re: "Obama's Misplaced Mideast Optimism"

Daniel Pipes at danielpipes.org (" Opine briefly on diverse topics ") provided some thinkery on likely fallout from the Arab Spring.

10/25

re: "Resettling the Mujahedeen-e Khalq of Iraq"

Daniel Pipes at Lion's Den ("a fast way to comment on many topics") is concerned about looming deadlines.

Money quote(s):

"Iraqi authorities threaten by April 30 forcibly to expel 3,400 Iranians, members of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq. MeK members rightly fear for their lives if pushed across the border for the Iranian regime criminalizes membership in the MeK and abominates the organization, its determined foe."

Prof. Pipes gives the (recent, Iraq-centric) background:

"Saddam Hussein allied with the MeK (also known as the People's Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, or PMOI) against their common enemy in Tehran. Following the U.S.-led conquest of Iraq in 2003, MeK members living in Iraq acquired "protected persons" status and entered a political limbo, neither friend nor enemy of the occupying powers. With the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops and increasingly close ties between the Iraqi and Iranian governments, MeK circumstances worsened to the point that in April 2011 Iraqi troops attacked Camp Ashraf, its Iraqi home since 1986, killing 34 people and injuring 325.

Cooler heads prevailed after this dangerous flare-up. With U.S. government approval, Baghdad signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United Nations in December 2011. In it, the Government of Iraq committed to the relocation of Camp Ashraf (now renamed Camp New Iraq) residents to a temporary transit facility where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would begin the process of transiting MeK members in Iraq to refugee status, a necessary first step to resettle them outside Iraq."

So that brings us up to the nearly-present day.

"(A)bout 400 MeK members voluntarily left Camp Ashraf on Feb. 18 and moved to Camp Liberty, a former U.S. military base. Their transfer, however, was marred by threats from Iraqi forces, harassment from elements of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and inhospitable living conditions and constant police surveillance within Camp Liberty."

CAA has seen (on the internet, so it must be true!) reports that, following the U.S. withdrawal from Baghdad, Camp Liberty was truly and most-thoroughly looted.

In the Iraq context, that means (as it does in much of the Third World), plumbing and electrical fixtures, to include pipes and wiring, pulled out of walls, ceilings, and floors.

"(T)here is no clear sense how the MeK members will all be processed as refugees within the next two months, much less of their ultimate destination for resettlement outside either Iraq or Iran."

The easy cases, the ones who have passports, citizenship, or legal residency in Europe or the U.S., have likely already departed Iraq. The remainder are something of an indigestible lump, in terms of their relocation.

".... Washington.... must not abandon the organization most feared by the tyrants in Tehran"

To that end, Prof. Pipes has several suggestions. Scroll down and read them here.

Prof. Pipes point about the PMOI being the "organization most feared" by the Iranian regime is an interesting one. For all the legitimate (to one degree or another) criticisms of the PMOI/MEK and its related/umbrella/subsidiary groups; they're terrorists, undemocratic, a personality cult, neo-marxists, maoists, &tc.; the Evil Mullah Regime (TM) in Tehran is afraid of them.

2/28

re: "Newt Gingrich and the "Invented" Palestinian People"

Prof. Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("the Internet's most accessed sources of specialized information on the Middle East and Islam") shares Prof. Gingrich's love of history.

Money quote(s):

"The former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and current Republican presidential candidate said yesterday that "there was no Palestine as a state. It was part of the Ottoman Empire. We have invented the Palestinian people, who are in fact Arabs and are historically part of the Arab people, and they had the chance to go many places." "

Pretty much factual, although the last bit is a little questionable, given how many Palestinian Arabs have been marooned in U.N. refugee camps for generations, as a matter of policy.

"(H)e happens to be absolutely correct: no Arabic-speaking Muslims identified themselves as "Palestinian" until 1920, when, in rapid order this appellation and identity was adopted by the Muslim Arabs living in the British mandate of Palestine."

The thing about inventions is that, successful or unsuccesful, they don't ever get un-invented.





12/10

re: "Friendless in the Middle East"

Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("the Internet's most accessed sources of specialized information on the Middle East and Islam") explains why the "Arab Spring" and "democracy" aren't necessarily good things in the mid- to long run.

Money quote(s):

"(O)ther than in a few outliers (Cyprus, Israel, and Iran), populations are predominantly hostile to the West. Friends are few, powerless, and with dim prospects of taking control. Democracy therefore translates into hostile relations with unfriendly governments.

Both the first wave of elections in 2005 and the second wave, just begun in Tunisia, confirm that, given a free choice, a plurality of Middle Easterners vote for Islamists. Dynamic, culturally authentic and ostensibly democratic, these forward a body of uniquely vibrant political ideas and constitute the only Muslim political movement of consequence.

But Islamism is the third totalitarian ideology (following Fascism and Communism). It preposterously proposes a medieval code to deal with the challenges of modern life. Retrograde and aggressive, it denigrates non-Muslims, oppresses women, and justifies force to spread Muslim rule. Middle Eastern democracy threatens not just the West's security but also its civilization.

That explains why Western leaders (with the brief exception of George W. Bush) shy away from promoting democracy in the Muslim Middle East." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Interesting that Prof. Pipes includes Iran among the outliers whose populations are not hostile to the West, but it's substantially true. It's Iran's governing regime, the mullah-cracy, that hates the West, not the overwhelming majority of the people(s) in Iran.

"Summing up the West's policy dilemma vis-à-vis the Middle East:

Democracy pleases us but brings hostile elements to power.

Tyranny betrays our principles but leaves pliable rulers in power.

As interest conflicts with principle, consistency goes out the window. Policy wavers between Scylla and Charybdis. Western chanceries focus on sui generis concerns: security interests (the U.S. Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain), commercial interests (oil in Saudi Arabia), geography (Libya is ideal for Europe-based air sorties), the neighbors (the Turkish role in Syria), or staving off disaster (a prospect in Yemen). Little wonder policy is a mess."

It's very easy to criticize U.S. foreign policies in the Near and MidEast regions.

(It's so easy that even CAA can do it!)

Prof. Pipes does us all a service by pointing out some of the limiting realities that constrain any effort to design and implement a humane, consistent, and non-suicidal foreign policy.

(It's rather like the "you-can-have-this-cheap-good-fast-pick-any-three" conundrum, only with humanitarian, consistence, and self-interest being your "pick-any-two" constraints.)

11/8

re: "In Praise of NYC's Muscular Counterterrorism"

Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("Opine briefly on diverse topics, mostly within his areas of specialization") recognized excellent counterterrorism at work.

Money quote(s):

"U.S. law enforcement agencies have generally responded to 9/11 with a pretend counterterrorism policy. They still insist that naming the enemy as Islamism causes terrorism, that Islamist violence poses no more threat than that of neo-Nazis, racial supremacists, et al., and that counterterrorism primarily involves feel-good measures such as improving civil rights, passing anti-discrimination laws, and displaying goodwill to Islamists.

And then there is the New York Police Department, an institution uniquely spurred by 9/11 to abandon its former laxity and get serious. The force that had mishandled prior terrorist incidents (e.g., the assassination of Meir Kahane) quickly transformed itself into an outstanding counterterrorist agency under the remarkable leadership of Raymond Kelly. (Andrew McCarthy calls him a "godsend"). Unlike other law enforcement institutions, NYPD names the enemy, acknowledges the predominant threat of Islamist violence, and built a robust intelligence operation."

Counterterrorism means countering terrorists. If "improving civil rights, passing anti-discrimination (?) laws, and displaying goodwill" will get you there, more power to you. But catering to Islamists surely won't.

"(T)he department dispatched officers to Pakistani neighborhoods and "instructed them to look for reasons to stop cars: speeding, broken tail lights, running stop signs, whatever. The traffic stop gave police an opportunity to search for outstanding warrants or look for suspicious behavior. An arrest could be the leverage the police needed to persuade someone to become an informant." NYPD established the Terrorist Interdiction Unit to handle these informants, including "mosque crawlers," "café crawlers," shopkeepers, and nosy neighbors."

Enforce the laws on the books. Novel concept. Target extra attention on the neighborhoods most likely to be harboring terrorists and their sympathizers (i.e., their support infrastructure).

This obviously doesn't mean that terrorists can't base themselves elsewhere, false-flag themselves, or even recruit from other neighborhoods and national groups, but it's just silly to ignore the obvious (and thereby create a sanctuary).

"It established the Special Services Unit to handle operations outside of New York City, where NYPD lacks jurisdiction, including several American states and eleven foreign countries. The effort has its share of successes; for example, a Muslim NYPD officer working undercover in New Jersey had a major role in Operation Arabian Knight, the June 2010 arrest of two New Jersey Muslims who pleaded guilty of planning to join the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab and then kill American troops.

It also established the Demographics Unit to "map ethnic residential communities within the Tri-State area [New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York State]" and to send undercover police officers, or rakers, to monitor Muslims. Made up of 16 officers speaking among them Arabic, Bengali, Hindi, Punjabi, and Urdu, the unit lists 29 "ancestries of interest," all of them predominantly Muslim, including one described as "American Black Muslim." In all, NYPD identified 263 of what it calls "ethnic hot spots" in the city, plus 53 "mosques of concern." "

All in all, a chronicle of solid intelligence/counterintelligence work on the domestic front. This is what the FBI should be doing (and hopefully, quietly, is doing) rather than playing snuggle-bunnies with CAIR and other unindicted co-conspirators.

9/13

re: "Empower Iranians vs. Tehran"

Daniel Pipes at DanialPipes.Org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") has news from and about Iran.

Money quote(s):

"How should Western governments deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which Washington labels "the most active state sponsor of terrorism"?

Iranian aggression began in 1979, with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the holding of some of its staff as hostages for 444 days. Major subsequent attacks included two bombings in Beirut in 1983: at the U.S. embassy, killing 63, and at a U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241."

And that's just hitting some of the high spots. Essentially, they have been waging war against the U.S., albeit mostly at a lowish sort of intensity, since 1979 to the present time (and presumably more to follow).

(My apologies to those whose personal experiences with, por ejemplo, explosively formed projectiles, were undoubtedly highly intense.)

"American responses fall into two main camps: tough and diplomatic."

"The diplomatic camp, which generally controls U.S. policy, accepts the permanence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and expects Tehran to respond to diplomatic overtures.

A main battleground in this dispute is the question of whether or not the most prominent Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK), should remain on the U.S. government's terrorism list. The tough camp generally views the MeK, founded in 1965, as a lever against the mullahs and (with a minority dissenting) wants it delisted. The diplomatic camp argues that delisting would anger the Iranian leaders, hampering efforts to improve relations, or (contradictorily) would limit Washington's ability to reach out to the Iranian street.

The pro-MeK side argues that the MeK has a history of cooperating with Washington, providing valuable intelligence on Iranian nuclear plans and tactical intelligence about Iranian efforts in Iraq. Further, just as the MeK's organizational and leadership skills helped bring down the shah in 1979, these skills can again facilitate regime change. The number of street protestors arrested for association with the MeK points to its role in demonstrations, as do slogans echoing MeK chants, e.g., calling Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i a "henchman," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a "dictator," and shouting "down with the principle of Velayat-e Faqih" (that a religious figure heads the government)."

There are merits to both arguments. Since the PMOI doesn't even own up to its past terrorist record against U.S. targets (i.e., murdered U.S. servicemen in 1970's Iran), they don't get a pass from me on this.

"The anti-MeK faction does not address the benefits of delisting but argues that the U.S. government must continue the listing on the basis of allegations of terrorism. Their indictment notes that the MeK killed six Americans in the 1970s. Whether or not these allegations are accurate, a terrorist incident must have occurred within two years to continue with the terrorist-group designation—rendering discussion of the 1970s completely irrelevant."

The "two years" rules is news to me. I followed the link and, admittedly, didn't read the whole Public Law, but when I went to the 8 U.S.C. section that appeared to be amended, the only "two years" that seemed to apply were purely procedural in nature (having to do with a petition period that occurs two years after an organization is designated for the list) and had nothing to do with the length of time since an organization last committed a terrorist act.

"The pro-MeK side points to three main U.S. terrorist databases—the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) -- and notes that in each one the MeK comes up clean since 2006 or earlier."

See above. If they won't even admit to what we know they did against us in the past, why would we trust them in the future?

"(C)apabilities and intentions? The State Department's 2006 "Country Reports on Terrorism" accused the MeK of maintaining "capacity and will" for terrorist acts but the 2007, 2008, and 2009 reports omitted this statement. Britain's Court of Appeal derided proscription of the MeK as "perverse," and the group was removed from the U.K. terrorist list in 2008. The European Union cleared the group of terrorism charges in 2009. The French judiciary dismissed all terrorism-related allegations against the group in May 2011."

This is where Mr. Pipes makes some sense. The West and the U.S. specifically are very much not the PMOI's enemies and have not been so for years. In fact, their military arm at Camp Ashraf is very much dependent upon the U.S. for protection.

He concludes:

"In brief, the argument to maintain the MeK's terrorist designation is baseless."

Nah, there's still a base, it's just not getting any younger; just like the families of the U.S. servicement killed by PMOI assassins in Iran all those years ago. An admission of responsibility, an apology, and some reparations to the families would go a long way in cementing the PMOI's credibility.

"Following a court-mandated review of the MeK's terrorist designation, the secretary of state must soon decide whether to maintain this listing. With one simple signature, the Obama administration can help empower Iranians to seize control over their destiny—and perhaps end the mullahs' mad nuclear dash."

For more on that, see Lex's latest here.

re: "Camp Ashraf attacked, USG observes"

Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") had updated his blog about the massacre at Camp Ashraf.

Money quote(s):

"The MeK reports that Iraqi troops killed 33 at Camp Ashraf"

The numbers may be inflated (or they may be accurate); the PMOI likes to work the media in their favor to influence on their behalf.

"The U.S. government had troops nearby but did not deploy them; instead, the Department of State condemned the attack ("deeply troubled") after it happened. On the scene, AP reports, "A U.S. Army officer at the camp Friday looked very angry when talking to the Iraqi commander at the scene. Asked why, an Iraqi translator accompanying the U.S. officer replied: 'Because of the high casualties'."

Let their be no mistake: the PMOI/MEK/NCRI are not the good guys. They may, however, be less-bad-guys than the folks who'd like them dead. That being said, I'm not a fan of adding them to the list of folks the U.S. has stood by and let be killed off, rather than make a fuss about things.

re: "U.S.-Pakistan Relations in Decline"

Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") makes some foreign policy suggestions.

Money quote(s):

"(H)ere is a realistic policy recommendation that serves American interests:

Give up on the pretence that the two governments are allies and treat Pakistan – with its many madrassahs, its Islamist military leadership, and rogue intelligence service – as a danger zone. Adopt a policy of containment vis-à-vis the Islamism coming out of it, rewarding cooperation and punishing hostile acts. This approach permits Washington flexibly to collaborate or confront as circumstances warrant and needs change."

The most obvious and immediate drawback for this approach is that Pakistan comprises the main supply routes (MSR) for our military forces in Afghanistan.

This is not so say we can't or shouldn't do this, but that there are consequences to doing so and preparation would be essential for managing them.

re: "My Optimism About Europe"

Daniel Pipes at DanielPipes.Org ("Although Mr. Pipes rarely writes about sex, this subject dominates the readership totals in all three of his formats: articles ") says:

"Perhaps alone in the coterie focused on the Islamist threat to Europe, I am cheerful these days. That's because I see the anti-Islamist reaction growing even more quickly than the Islamist threat itself."

Read why.

re: "The Voice of America, Silenced on Radical Islam"

Daniel Pipes at danielpipes.org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") wonders at some broadcasting guidance.

Money quote(s):

"For the past year, there's been a concerted push within the U.S. government to ban frank talk about the nature of the Islamist enemy. It began with the Department of Homeland Security, then moved to the National Counter Terrorism Center and the departments of State and Defense. Already in May 2008, I heard an excellent analysis of the enemy by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Mahnken in which he bizarrely never once mentioned Islam or jihad.

I've been wondering how this change in vocabulary actually occurs: is it a spontaneous mood shift, a group decision, or a directive from on high?"

&

"VOA is not a commercial station with a bottom line and shareholders.

Founded in 1942 as part of the Office of War Information, it is funded by the American taxpayer and speaks on behalf of the U.S. government. It must not pander to increase its ratings at the expense of its integrity."