room for introspection and self-criticism?

The State Department rarely garners similar praise from the American people or its elected leaders. Republican congressmen on Capitol Hill talk a big game on national security and vow never to cut the military's budget, while at the same time threatening to slash the International Affairs budget by 20 percent. U.S. military officers and troops are held up as the best of what America has to offer, while diplomats . . . well, few Americans are quite sure of what diplomats even do.

That's a pity because, despite bungling the admittedly challenging Afghanistan mission, the State Department has a pretty good story to tell about itself." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

It's one of those perennial delusion of the American body politic: that foreign aid and diplomacy (State and USAID) are where all the money goes, when quite the reverse is true.

(This is not to say that the dollar amounts aren't large, from any individual citizen's perspective. It's certainly more than I'll ever have in my wallet or bank account. Even my Swiss and Caymen accounts. But they amount to rounding errors in the context of the federal budget as a whole.)

"One of the illicit delights of reading the WikiLeaks cables has been to discover what wonderful diplomats the United States has in its service. The reports written by U.S. ambassadors and their subordinates are knowledgeable, literate, pithy and often amusing. They confirm, in a larger sample size, my anecdotal experiences visiting embassies around the globe. I remember, for example, spending an afternoon with the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh in 2010 and being blown away by the competence and professionalism of the staff. Many foreign service officers were on their third tours in the country, and even the newest officer -- charged with running the motor pool, of all things -- spoke fluent classical Arabic as well as several dialects."

CAA has not, of course, actually read anything at the Wikileaks site. That's still a no-no.

But CAA did read a few of the articles which were written about those State cables which were leaked, and they tended to echo Mr. Exum's impression: well-written, insightful, and honest; telling "truth to power" as it were.

And as for the motor pool officer.... it's helpful, in foreign countries, if the guy in charge of the motor pool's drivers and mechanics can actually speak their language. That tends to help with little things like telling them what you want them to do.

"Unfortunately, the State Department is not very good at telling its story to either the U.S. Congress or the American people. When people effectively stand up for the budget of the State Department and make the case for a larger International Affairs budget, it is too often either U.S. military officers or conservative, "pro-military" defense intellectuals. The State Department and its foreign service officers deserve some of the blame here. I recently finished John Lewis Gaddis’ biography of George F. Kennan, and Kennan’s life is a reminder that those Americans who are most knowledgeable about other cultures can often be the most contemptuous and ignorant of U.S. domestic political culture. Foreign service officers who do not hesitate to spend endless afternoons drinking chai with Central Asian warlords somehow can't, by and large, stomach the occasional coffee with a junior congressman from Nebraska." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

State has gotten better, having taken a leaf from the DoD and individual uniformed services books and established a permanent liaison presence on Capitol Hill itself, for both houses of Congress. Those folks work daily to increase Congresional awareness of what State (and the Foreign Service) have to offer them in terms that they understand, such as helping members of Congress in providing constituent services (to use a consular example).

So I'm not sure what Mr. Exum means in terms of avoiding coffee with congressmen. For FSOs abroad, generally the last thing visiting CODELs want to do is talk with U.S. diplomats so when they're abroad finding facts. They can talk to State Dept. people when they're in Washington, by gum!

"The result is that the State Department as an organization constantly feels that it is under pressure and underappreciated by its appropriators. We should not wonder, then, why such an organization fails to be introspective or critical of itself. That shortchanges both America and the State Department"

&

"A military can defend -- or learn from -- its performance during a war, but diplomats and aid workers can rarely demonstrate how their efforts toward conflict-prevention preclude a need for the military to get involved in the first place. And the efforts of diplomats and aid workers rarely benefit the economies of congressional districts in the same way military bases or the arms industry does.

Nonetheless, if the State Department and USAID are ever going to have the confidence to be as self-critical as the U.S. military, they have to better sell their efforts to the American people and its representatives in Washington."

It's like Al Pacino said in The Recruit: "Our failures are known. Our successes...are not." When a country doesn't fall apart, collapse into civil war, or things don't otherwise get worse; was that because the U.S. was effective in that country or would it have happened anyways. It's always hard to prove a negative.

That being said, as a consular manager, CAA likes to take whatever opportunities he can to garner a little American good will for the State Department, for the Foreign Service, and of course for the dedicated and wonderful people who make up what used to be called the Consular Service.

How to do that? Well, in terms of Congress itself and congress members specifically, be timely and appropriately respectful in responding to congressional inquiries. This should be a given, of course, but it should at least be mentioned.

Some parts of the federal government think that stonewalling or otherwise blowing off questions or requests from the people who vote on their agency's budgets is a good idea. I've never gotten that impression about State, but let's not slack off on this.

Have an office SOP (standard operating procedure) for responding to congressional inquiries which includes things like setting a suspense date when they're received, some simple process for recording and tracking each inquiry's progress, an easily understood scheme for assigning individual responsibility for researching and then drafting a response, and some form of review process by a manager.

CAA likes for the staff under his supervision to have as much "ownership" of their caseload as is practical. So if an inquiry has to do with a particular employees caseload or portfolio, such as a visa case that they handled themselves, then CAA would always have that FSO research and draft the response.

For one thing, every FSO should know how to correctly write an official letter to a congressmen using the correct protocol and forms of address. This is pretty basic stuff, but there's nothing like doing it to gain familiarity and a level of professional comfort.

For another thing, CAA believes in empowering subordinates. This goes along with owning your portfolio or caseload. Supervisors and leaders should set goals, set standards, and then get the Hell out of the way and not micro-manage if they can avoid it. Sometimes being a leader means butting back into a particular case, but if your staff is properly trained (and HR didn't send you an idiot), this shouldn't happen all that often.

Proper formats for responses, including standard language (i.e., boilerplate) should be standardized and readily available for FSO (or local staff) to consult or plagiarize.

And CAA's FSO staff could put their own signature block on their responses if they wanted, or CAA would put his; however the FSO was most comfortable. In some cases, it will be wiser to put a more senior person's name on it, but when that happens it's best to explain to your FSOs why you made that decision.

An example is when an inquiry may be controversial and you want to divert any lightning bolts from Mount Olympus away from your junior officers.

(If you're the leader, providing top cover to your followers is just part of why they pay you the big bucks, after all.)

CAA also likes to respond to congressional inquiries in the medium by which they are received. If an inquiry comes in electronically, then by email shall it be answered; but with a hard copy to follow by mail.

In fact, CAA used to send an electronic copy of his office's responses as email attachments even when the inquiry itself arrived in hard copy, just to let the congressional offices know that a response to their question was on its way, with a sneak preview so they weren't being held in suspense or anything.

CAA once dated a congressional staffer who had as a major part of her responsibilities the logging and tracking of correspondence her congress member's office received, much of which fell under the heading of congressional inquiries that were relayed to individual agencies.

(This was a few years before meeting Mrs. CAA, but that's not really germane.)

The point is that the handling of such matters is a core function of any congressional office. So FSOs would be wise to bear that in mind.

The further point is that good congressmen know how to field requests and questions by their constituents, and like good players of America's pastime, they know how to field the balls that come their way.

So FSOs need to do the same, and with the same understanding of their importance. They really do come from the people who pay our salaries and they are routed to us by the people who set those salaries.

(There are other ways FSOs can implement outreach to congress or the U.S. citizens, but that'll have to wait for another post on another day.)

7/25

re: "Publishing In A Handbasket"

Sarah A. Hoyt at According to Hoyt ("playing the authorial game") discussed conspiracies, propaganda, disinformation, and "the narrative."

Money quote(s):

"“I entered our section offices through a washroom booth in MacArthur Station. You won’t find our offices in the phone lists. In fact, it does not exist. Probably I don’t exist either. All is illusion. Another route is through a little hole-in-the-wall shop with a sign reading RARE STAMPS & COINS. Don’t try that route either – they’ll try to sell you a Tu’ penny Black.” Robert A. Heinlein, The Puppet Masters."

Forget the movie version, read the book.

(Although CAA quite enjoys Donald Sutherland in general and thought Julie Warner was scrumptious as "Mary.")

"There is nothing so inherently human as feeling a frisson of excitement at the idea that behind the rational, dry world we know, conspiracies move in the shadow, manipulating men and societies to their whims."

Not that conspiracies don't exist in the real world. Quiet the opposite. The thing is there are so many conspiracies (for values of "conspiracies"), each working at cross-purposes, that it's hard to see any one or another getting much in the way of an upper hand.

The most successful conspiracies develop a narrative, a world-view, into a consensus that is self-perpetuating over the long term. (Which is a subject for another time and a better writer.)

"Science Fiction and Fantasy is particularly rife with conspiracies and long-held secrets. Part of this is that for some of our premises, say “there are aliens among us” or “the fairies have always been here” or even “of course there are vampires. They all work for the IRS.” "

The best science fiction takes just a single fact about reality or possible futures (or pasts) and twists it just so, and lets the logic flow therefrom.

"(E)ven in Puppet Masters, Heinlein had the UFO landings be real and the government has sat on them.

Yesterday I was talking to a young friend about conspiracies and the possibility of conspiracies, particularly by the US government. You have to understand, my own young self was convinced that the US government well well-night omnipotent, and I think so are most Europeans of all ages. I remember when, a few years ago, I told my parents that our passports were going to take – I think – six months (aftermath of 9/11) and was told I was lying. This was impossible. “Big country like that. Such an efficient government.”

I think I preferred it that way. Yes, yes, I saw all the movies with evil CIA does something evil. Sorry. I still preferred the idea that our government was sharp like a well-honed blade and capable of doing things and keeping them secret for years. Why don’t I believe that? Well… I first came to the States as an exchange student during the Carter presidency. Very few illusions can survive killer rabbits."

Just so.

"(F)or the record let me say right now that I don’t believe there are UFOs hiding among us. If the IRS employs vampires, they must survive on blood sausage. And the Kennedy assassination was a conspiracy. Well, duh. Of course it was. It was a soviet conspiracy. That was why Oswald was trained. He came to the US to kill Kennedy. Look, children, sometimes things are what they appear to be, and that’s the greatest conspiracy. (And why, you ask. Oh, tons of reasons, including the fact that our sainted president WAS on prescription drugs that lessened his self control. But it’s also possible it was an agit prop operation, something the Soviets were VERY GOOD at. Look at its effect: it succeeded in radicalizing the leftwing of US politics as nothing before it had. And sometimes the effect is exactly what it was meant to be.)" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Remember what I said about above about the most successful conspiracies? Communism or bolshevism or marxism or whatever narratival expression of the "original" conspiracy did of course exist and many unspeakable (or least barely spoken-of) and fell deeds were committed in its furtherance and in its behalf. And that just scratches the surface. Adding Kennedy to that body count, justifiably or not, is in essence the merest feather-weights increase to that weighty collection of evils.

(Look, you can take CAA out of the Cold War, but you can't take the Cold War out of CAA!)

"I don’t believe in conspiracies, but I do believe in misinformation. As all of you know, I stop short of being Roman enough to deify Heinlein. BARELY short. So I will refrain from saying that his starting with the conspiracy and then leading us to the real way something really big can keep secret RIGHT UNDER OUR NOSES was deliberate and a work of genius. Perhaps it was. Ginny is no longer alive for me to ask.

It’s also entirely possible he just used the conspiracy to draw us in, and of course the misinformation was part of what he saw with World War II and the Cold War. The juxtaposition is possibly accidental.

The facts of the Kennedy assassination are right in the open. Have always been. But even those who know Oswald was a communist and had a Soviet wife, will say “yes but…” and then on go on blab about the climate of hatred or evil conservatives. Why? Because all the books, most of the articles and ninety nine point nine percent of the dramatizations involving Kennedy go haring off those points and leaving the obvious, visible truth by the way side as something of little importance." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Misdirection. It also works in magic, politics, and other stage performances.

"(W)hile I can’t believe in conspiracies – particularly conspiracies by bureaucracy (wikileaks, anyone?) I do believe in the efficacy of “the big lie”. It works because it doesn’t try to cover up every proof of what really happened. Instead, it suppresses the truth by repeating the lie so often and so loudly, and by accusing anyone who challenges it of being crazy or worse, until truth shuts up and goes away. It’s still there. It’s just that no one looks at it." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Just because Hitler used it (and did so successfully) doesn't mean others don't use the same technique. He also used staircases, automobiles, sidewalks, and tableware.

"(H)ere’s the thing, right now (wikileaks, Journolist) the levers of power and the “shut up, we’re smarter” aren’t working. There are to many other channels of communication, people are talking and posting phone videos of what they actually saw. Oh, some of it still works. The whole Arab Spring thing is not going anywhere as positively as it was painted. I’m sure the readers of this blog, innocent and fragile flowers all, will be shocked to know in most cases it might just be a way to more extremist religious regimes." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA hasn't, yet, read any of Mrs. Hoyt's books but, if her fiction is as good as her web log, that is going to have to change!

"They learned at college that they are smart because they believe a set of things their professors told them — and that only ignorant people believe otherwise. And they want to go on thinking they are smart. They want to be able to tell all those squabbling bloggers and indie writers to “shut up” and “you’re irrelevant” and “we’ll never invite you to the nice parties.” "

10/17

re: "State Dept Throws Sink + All Fixtures But One to Fire FSO-Non Grata, Peter Van Buren"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator") had a good summary of Peter Van Buren's situation (as of March 19th).

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps it is comforting to some to hear that the State Department will finally get to penalize Mr. Van Buren for linking to two non-secret cables on WikiLeaks. But we gotta ask -- whatever happened to the 2010 Diplomatic Security investigation on the leak of two secret 2009 Eikenberry cables to the NYT in 2010?

Or for that matter, is anyone investigating the leak of Ambassador Crocker's top-secret cable to Washington in January this year, warning that the persistence of enemy havens in Pakistan was placing the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in jeopardy.

Somebody really should check out the status of these investigations and see if anyone has been prosecuted yet. The public may get the wrong impression that linking to non-secret cables in a blog is more dangerous than the actual leaks of secret and top secret materials to the newspaper of record."

There're leaks, and then there are leaks. Different spanks for different ranks. Sometimes a leak is unofficially official, or perhaps just when it's to the New York Times, well, that's just okay then.

"The comment that we often hear is that, he should have done the honorable thing and resigned from his job before writing this book or before skewering his employer in his blog.

And we understand that sentiment; for the bureaucracy to “function,” it must have order. For order to exist, employees must follow the line and not be going off every which way. If employees disagree with a policy, there is what they call the “Dissent Channel,” to register one’s disagreement with official policy. As an aside, AFSA even gives out awards for what it calls “constructive dissent.” We have it in good authority, by the way, that Mr. Van Buren has been nominated by more than one person for AFSA’s William R. Rivkin Award for midlevel officials. Let’s see if AFSA can find an excuse not to give out the award this year.

In any case, it is worth noting that the State Department is not obligated to share the dissent received with the American public, nor is it obligated to report what action it takes in response to such a dissent. If that fails, resignation from one’s job has been the accepted course of action, a norm drilled into the heads of our State Department folks."

Diplopundit has an entire post, dedicated to how the AFSA creative dissent awards turned out this year.

"While we understand what appears to be a prevailing collective desire that the employee who disagrees with policy leave in polite terms, we are wondering if the time has come to rethink that. Getting off the bus quietly is encouraged in that culture, and presumably from the perspective of the organization that’s the best course of action. It avoids controversy and the parties can pretend the separation is like a marriage that no longer works, etc — but is this necessarily good for the paying public? Should the employees ought to just be thankful they have a job and keep quiet? And for those who can’t keep quiet for whatever reason, must they give up their livelihood for pointing out the stinky elephant in the room?"

All good questions and ones going to the heart of the Foreign Service corporate culture.

"Instead of taking this case seriously as a good excuse to look inward and review the policy of reconstruction in war zones, and absent a change of direction, develop more effective metrics and accountability for these projects, the State Department took its fight to the messenger. And wasted time and resources there."

CAA hasn't read Brother Van Buren's book. CAA may never read his book. Not that it's an unworthy book, but.... while CAA's heart may feel that the work of PRTs and E-PRTs was/is good, worthy, and well-intended, CAA's mind has told him from the beginning of GW2 (Gulf War II) that the U.S. was never going to stay long enough, in either Iraq or Afghanistan, for nation-building (as such) to do much good in the long run.

So the money (and the lives) spent were going to go towards buying only temporary successes.

Now, there's a school of thought that posits things like good and evil, success and failure, if they're going to be measures or used as any sort of metric, must be matrixed against time or duration for them to have any sort of useful meaning.

So some temporary success, some lives improved (if only for a few years) are not things to be scoffed-at or disregarded; but they're going to be analyzed against dollars and cents they must include their duration as well.

"The State Department spends much money and effort to recruit and train the “best and the brightest” to represent America overseas, then proceeds to hammer and shape them into, I’m sorry to say, drones, who follow directions, not create waves and most importantly, whose stingers are without barbs."

CAA exists. Ponder that.

Diplopundit closes with a thoughtful question:

"I’m sure the State Department can argue that “enforcing” the rules, however selectively, is done to promote the proper functioning of the Service. But should the proper functioning of the Service trumps everything else? Whether you agree with Mr. Van Buren’s message or not, his method of delivery or not, his case has created a precedent. Throwing the sink and all fixtures at him would help ensure that nothing like this ever happens again. I suspect that would be good for the State Department. Order restored. Life goes on.

But are we, the American public better served?"

3/19

re: "DIPLOMAT Articles on All and Sundry"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("A digital hybrid of blog and memoir presented on a daily basis, or not.") provides a nice block of excerpts from his recent article at DIPLOMAT, "Diplomatic Drafting and Wikileaks."

Money quote(s):

"(T)the Wikileaks document dump exists in a category of its own.

The material is so powerful precisely because it blows away Assange’s banal anti-Americanism. Yes, it’s horribly embarrassing for Washington that all these cables have leaked. Confidences have been ruined. Sources endangered. In terms of writing style the cables often err on the dense and overlong side.

However, far from exposing the dark side of American/Western policies they show as never before the strengths and values of the Western Anglosphere diplomatic method. The documents uncover mile after mile of sensible, balanced, practical, timely and reasonable analysis and comment by American diplomats, often with amusing extra insights and personal touches..." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Which is nice of him to have said. One tries, after all.

"The UK has of its own free will (at least as expressed through Parliament when ratifying the Lisbon Treaty) accepted EU voting rules which allow this to happen, just as the Treaty also provides a procedure to enable a Member State to leave the Union and get back all its sovereignty once again.

Nonetheless, as the eurozone crisis gathers momentum, the existential question of sovereignty is coming back to the fore even in placid, postmodern Europe. What claims, if any, do (say) Greeks have on (say) German resources and hard work by virtue of EU ‘solidarity’? What claims do eurozone members have on (say) the UK, smugly watching the disarray from across the Channel? Tricky."

These are not exactly idle questions nowadays.

11/3

re: "Report: State Department Spokesman PJ Crowley Resigns"

Drew M. at Ace of Spades HQ notes a personnel change at the State Department.

Quote(s):

"Normally not that big of a deal but this guy is a real tool, even by the low standards one generally has for professional mouthpieces and people who work at the State Department."

Now, that's just mean. Like shooting a man's suit.

"Crowley's comments got lost in the bigger news of Libya and then Japan but his fate was pretty well sealed on Friday when Obama was asked about them and Manning's treatment in general."

"(P)utting the President in that spot is not a career enhancing move."

Drew's dislike of Crowley goes back to 2009, as he explains:

"If you follow the link, you'll see that I was not amused at the use of the word "debate" to describe the slaughter of peaceful protesters. My language was a tad bit harsh and somewhat unprofessional but I was infuriated at the time. In retrospect if I could do it over again...I"d use even harsher language.

Not that the next mouthpiece will be better or the policy they will be spinning for will be any more coherent but I'm happy to see this guy go."

re: "Love Letters to Congress and Who Gets Magic Dragoned Between FSI and First Post"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("Just one obsessive observer, diplomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and the worldwide available universe.") has created a whole new tag.

Money quote(s):

"I still look at this as a fairness issue for those who remains in the Service. I just hope you all don't get get stuck in the OCP fight. If you are a member of the FS community, your main mission if you decide to accept it -- ta-da! --is to to help educate Congress and the American public about your work and your life abroad in the service of this country. Congress is not the enemy, ignorance is.

The U.S. State Department as an organization has never been good at explaining its work to Congress and the American people. You don't believe me? Ask your neighbors what they know about Foreign Service Officers, and they'd probably ask which foreign country these officers serve. If you tell them, the United States of America, they'd probably ask if these officers are, you know ... real Americans, being foreign and all. And those who are able to identify them as American diplomats would inevitably bring up the words, "pinstriped, cookie pushers," "cocktails", "elite" and most recently, of course, "voluptuous blond" and "WikiLeaks." To others they are nothing more than visa stampers and passport shufflers. A good number of the American public who travel overseas have no reason to see them at US embassies or consulate unless they have lost their passports, marry or adopt a foreigner, lands in the foreign hospital or jail, survives a plane crash, is a victim of crime, is evacuated, or in a host of other emergency crises abroad."

As a Department, State will always lack the kind of domestic constituency that a department which, for instance, builds jet engines and weapons systems in lots of congressional districts will have. That's reality. As both a "diploblogger" and a "milblogger," part of my "mission" as CAA is to educate and advocate with the folks who should be our natural allies, our colleagues in the uniformed services.

"You will hear officials insisting that State is full of really smart, really talented people. But you just have to take their word for it because the officers themselves, smart as they are, are not allowed to have their own opinions or tell their stories. Even in their private capacity. What? Like we're afraid FSOs would wikileaked themselves in their blogs?"

There would be a reason (or two) why this web log is pseudonymous.

"Just so sad.... you see all these wide-eyed newbies entering the service and then puff, their blogs get magic dragoned between FSI and their first posts."

"(M)agic dragoned." That's a new one, but apt enough. I've seen the terms "black dragon," "tigers," and "mandarins" used, generally implying what Dave Barry likes to call "the powers that be" (i.e., white men in blue suits).

"Telling the story of the Foreign Service is not an easy thing. You walk that fine line of either coming across as too whiny or as too bland if you've got nothing else to blog but brown grass in your backyard due to drought. A good thing that the FS has some talented writers who are able to straddle the fine line."

re: "Quiet in Cairo"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor ("The Original Blog *") comments on a recent Wikileaks disclosure.

Money quote(s):

"WikiLeaks continue to show the consequences of empire by bureaucracy. They also have a consequence: it is always difficult to get ones foreign service to be candid with their bosses, and the senior State department career officials to be candid with their political masters. Now that everyone can see there is a real danger that anything they write or say can be part of a Washington Post -- or Fox News -- article for all the world to see, that becomes even more difficult. Few in Washington actually know what is going on overseas, because few in Washington and even fewer of those we send out as diplomatic officers know any history of either the world or the region to which they are sent; now they'll all learn and say less about what they find when they report. Welcome to the candid world. Open diplomacy openly arrived at."

-----

Agree with it, disagree with it; the point is still valid even if some of the criticism seems off-target. Outside of academia itself, it's hard to find a group of people so interested in the world and its history as my FSO colleagues.

re: "An Intelligence Failure In The Middle East?"

Doug Mataconis at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") critiques the inevitable casting about for a fall guy.

Money quote(s):

"(M)any in Washington are expressing disappointment that the U.S. intelligence community seemingly missed the warning signs"

You mean, like Tunesia's "Jasmine Revolution"? Or like the fact that Mubarak was almost 82?

" I’ve got to agree with Ed Morrissey that there’s really very little to this criticism, and it looks to me like we’re seeing people in power stake out their positions for a “Who Lost Egypt?” debate should that come to pass"

It's right there! Right where it's always been! It was never ours to begin with!

"(D)ocuments from the Wikileaks diplomatic cables dump show that the U.S. has been concerned for years about the question of who would succeed Hosni Mubarak, and that we spend the last several years providing behind the scenes support to dissident groups in Egypt"

I can neither confirm nor deny (even if I knew, which I don't) whether this last is true, especially since FSOs (and others) have been directly ordered not to access Wikileaks.

"(O)n some level, the idea that the intelligence community missed anything here is simply absurd."

Remember: no policy failures, only intelligence failures. Or, alternatively, diplomatic failures.

&

"Anyone in Washington who says they didn’t see this coming is either lying or they weren’t paying attention to the world around them."

re: "The Effects of WikiLeaks on Those Who Work at the State Department"

Samuel Witten at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") has written the best two-paragraph explanation of a cable that I've ever seen.

Money quote(s):

"The diplomatic cable, a tool used by many governments, provides an official channel for U.S. diplomats abroad to report back to Washington and for Washington to instruct diplomats on how to approach relationships with foreign governments, the public overseas, international organizations and many other audiences. Many cables to and from our diplomatic posts include analyses of complex issues of foreign policy and diplomacy. Others provide candid recommendations of ways to advance U.S. interests against steep odds in dangerous and uncertain places. Some seek urgent guidance and identify sensitive information and options to address contingencies. Others offer insights into the character and motivations of foreign leaders, potential U.S. allies and opponents, opposition political parties, human rights activists, and dissidents.

Cables are a fundamental part of the State Department’s core culture, an essential component of how State Department diplomats and lawyers do business. The process of obtaining “clearance” on a proposed cable within the State Department (or from other concerned federal agencies) ensures that messages and instructions reflect all of the interests at stake and have the benefit of cumulative experience. Cables also create an official, historical record of the U.S. Government’s international actions and help ensure accountability for decisions."

"When overseas, I sent cables discussing and analyzing meetings or negotiations I attended or seeking guidance from Washington on possible options and instructions. When in Washington, where I was based, I made every effort to ensure that our outgoing cables were clear and detailed enough that colleagues around the world would benefit from precise analysis and assistance.

Damage from WikiLeaks disclosures go well beyond the immediate consequences reported in the media. The releases undermine the essential ability of our foreign affairs professionals to do their jobs. The leaks compromise the acquisition and flow of information around the world, reduce the effectiveness of our international outreach, and may put lives at risk."

"Putting aside the anti-Americanism of some supporters, there are those who suggest that the leaks promote a kind of openness, giving the public a better understanding of how diplomacy operates and clarifying the interests and goals of the United States and foreign governments. Some may argue that the knowledge of a potential leak – which always exists – may enhance the analytic and reportorial rigor of our diplomats abroad. In this respect, some suggest that the cables, overall, provide an advertisement for a State Department full of excellent professionals advocating and defending American interests around the world. There is certainly much truth in the latter. But to the extent there is any value in these public disclosures, that value, in my opinion, is far outweighed by the substantial negative impacts."

&

"The U.S. has aggressively sought to contain the diplomatic and strategic damage resulting from WikiLeaks disclosures. In this respect, any negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy that have resulted from WikiLeaks could well be compounded by additional disclosures, but may be ameliorated in many cases by the passage of time and subsequent events. Similarly, some of the negative professional and practical consequences at the State Department and in our international relations will improve over time.

That said, the profound unease and anxiety about the breach in our system through the unauthorized leaks may never disappear entirely. For the foreseeable future, foreign officials and private persons will understandably be worried about whether their dialogues with the State Department will be secure. Some candor and critiques by our own professionals may go unwritten or held in narrow channels of distribution."

If no one is willing to talk to us, we’re not going to be able to do much in the way of promoting mutual understanding. Or much of anything else.

The impact of this simply can’t be over-stated. No one can possibly believe their identities and the information they provide us will be held in confidence. We simply will no longer be trusted to pass information to the right ears and no further.

Any cable-drafter already knows that the potential readership of any given cable is quite large. Potentially, anyone within (and in some case outwith) the State Dept. possessing the right accesses could become a reader, either today or next week, next month, or next year. Cables are forever, communications-of-record; if nothing else their contents will become summarized and encapsulated in reports which trickle ever upwards.

Nothing levels our side of the playing field quite so drastically as when our mail is being read, even long after the fact. Candor and plain-talking are essential or you’re just spinning your wheels.

Time and again I’ve instructed report-writers to tell the facts, what they know and how they know it, what they saw and heard, as distinct from what they think and deduce from it (but include that too, clearly differentiated) and let “higher” do the second-guessing from their position of access to a wider ranger of information. Don’t self-adjudicate.

I must confess I’ve done this myself, pre-Wikileaks. Not writing everything I know or have heard about something, but passing the information (less the specific identity of a source) to “higher” through channels as secure (actually, in hindsight much more secure) as cable traffic but without the same paper trail. I thought I was just being paranoid about protecting my sources, but it’s true what they say: Paranoia Is Its Own Reward.

It also deprives “higher” with the fuller appreciation of that information which knowing the actual source can provide.

re: "The Effects of WikiLeaks on Those Who Work at the State Department"

Samuel Witten at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") has a great analysis on the Wikileaks fallout at the State Dept.

Money quote(s):

"The diplomatic cable, a tool used by many governments, provides an official channel for U.S. diplomats abroad to report back to Washington and for Washington to instruct diplomats on how to approach relationships with foreign governments, the public overseas, international organizations and many other audiences. Many cables to and from our diplomatic posts include analyses of complex issues of foreign policy and diplomacy. Others provide candid recommendations of ways to advance U.S. interests against steep odds in dangerous and uncertain places. Some seek urgent guidance and identify sensitive information and options to address contingencies. Others offer insights into the character and motivations of foreign leaders, potential U.S. allies and opponents, opposition political parties, human rights activists, and dissidents.

Cables are a fundamental part of the State Department’s core culture, an essential component of how State Department diplomats and lawyers do business. The process of obtaining “clearance” on a proposed cable within the State Department (or from other concerned federal agencies) ensures that messages and instructions reflect all of the interests at stake and have the benefit of cumulative experience. Cables also create an official, historical record of the U.S. Government’s international actions and help ensure accountability for decisions."

The above is without doubt the best two-paragraph explanation of a cable that I've ever seen.

Left out are the categories of cable which are, I believe, excluded from the Wikileaks breach, which are the relatively non-sexy cables having to do with official orders (such as travel or assignments, promotion lists, &tc.), law enforcement and consular-related communications which incorporated personally identifying information.

"Damage from WikiLeaks disclosures go well beyond the immediate consequences reported in the media. The releases undermine the essential ability of our foreign affairs professionals to do their jobs. The leaks compromise the acquisition and flow of information around the world, reduce the effectiveness of our international outreach, and may put lives at risk."

"Our foreign affairs professionals can do their jobs properly only when they can exchange information in confidence with foreign leaders, would-be leaders, academics, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens. Many interlocutors are willing to engage with American diplomats only because of implicit or explicit understandings that the exchanges will be kept confidential."

If no one is willing to talk to us, we're not going to be able to do much in the way of promoting mutual understanding. Or much of anything else.

"It seems inevitable that many officials from foreign governments or international organizations, not to mention private persons at risk, will be more reticent in their contacts with the United States. The releases already made thus are likely to put a chill in our normal diplomatic dialogues; in some cases, it may take years to restore confidence and underlying relationships."

This is huge. The impact of this simply can't be over-stated. No one can possibly believe their identities and the information they provide us will be held in confidence. We simply will no longer be trusted to pass information to the right ears and no further.

"Diplomats are asked from the first day of their training to think critically. Their job is not merely to report on what they see and hear, but to evaluate, challenge conventional wisdom, and recommend strategies for advancing U.S. interests in complex situations."

"(E)xperts in Washington benefit from “atmospheric reporting” (such as reports of what people are saying informally or what the public mood might be in some locations) because it helps them put other information in context. Candor and creativity in reporting and analysis could well be casualties of the shadow cast by WikiLeaks."

Any cable-drafter already knows that the potential readership of any given cable is quite large. Potentially, anyone within (and in some case outwith) the State Dept. possessing the right accesses could become a reader, either today or next week, next month, or next year. Cables are forever, communications-of-record; if nothing else their contents will become summarized and encapsulated in reports which trickle ever upwards.

"Cables are both vehicles for instructions to our negotiating delegations and part of the record of our negotiations."

Nothing levels our side of the playing field quite so drastically as when our mail is being read, even long after the fact. Candor and plain-talking are essential or you're just spinning your wheels.

"Candor, creativity and “out of the box” views are appropriately sought – and needed – by decision makers. Thanks to WikiLeaks, cable-drafters are now seeing their candid words, thoughts, and analysis, all intended for internal consumption, splashed on the front pages of newspapers and circulated around the world on the internet. Concerned for perhaps the first time in their careers that they have damaged U.S. interests, at least some of these employees could be more cautious in the future."

Time and again I've instructed report-writers to tell the facts, what they know and how they know it, what they saw and heard, as distinct from what they think and deduce from it (but include that too, clearly differentiated) and let "higher" do the second-guessing from their position of access to a wider ranger of information. Don't self-adjudicate.

Mr. Witten concludes:

"For the foreseeable future, foreign officials and private persons will understandably be worried about whether their dialogues with the State Department will be secure. Some candor and critiques by our own professionals may go unwritten or held in narrow channels of distribution."

I must confess I've done this myself, pre-Wikileaks. Not writing everything I know or have heard about something, but passing the information (less the specific identity of a source) to "higher" through channels as secure (actually, in hindsight much more secure) as cable traffic but without the same paper trail. I thought I was just being paranoid about protecting my sources, but it's true what they say: Paranoia Is Its Own Reward.

It also deprives "higher" with the fuller appreciation of that information which knowing the actual source can provide.