The Hill - Diminishing American diplomacy around the globe a dangerous prospect

Brett Bruen at The Hill ("It signals the important issues of the moment.") makes some nice arguments about the importance of U.S. diplomacy to real life Americans.

Money quote(s):

"You’re robbed on a trip overseas. It’s late on a Friday night. A short message at the American Embassy informs you that due to budget cuts they no longer provide afterhours service. No help will be available until Monday. Even then, you’ll face long lines and limited options. Can our citizens really do without diplomats?"

Most consular services are supported by fees.  Application fees for visas, processing fees for passports, notarial fees; you get the picture.

There are some instances where there's no fee charged; in death cases, in assisting victims of crime, in visiting U.S. citizens detained, arrested, or imprisoned abroad.  That comes out of overhead.  Embassies and consulates (and the Bureau of Consular Affairs which pays the salaries of consular staff) eat the cost; the paying customers subsidize the non-paying ones.

One of the concerns about (possibly) moving the visa and passport missions to DHS is the question of who then shoulders the burden of some of the most sensitive functions of consular work, assisting U.S. citizens abroad?  Along with that, who pays for it?  Would State retain those responsibilities?  Would DHS assume them?  If the fees ($2 billion annually) were to move along with the visa and passport function to DHS, is Congress then going to begin appropriating a budget (which it hasn't had to do in decades) to pay for those non-fee generating services?

"In defending diplomacy, we too often talk in bold and broad terms. World peace. International trade. America’s standing on the global stage. These goals seem detached from the kinds of things that impact people every day. Less heralded are the concessions achieved by our negotiators that make the world a fairer place to do business. Few will connect the fact Americans need a visa to so few countries with the work of diplomacy. There are no parades for the war that didn’t happen."

Americans may travel to so many countries around the world needing to get a visa beforehand that some are honestly surprised when they encounter a situation where they do.  Naturally, that tends to happen (since nowadays nobody books trips through travel agencies which might have warned them) when they try to board a flight for their dream vacation destination and are denied boarding.  Even more naturally, that will happen as they try to change plans at an airport overseas and on a weekend in a city where they don't understand the language, they have no hotel reservations, and there is no U.S. consulate.

"There are those in the West Wing who doubt diplomats’ support for Trump’s foreign policies. Yet, every senior diplomat in Foggy Bottom served under Republican and Democratic administrations. They did so because they are guided by a belief in American principles, not party."

It's true our diplomats genuinely put country before party.  Nonetheless, it's also true that the last eight years really muddied those waters, especially in the minds of those who watched from the other side of the aisle.

Security Decisions, part the second

This earlier post discussed the application of security standards to existing buildings in terms of some of the limitations that reality imposed.  That is, that along with prohibitive expense, the practicality of such endeavors rests firmly somewhere in the range between Extremely Difficult and Bliddy Impossible.

Diplomacy, like politics, is an art of the possible.  Diplomatic security must matrix both the imperative to provide security, to protect, with the need to carry out  the diplomatic mission itself.  Sometimes that means that the security situation is so dire that the diplomatic mission must be abandoned; other times the diplomatic mission will be considered so imperative that security measures take a backseat.  Or are adapted to fit the situation.  Thus we have active and ongoing diplomatic missions, and have for years, in countries where we would otherwise have shuttered our embassies and evacuated our staff.  E.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Libya might be considered a reasonable addition to that list.

States are responsible, under the Vienna Conventions and customary international law, for providing the protection necessary to secure those diplomatic and consular facilities which it has accepted within its territory.  Not being an area expert on Libya specifically or the Mahgreb generally (but not being completely ignorant of those regions either), the question of just how much control the new, post-Qhadafi, central government of Libya has beyond the city limits of Tripoli seems fairly relevent with respect to how much the U.S. should have relied upon them to provide adequate security to our facilities in Benghazi.

Just what the purpose of the U.S. mission in Benghazi was is still very much an open question, the opening of an “American Corner” notwithstanding.  But its purpose(s) were (was?) of sufficient importance to the accomplishing of the larger goals of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya that:

- It was established in the first place (to the accompaniment of whatever security waivers and exceptions may have been necessary to do so); and

- It remained upon until it was destroyed; and

- Amb. Stevens believed it necessary to travel there on as inauspicious a date as the 11^th anniversary of 9/11.

Now, CAA is going to pull back the gauzy veil that obscures some of the nuts-and-bolts of actual diplomacy with some observations and caveats.

Caveat #1:  CAA doesn’t know what the purpose of the Benghazi mission (beyond what little can be found at the embassy website) was because it is not now nor has it ever been part of my professional portfolio.  If there’s some especially classified aspect to that mission, as a professional matter CAA has had no need-to-know.  So I don’t know.

Caveat #2:  As someone who’s held a top secret clearance since before he could legally drink hard liquer, CAA realized decades ago that the possession of certain secrets meant that forever after, with respect to some fields of endeavor, even my guesses could be considered to be classified information.  So there are quite a fews things about which, due to the meandering nature of what I laughingly describe as my “career path,” CAA does not speculate aloud.  And CAA certainly does not do so in public fora such as the internet.

Observation #1:  Technically, there are a few clearcut categories of U.S. diplomatic facilities located overseas:  embassies, consulates general, and consulates. 

(But real life is never that neat and clearly delineated.)

Observation #2:  Since the breakup of Yugoslavia (if not before) and U.S. intervention in the Balkans, the State Department came up with things called “U.S. Liaison Offices” (or “USLO”).  These were kinda/sorta consulates, in that they often performed the sorts of services usually associated with U.S. consulates, but were generally not intended as permanent facilities.  USLOs sometimes get upgraded into more-or-less permanent posts and become consulates or consulates general; other times they are eventually closed.  The U.S. has continued using this model in places like Iraq.

Observation #3:  Once upon a time, CAA used to go TDY from the U.S. and participate in surveys of various U.S. diplomatic facilities.  Never mind what kind of surveys:  the point is that my teams would visit every U.S. diplomatic office in a particular country.  Off the top of my head I did that in eight or nine countries around Africa and the Middle East.  In some of the countries where we had a largish diplomatic presence, we might have “official” Americans scattered in penny-parcels across a vast landscape, all of them falling under the authority of the chief of mission (i.e., the U.S. ambassador) and all of the going about the legitimate business of foreign affairs, international development, or military assistance (to list just three examples).

So I don’t find it especially mysterious or troubling that the U.S. had an official office-building in Benghazi that wasn’t formally flagged as a consulate (or consulate general) under a U.S. consul (or consul general).

re: "The EU's diplomatic corps celebrates gloomy first birthday"

David Bosco at The Multilateralist ("On The New World Order") reported on the EAS' first anniversary.

Money quote(s):

"The EU's new diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service, was created a year ago. A product of the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS was designed to give flesh and bone to the longstanding aspiration of a common European foreign and security policy. The service's first chief, Britain's Catherine Ashton, has had the unenviable task of making the EAS coherent and relevant. Operating in an often toxic political and budgetary environment, she has had to draw on and meld personnel from national diplomatic services and the EU bureaucracy.

The most obvious structural obstacle to EEAS influence has been the jealousy (and occasional disdain) of national diplomatic services, particularly those of major EU states. All EU states formally support the EEAS, but many are deeply reluctant to shed any meaningful foreign-policy autonomy. But the jealousy of nation-states has not been Ashton's only obstacle."

Predictably, for those who've studied or survived bureaucratic entities, a major difficulty the EAS folks face is infighting from other parts of the EU bureaucracy.

1/6

re: "Foreign Service Staffing Gaps, and Oh, Diplomacy 3.0 Hiring Initiative to Conclude in FY2023"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator who monitors the goings on at ‘Foggy-Bottom’ (i.e. the State Department) and the “worldwide available” universe from Albania to Zimbabwe") went over Diplomacy 3.0 point-by-point.

Money quote(s):

"State created new positions under Diplomacy 3.0, all midlevel positions. Instead of hiring midlevel personnel to fill those positions, it continued to hire entry level personnel."

Midlevel ranks are where the shortages currently exist.

The FS cohorts hired under the first two initiatives (beginning with Sec. Powell's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative or "DRI") are already in the midlevel ranks, some even at the highest midlevel rank (FS-01: Foreign Service Officer, Class One), the equivalent of a colonel (or a Navy or Coast Guard captain).

Which is one reason State is so resistant to hiring directly into the midlevel grades. No one (or hardly anyone) in living memory has suggested that the military and naval services hire their field grade officeers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels; lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains) directly off the street.

Even special service officers such as medical doctors don't enter the medical corps above the rank of captain (O-3, equivalent to FS-04, the highest FS entry-level grade).

7/17

re: "The Definition of Insanity"

Deebow at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") found fault with the latest iteration of the "peace dividend."

Money quote(s):

"We did this after WWI, WWII and during the decade of Slick Willie and the Peace Dividend. Resurgent China, collapsing Norks, Nuclear Iran, unfinished Afghanistan; really, I probably could go on and on with people who would wish us ill."

&

"(D)id anyone consult any random first sergeant out in the motor pool or Infantry branch officer on what they learned at West Point?, I mean, besides the mandatory attendance at presidential speeches and diversity classes? You know, the strategy and tactics part, theatre logistics, air land battle? Have any of those mental midgets heard of being there "firstest with the mostest" to win the battle? The 82nd Airborne is built around the idea that we are not going to spend time in the mutual circle jerk of international diplomacy, we are going to put men on the ground to influence our enemies decision making process and get inside their OODA Loop. Ships and airplanes driven and flown by men can still not own the ground that young men in the mud will be forced to wrest from our nation's foes. We owe it to them to give them enough comrades to ensure it can be done.

And the last time I walked the battlefield, the only dude who owned the ground was not the pilot in the B-1B I invited to the party after I kicked it off with my own fireworks; it was me, and all the other dudes on the bad-ass list I brought with me; standing on the earth I wanted to own and kicking the stinking jihadis off of it in the nastiest, most lethal and final fashion I could come up with moment to moment."

These are serious subjects studied seriously by serious people. I'm not sure they fit in with the narrative.

"Wars are not something you can fight with a coupon or try to duck out on the cheap and my bet is that we could afford a poop ton more troops and equipment if we weren't making loans/campaign contributions to outfits like Solyndra and putting our debt at 100.3 percent of our GDP, along with all of the other Marxist crap that the OinC has decided is good for America.

This is bad voodoo and the sooner the amateurs in Foggy Bottom and the Puzzle Palace that are entertaining the whisperings of the Good Idea Fairy are on the rocket sled to irrelevance, the better."

&

"(T)his is the worst idea this administration has ever had, and the Libturds that thought this up better start studying up on their Chinese and getting familiar with the 12th Imam, because there may test questions at the re-education camp later."

This presumes that their new overlords will bother trying to re-educate them.

1/5

re: "The Long Term"

The late, great Lex at Neptunus Lex (" The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy! ") remarked on a U.S. diplomatic "win" out in the far reaches of the Pacific Rim (i.e., in China's front yard).

Money quote(s):

"(T)here’s always a but in diplomacy – one move, even a series of well choreographed and expertly timed moves – does not a match make"

The point being, I think, that the "match" is rarely ever fully over, except in such exceptional circumstances such as the end of a major war, the collapse of a dynasty or empire, or some sort of mass extinction event.

(And then a new match will start, and some of the "new" players will look awfully familiar.)

"First comes the political succession, then the internal struggle for power and the coalescence of a national strategy. That is, of course, if the Peoples’ Liberation Army has the patience for it.

In the really long term, we’re all dead. The state within a state represented by the PLA gets to ponder its over-reaching, rebuke and subsequent loss of face and decide how long “long” is." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The PLA isn't going anywhere, absent a really cataclysmic (for China) turn of events.

"For US diplomats, it’s all pats on the back, champagne toasts and Washington fêtes, for now. A chance to celebrate a coup. An opportunity, even, to treasure an adversary worth tilting against, after a decade of squashing irrational bugs, and making uncomfortable alliances.

Let’s hope we haven’t forgotten how to play this game."

Kudos to all involved, but don't get cocky.

p.s. For friends and fans of Lex, be sure to drop by The Lexicans.

11/20

re: "Afghanistan: America's Willful Deception"

John Bernard at American Thinker (" a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans ") had harsh words for our wartime national political and military leadership.

Money quote(s):

"The battlefield is as fluid as diplomatic efforts to shape the outcome are convoluted. While diplomacy during peacetime can be described as the efforts between two national representatives to overcome obstacles to a good, healthy, and mutually productive relationship, diplomacy during hostilities cannot. "Diplomatic efforts" during an ongoing conflict are at best an oxymoron. The failure of two parties to work out problems with one another is what leads to war, and if war is the ultimate outcome of a failure of diplomacy, then it stands to reason that the successful outcome of the war can be defined only when one warring nation capitulates to the battlefield prowess of the other." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

War is sometimes described as the failure of diplomacy, and there's more than little truth in that. Diplomacy has also been described as the continuation of warfare by other means, and vice versa.

"What is truly amazing is that the level of morale in the ranks of our war-fighting community has remained as high as it has. High morale is not, however, an accurate indicator of how our military views our successes on this battlefield, especially at this point in history. The reason it does not is because this is one of the only times in our history when a draft has not been used to maintain numbers in the ranks. Those who have served both in Iraq and Afghanistan have done so willingly, and their overall perception of time served is generally more positive than that of conscripts." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The result, although we are now engaged in disassembling and dispersing it, is the most experienced and professional army, in all components (regular, guard, and reserves) since World War II.

Granted, the army we had at the end of the (first) Gulf War was the product of both the Reagan build-up and the officer corps that overcame the post-Vietnam hangover, but we disassembled and dispersed much of that as well.

"(T)he lexicon has morphed. While success on the battlefield has historically been defined as victory, even the word "battlefield" has been carefully expunged from the public dialogue. Success has been co-opted by "compromise" and victory remanded to the dustbin of unacceptable words and phrases. Enemy prisoners of war (EPW) are now future leaders in the new coalition government envisioned by the luminaries in D.C. General grade officers have been carefully selected for their willingness to capture the vision and then translate it into conduct on the battlefield that reflects the intent of their commander in chief.

The American population have been exposed to military jargon they don't understand as well as historically incorrect details about Afghan society and Islam, and they have been force-fed these carefully manicured stories of successful encounters with Afghan society for at least eight years." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Damning assertions one and all, and none of them incorrect.

It was an American general, once upon a time, who said "There is no substitute for victory."

We've come a long way from that time, but not all progress necessarily represents an improvement.

"(W)e have had further confirmation of an ongoing effort by U.S. representatives to reconcile with the Taliban and to release battle-hardened Taliban fighters back to Afghan society. While we have chosen to abandon the battlefield in a quest for a magic potion to make the Taliban like us, they, are doing their level best to "explain" to us that they have no interest in peace, an example of which is the killing an Afghan "peace negotiator." They are also exploiting our weakness on the battlefield due to our apparent unwillingness to bring the fight to them!"

&

"(M)any questions are raised by all of this, but none is as important as this one: why did we ever let this government convince us that rebuilding Afghanistan was somehow better for the United States? This question is important simply because there are those of us who are serving in that part of the world who have been led to believe they are there for the security of the United States. Regardless of the apparent inanity of the mission, the overwhelming evidence of IED placement, VBIED traffic, the obvious lack of measurable support from the local population, and the incessant stories of moral and ethical failure in the Kabul government, these war fighters press on. The government that has compelled them to serve in a hostile environment owes them at least the ability to defend themselves when fired upon. The ROE, however, denies them use of the basic tools of the trade: artillery, close air support, use of organic weapons systems like the 60mm mortar, and even small arms fire if their proximity to civilians cannot absolutely guarantee safety for the civilians."

This is a legitimate question: Is rebuilding Afghanistan necessarily to the advantage of the U.S. and, if so, in what way? Simply making the assertion doesn't make it so.

"(T)he conditions in Afghanistan are hardly normal, and no matter how much the general grade officers and their counterparts in D.C. want Afghanistan and Afghans to reflect their vision for them, it isn't going to happen. One thing is certain: as the number of service members in Afghanistan is drawn down, the real threat to our war fighter community will grow exponentially." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"The truth is, in spite of the narrative, the actual evidence suggests that things in Afghanistan are turning in favor of the Taliban. The danger to our forces will not only continue, but will grow in intensity as more and more control of the battle space is handed to the Taliban. And this giving over of control is a direct consequence of our having chosen not to hold the Taliban accountable on the battlefield -- a battlefield created by a failure on the part of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other like-minded Islamic cells to choose peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. It is also a complete failure of the remainder of the so-called peaceful Muslim ummah to denounce the violence perpetrated by these groups." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)

A negotiated withdrawal with a Taliban-dominated (or coalition government which includes them), with the kind of exposed lines of supply and communications we endure in Afghanistan, is a recipe for catastrophe, subject to the meagre mercies of one history's most merciless foemen.

"Those in the highest levels of governance in this country and appointed to highest echelons of authority in the DOD have willingly rendered their consciences and their minds incapable of considering the threat, the motivation, and the determination of this enemy, and the proper response to the threat. Instead, they have done what too many men in this age have done. They have been seduced by a lie that allows their weakened character to take the less painful road rather than the road that would have led to victory.

And in so doing, they have purposefully deceived a nation and a nation's most valuable asset: its war-fighting community."

5/16

re: "Diplomatic Political Reporting: Say What You Think?"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("A digital hybrid of blog and memoir presented on a daily basis, or not.") gave thoughtful advice to diplomatic report writers.

He urged "the following general rules:

• if you want it to be read, make it readable
• some things are important - but don't matter
• no stupid words!
• don't be boring"

This crossdecks nicely to the U.S. diplomatic context.

"Part of the problem with political reporting is getting right the balance between what HQ wants to know and what it needs to know. Usually HQ is several months behind where any given overseas problem 'is' - standard briefs get word-processed and stale, drawing on expired assumptions.

So just as it is right to try to keep HQ up to date, Embassies also need to remember that HQ usually won't be that interested in anything which significantly changes the 'narrative' unless it is dramatic enough to catch the headlines in the HQ country.

Likewise you can say what you like in an urgent telegram, but the dominant thought about any given overseas development back at HQ will be whatever the media are saying that morning about it. Ministers pay more attention to the newspapers read in the car on the way to the office than to diplomatic cables, since any questions they will be asked during the day will draw on that media reporting, even if it is wrong or stupid..."

All very good advice, simply substitute words like "the Department," "Main State," "the Seventh Floor," or "the Bureau" where "HQ" appears, "secretaries" for "ministers," and understand that "newspapers" actually means CNN, NPR, the Washington Post, and the New York Times.

Urgent messages should relay breaking news; the context and conditions should already have been provided by background cables sent so that desk officers and the like get the "ground truth" and flavor of the place that only on scene reporting can provide.

"(T)here is no easy answer on how a young diplomat should best deal with a situation where the mission and its policy are at variance with reality, honour and common sense. Of course anyone feeling really upset can launch into the various available grievance/appeal processes, but that merely builds up a reputation as a vainglorious boat-rocker and in any case is a hopeless vehicle for changing policy analysis."

Amb. Crawford provided a nice anecdote from his own, occasionally controversial, past. Note that he made ambassador after this episode.

"(I)t ultimately comes down to how you want to live. Most of us rationalise such things away on the grounds that it just takes time to change policies, and that much of what 'policy' is ebbs and flows anyway. Sometimes it's better to avoid fighting a losing battle on one issue for the sake of making a difference in another.

If that isn't your style, resign and do something else. But remember that if you do that, the organisation you've left will have one honourable voice fewer - does that really help either?"

A very good question, but keep your hand on your wallet, and your soul, while you ponder it.

11/20

re: "diplomacy"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Jack_Savage's comment of Friday, February 10th at 8:40 AM EST(link).

Jack Savage said:

"When we are in a foreign land, aren’t we ALL diplomats?"

My response:

"Only when we screw up.

Seriously, I got that same briefing as a Private (E-2) in Germany back during the Bad Old Days (TM) of The Cold War as well.

So in a broad-swath philosophical sense that’s true.

From a perspective of international law (specifically the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), anybody we send over on a diplomatic passport (IF THEY ARE GRANTED A DIPLOMATIC VISA BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT) is a “diplomat.”

But in terms of reality, it’s our Foreign Service Officers (FSO; both from State, USAID, and Dept. of Commerce “Foreign Commercial Service) and Foreign Service Specialists (FSS) who are “actual” diplomats by training and profession.

You could add to that some (but not all) of the various attaches (such as military ones) from other government “tenant agencies” as they get specialized training for working in a diplomatic environment."


2/11

re: "Ten Things You Should Know About the State Department and USAID"

Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, at DipNote ("U.S. Department of State Official Blog") had a good piece about things you likely don't know.

Money quote(s):

"Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used to say that the Department of Defense has as many people in military bands as the State Department has in the Foreign Service."

The other sound bite factoid is that the DoD has more lawyers than the State Department has diplomats. I've never seen anyone even attempt to dispute either statement.

"2. We support American citizens abroad. In the past eight months, we provided emergency assistance to, or helped coordinate travel to safe locations for, American citizens in Japan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Cote d'Ivoire in the wake of natural disasters or civil unrest. Last year, we assisted in 11,000 international adoptions and worked on over 1,100 new child abduction cases -- resulting in the return of 485 American children."

I was going to follow this up with an excerpt from the State Department's "mission statement" that presents consular activities such as protecting-Americans-abroad as one of the core missions of the Department, but all I can currently find is some blather from the Bureau of Resource Management about "Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere."

Huh? (Which is to say: OFFS! WTF?)

(Okay: where did the real mission statement go? I've seen it before.... )

At least CA still has a real mission statement:

"The mission of the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) is to protect the lives and interests of American citizens abroad and to strengthen the security of United States borders through the vigilant adjudication of visas and passports. CA contributes significantly to the USG goal of promoting international exchange and understanding. Our vision is to help American citizens engage the world. The Bureau issues the travel documents that allow Americans to travel the globe and lawful immigrants and visitors to travel to America and provides essential cycle of life services to American citizens overseas."

D/S Nides continued:

"9. We help Americans see the world. In 2010, we issued 14 million passports for Americans to travel abroad. We facilitate the lawful travel of students, tourists and business people, including issuing more than 700,000 visas for foreign students to study in the U.S. last year. And, if a storm could disrupt your vacation plans or if you could get sick from drinking the water, we alert you through our travel warnings."

Yeah. Stuff like that. Facilitate legitimate travel. Provide accurate and timely travel information and cautions. Get some.

"10. We are the face of America overseas. Our diplomats, development experts, and the programs they implement are the source of American leadership around the world. They are the embodiments of our American values abroad. They are a force for good in the world."

Development experts.... Sadly, D/S Nides' statement continues the conflation and assimilation of State and USAID. CAA remains wholly unconvinced that this is all that great a good idea.

That being said, U.S. diplomats serving at our far-flung embassies, consulate, and other missions abroad are often the first, if not the only, representatives of either/both the U.S. government or the American people who most non-Americans abroad will ever encounter in person.

And our powers should only be used for good.

D/S Nides concluded:

"All of this (and more) costs the American taxpayer about one percent of the overall federal budget. That is a small investment that yields a large return by advancing our national security, promoting our economic interests, and reaffirming our country's exceptional role in the world."

It's a truism (or "truthism") that most American citizens have a vast overestimation of just how much of the federal budget goes to either diplomacy or to foreign aid. Even when you throw in what the DoD spends or military aid, it's still a drop in the eye dropper compared to the rest of the "discretionary spending" and "entitlements."

(Oh, and this presumes that there is a budget, something which has not been true for several years now.)

8/26

re: "Numbers"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Jack_Savage's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 10:14 PM EST(link).

Jack Savage said:

"Maybe it is because they really don’t do much of anything, and if they do anything, they don’t have a lot to show for it.

Example: You have the finest diplomats on the planet in Baghdad – 16,000 of them, as a matter of fact – and they can’t figure out a way to negotiate getting food shipments in a timely fashion? In a country we rescued from a dictator at great cost in lives and money? And their only strategy to achieve this objective is to whine to the New York Times?

And you seem to think they prevent wars and keep our enemies at bay?

Spare me."

My response:

"According to the original post (above), there _aren’t_ 16,000 diplomats at the Baghdad embassy.

“So the wizards at State has suddenly realized that constructing a 104-acre, $750,000,000.00 embassy complex and building up the embassy staff to 16,000 people (including 2,000 diplomats and several times more contractors), without running either by the Iraqis first, “may have been ill advised.” ”

So support staff is 16,000 (presumably that includes locally-hired Iraqi staff members as well) handling all the support, medical, transportation, SECURITY, &tc. that used to be handled by the U.S. military because those services are/were either unavailable in Iraq or untrustworthy.

Leaving 2,000, of which probably a fifth are specialists of one sort (security, management, communications, administration) supporting the other 80 percent. Figure several hundred of that remainder are program specialists or attaches of one sort or another who belong to “tenant agencies” (such as USAID).

Frankly, if even 2 or 3 hundred of that figure are actual State Dept. commissioned foreign service officers (i.e., actual diplomats) I’d be surprised.

And wasn’t VP Biden “all over” getting that SOFA negotiated? (crickets)

Lastly, as I was ranting to the missus earlier today, too many people working either for State or at our embassies are under the mistaken impression that the New York Times and/or the Washington Post are somehow “on their side,” probably because they foolishly hold the same sorts of demented transnational progressive worldviews espoused by those fishwraps. The truth is that the NYT and the WP are never happier than when they can embarrass those who serve our country, whether that’s in uniform or out of it."

2/9

re: "Consular Diplomacy"

Japansen at White Waters & Black ("Adventures in Diplomacy aka Life in the Foreign Service") shared some reflections on consular work as diplomacy.

Money quote(s):

"Working in the consular section isn’t the stereotypical image of diplomacy. Many times the work is characterized as drudgery, stamping 100s of visas in a mill in some backwater. Truth is, it’s pretty interesting work, or at least it can be depending on the post."

Much of Foreign Service life hinges upon just this phrase: "depending on the post." It's an awfully big world out there; working and living conditions may vary hugely from one diplomatic assignment to the next.

Japansen correctly labels the "stamplng 100s of visas in a mill in some backwater" image of consular work as stereotypical. To beat this drum just-one-more-time, if all you're doing is "stamping" then you're doing it wrong.

"You have to stay on your toes and think on your feet as you only have a few minutes to figure out if someone is a legitimate candidate, qualified for the visa, or if they aren’t.

But beyond the basic work of adjudicating visas, it is easy to overlook the real diplomatic work that goes on at the window. For a lot of people in the host country, the consular officer is the only American they’ve ever met and their first real interaction with our country. It is important to treat people with dignity, especially when they don’t qualify for a visa."

Japensen is correct, but leaves out an important factor. While each visa applicant must legitimately qualify for a particular category or type of visa, that same applicant must have no visa ineligibilities. This is not a mistake on Japansen's part, more just an angle of perspective; one can certainly think of "has no visa ineligibilities" as being one of the qualifications of a legitimate visa candidate.

That being said, simple politeness and courtesy can go a long way in consular diplomacy. In many places, the average person is simply un-used to interactions with government officials who are polite, courteous, and efficient. That by itself makes a powerful first impression for someone who has never met an American government official before.

"While I see between 40 and 60 people a day, they only see one American and its important that they leave with a good impression that they had my full attention, concern, and consideration."

Forty to sixty non-immigrant visa applicants is a moderately light workload and certainly not in the "visa mill" range of 100+.

This allows a bit more time and consideration per each applicant, which can cut to either their advantage or disadvantage.

"Some countries are part of the visa waiver program and they don’t have to apply for simple visitors visas; they get one automatically at the border when they enter. Japan is like this, for example. You can just show up and get in for 90 days (and the same goes for the Japanese coming to America. But there’s only a handful of countries in this program and it only applies for basic tourist visas; everyone else has to come to the embassy and apply."

Travelers from visa waiver countries have to complete an online form called ESTA (Electronic System for Travel Authorization) in advance of their travel. And while this used to be fee-less, it's now seen as a cash cow for the travel advertising industry.

(I kid you not. Visa waiver travelers are being fleeced in order to pay for advertisements to encourage tourism to the U.S.)

"I take a lot of pride in being able to professionally and politely explain to people who don’t qualify for for visas why they have been denied. It’s important that they feel that they were treated fairly and with respect. It’s common sense and common courtesy, really, and I don’t mean to make it out to be more than it is."

This is an important skill. Saying "no" in a firm manner which does not insult or inflame the visa applicant while making it clear that the decision is final.

Explaining how to do this always reminds me of the definition of "Irish Diplomacy;" to wit:

"the ability to tell a man to go to hell so that he looks forward to making the trip."

"It might be my only time working in a consular section (every new Foreign Service officer does it for one of their first two tours; Consular officers do it as their mainstay) and I’m getting the most out of it. I get to meet a lot of people, get to grant a lot of joy and happiness, and have to be considerate when that joy and happiness isn’t forthcoming. You hear a lot of stories too, some of which are pretty amusing. And fundamentally, it’s important work."

8/24

re: "Default, Dear Brutus, Is Not In Our Stars, But In Ourselves"

Iowahawk made predictions for a budgetary meltdown.

Money quote(s):

"State Department diplomacy becomes 38% less diplomatic."

Hmm. CAA already feels less diplomatic.



7/28

re: "More Consulting"

Digger at Life After Jerusalem ("The musings of a Two-Spirit American Indian, Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer") gave props to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).


Money quote(s):


"(S)peaking of INR (the speaker...keep up), I encourage you to get briefings with them. Too often, folks forget INR, and they are a font of knowledge. They can tailor a briefing to your clearance level, and let me tell you they are all awesome. You will only find experts of their calliber in the finest universities. And check out INR/OPN too. They do media analysis and polling in our countries. They will have some great unclassified info for you. I had two INR briefings today in addition to the Fulbrighter talk, one with the analyst and one with the analyst from OPN, and they were great.You will be better prepared for having done it."

Despite rumors to the contrary, all diplomats are not spies, nor are all U.S. diplomats secretly CIA agents. Not true. The U.S. diplomatic community is, by and large, distinct from America's intelligence community; that is, with two caveats and one exception-by-overlap.

Caveat 1: Diplomatic reporting is available for inclusion in all-source analysis just like all other sorts of reporting, such as open-source (i.e., press & media, books, &tc.), military, and actual intelligence collection products of whatever sort.

Caveat 2: Diplomats are also consumers of intelligence products. They'd be stupid not to be.

The exception, or overlap, between the diplomatic and intelligence communities is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research or INR. INR is the part of the State Dept. that's an actual part of the IC. While relatively small (as is DOS itself), INR has some very good analysts working for it and they have, within the overall IC, a reputation for "punching above their weight class." That's a good thing.


7/21

re: "Moving Forward"

Becky at Small bits ("the bits and pieces that I am okay sharing with the world at large") shared some sage words for the diplomatic couple-on-the-go.

Money quote(s):

"As a spouse, sometimes it is hard to figure out where I fit and what my life will mean at each post. Today was thinking a lot about viewing each change as a blank canvas and opportunity for creation versus viewing each change as ripping me from what I understand. I think I have done both. I also thought about what it means to find yourself as a family member in this job that becomes a lifestyle. You need to be yourself but of course you are mindful of your spouse's career. It's a weird lifestyle in the way that we interact with folks from work almost constantly.

I am really grateful for a supportive spouse who loves me as I am and trusts me to find that balance. One day I apologized for playing soccer with all the kids instead of sitting around in high heels at some function. (It was an outdoor, casual event.) He looked me straight in the eye and told me not to apologize. While he gets the need to be culturally sensitive, he basically said, "You're an American woman and part of being an American woman is choosing who you are and what you care about. Sharing that is part of being a diplomat too. I love you and who you are. I trust you to know what is appropriate and when." " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA wishes he'd said this himself. It's all true. It's "leadership by example" applied to cultural diplomacy.

10/6

re: "Israel about to denuke Iran?"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") asked a question about which the clock is ticking.

Money quote(s):

"I find Netanyahu's unveiled threat to be quite refreshing given the usual nature of diplomacy as formalized lying in formal wear or the ever popular nibbling of petit fours and sipping of mint tea by the hotel pool. This was the equivalent of a shotgun blast from the front porch telling would-be thugs this ain't the house you want to be messing with. The fact that Israel has a history of following up warning shots with decapitating strikes makes this all the more believable." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

UJ likes to describe diplomacy thusly; at certain rarified levels it has an uncomfortable ring of truth to it. For my part, the only time CAA has worn formal attire in the line-of-duty as a diplomat was to attend a USO-sponsored event while accompanying my ambassador.

"The public statements by Netanyahu are obviously aimed at both the Iranians and the "international community" as a last chance to avoid the logical and likely action to come. Iran has picked this fight and I think soon it may learn something others in the area have, Israel doesn't play."

The preliminaries, presumably aimed at forestalling the need for truly escalatory measures, may already be underway. Or all those lab explosions and inconveniently deceased Iranian nuclear scientists may just be coincidence.

(And I have a bridge to sell.)

11/3

re: "After 9/11 anniversary: the return of US diplomacy"

Nicholas Burns at the Christian Science Monitor wrote a great piece on the future of U.S. diplomacy.

Money quote(s):

"During these last 10 years, the US has fought two major land wars simultaneously. It has conducted an aggressive, controversial, and dangerous military campaign against terrorist groups from Iraq to the Afghan/Pakistan border to Somalia and Yemen. And America has transformed the way it defends itself from the terrorist threat at home and overseas.

The US has relied on the military to hit back when attacked or even threatened, to place first priority on building up defenses, and to sometimes shoot first and ask questions later. Much of this made sense in the months immediately following the shocking new threat that appeared with such sudden and terrible force in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001."

Students of strategy, grand or otherwise, already know that both military force and diplomacy are only two of the dimensions in which state (and non-state) actors operate.

DIME, anyone?

"(U)nlike the years following 9/11, the most difficult challenges ahead will require greater reliance on a combination of diplomacy and traditional statecraft and all that comes with it. That includes negotiating with odious regimes, threatening and cajoling them – but more often overcoming them through the strength of our political alliances – to get our way in the world.

This return of diplomacy to center stage in American foreign policy will take many different forms.

First, diplomacy is ascendant in the costly, ill-defined, and inconclusive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that will end not on the battlefield but at the negotiating table. President Obama’s decision to remove combat forces in Iraq and ask the State Department to lead at the end of this year is sensible and long overdue. The US will also need to negotiate its way out of Afghanistan in the next few years as a conventional military victory there is unattainable."

Note the "conventional" qualifier on "military victory" in that last sentence. Still an arguable proposition, not quite a foregone conclusion, and there's lots of room for discussion as to what "conventional" warfare actually involves.

"This renewed commitment to diplomacy is critical for America’s national strategy. It is the most practical and effective way to coalesce with allies and friends as well as to confront foes in the decade ahead. That is why leaders in Washington should make the same commitment to rebuild the State Department as they did with the Pentagon, CIA, and Homeland Security in the years following 9/11. Congress fully funded those three pillars of national security but starved the fourth and equally important pillar – diplomats and USAID professionals."

Strangely, the fourth pillar tends to be the least expensive of them all; which is ironically one reason it's so politically easy to call for cuts in diplomacy and (because they're not actually the same thing) foreign aid budgets.

Let me walk you through that thought: not only are the dollar amounts smaller, but since they tend not to be spent in any congressmen's districts, employing more than a handful of their constituents, there's no immediate political price to be paid by any individual congress person.

It's not that U.S. diplomats and USAID staff don't vote, even when assigned overseas, but they're so relatively few, so difusely dispersed throughout the U.S., that no single politician has more than a handful in their district.

Not only that, but those deployed abroad have to cast absentee ballots, which (along with military overseas ballots) tend to get tossed out on technicalities or only counted long after the election results are actually announced.

"After 9/11, President Bush essentially put the military on the front lines of America’s international engagement all over the world, with the diplomats in reserve. The military became in the minds of politicians and in the public imagination the default choice for dealing with international problems."

And Pres. Bush was, fairly obviously, correct to have done so, disagree though you may with how he prioritized those military campaigns or implemented them.

Of course, even with the military in the forefront, there was action in most of the other dimensions of national policy, if only in support of those military efforts.

"America will face in the next few years the most dangerous and complex set of international challenges in recent memory. As it returns to diplomacy, political leaders at home must also resist the pernicious allure of isolationism so evident on the extreme right and left of the political spectrum. Americans must instead renew their global leadership role as the country moves further away from the tragedy of 9/11 and encounters the more complex times ahead."

Isolationism is a sucker's game, even for relatively insular Americans, and the voters know it. The real question is to what degree U.S. will be engaged internationally and in what arenas.

_____

Who is the writer?

"Nicholas Burns is professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics, and director of the Future of Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served as under secretary of State for political affairs from 2005 to 2008. Previously, he was US ambassador to NATO."

Also:

"Burns served in the United States Foreign Service for twenty-seven years until his retirement in April 2008. He was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2005 to 2008; the State Department’s third-ranking official when he led negotiations on the U.S. – India Civil Nuclear Agreement; a long-term military assistance agreement with Israel; and was the lead U.S. negotiator on Iran’s nuclear program. He was U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2001–2005) and to Greece (1997–2001) and State Department Spokesman (1995–1997). He worked for five years (1990–1995) on the National Security Council at the White House where he was Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs and Special Assistant to President Clinton and Director for Soviet Affairs in the Administration of President George H.W. Bush. Burns also served in the American Consulate General in Jerusalem (1985–1987) where he coordinated U.S. economic assistance to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and before that, at the American embassies in Egypt and Mauritania.

Professor Burns has received twelve honorary degrees, the Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Award, the Woodrow Wilson Award for Public Service from the Johns Hopkins University, and the Boston College Alumni Achievement Award. He has a BA in History from Boston College (1978), an MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (1980), and earned the Certificat Pratique de Langue Francaise at the University of Paris-Sorbonne (1977). He was a visiting Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in summer 2008."

_____

As the Foglio's might say, he's a "schmat" guy.

9/9

re: "Foreign Policy Technique"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("This website makes available to the general public interesting episodes and insights from Charles Crawford's eventful diplomatic career, and aims to explain in a open-minded, reasonable way how diplomacy works in practice.") tells you more of what you need to understand about diplomatic realities and engagement.

Money quote(s):

"Over at Commentator is my latest piece on UK engagement with Libya, in which I argue that what happened in recent years was principled, smart and mainly effective."

The following is a short passage from the longer excerpt he provided.

"there are only two basic choices available to democracies when it comes to dealing with odious regimes: Isolation, or Engagement. And that both can have perverse consequences, because it is impossible to deal with perverse regimes without some perverse outcomes"

Pithy, and to the point.

"(T)aking for granted that a 'Western' democratic system with a strong legal system is just 'better' than a cruel torturing dictatorship. What should the democracy do about the dictatorship?

One option is to do nothing. Faraway wicked foreigners oppress each other - what's new?

That option is in fact quite often used, even if there is a busy pretence of 'doing something'. Saudi Arabia is the classic example of a system which in most respects imposes odious unfair apartheid-like restrictions on its citizens, and which we studiously treat as a 'factor of stability'. Communist China used to be far worse, murdering millions. As did the USSR.

In all these cases the hard fact that these systems are powerful, ruthless and/or rich compels a certain caution. But does the fact that we 'tolerate' (say) the Saudi system demolish any claim by us to moral superiority? Double standards, they shriek.

No. Any good policy has to be realistic as well as consistent. If you can't stop all killers, it's right to stop those you can stop. To that extent there is solid intellectual and moral territory between 'double standards' and 'no standards'." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

You can only do what you can do; which doesn't mean you can't do anything, just that you can't do everything.

"The default position of Western democracies these days is that change should be 'peaceful'. The implication of this position (never discussed) is that enslaved people are better off if their slave-drivers reform slavery gradually, rather than get abruptly toppled even at the cost of many human lives. Slave-drivers need dialogue! A lot of dubious moral philosophy lurking behind that proposition.

What if we think that there are possibilities for more or less peaceful change? Egypt in some ways is a good current example. NB South Africa is always presented as a triumph for peaceful change but of course wasn't.

Libya might have been too, had the Gaddafi elite not reverted to stupidity instead of using its new improved relations with Western democracies to negotiate ." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

We tend to forget, at a distance of more than two centuries, just how bloody our own two revolutions (if you count the American Civil War as a second revolution, the one that liberated the rest of us) were. For the British, their bloody revolutions are even more distant, with less dramatic (to us) conclusions.

"In each individual case the options range far and wide, as does the prospect of getting allies and building successful coalitions for change.

Let's not forget too that Western political leaders' main focus is what their voters want. And voters (with rare exceptions) do not put changing the ways of revolting foreign regimes far up their priorities list. Or much taxpayers' money to be spent on the problem."

Some voters. Others are quite willing for their government to very meddlesome, with the treasure and blood coming from their fellow citizens.

"So in the real world of foreign policy it makes no sense to take a stark 'no compromise' position of substance with dictatorships. They exist, they have UN and other votes, they can export trouble, they probably have Ambassadors in London. Your aircraft may need to fly over their territory, or they may agree with you on various international technical issues. It's complicated.

You almost always end up with some form of 'engagement'. But the fact of matter-of-fact exchanges and opportunistically looking for areas to build some common ground is not the same thing as having a policy of Engagement aimed at deliberately using a range of options (openly or otherwise) to bring out reforms." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

In the real world, you make compromises. You make the best ones you can, but they're still compromises. Americans were cautioned early in their history against going abroad in search of dragons needing slaying.

Which doesn't mean you don't ever take fire and branch overseas to put an end to some odious regime which takes the ill-considered trouble of making themselves your enemy, just that you don't go looking for trouble.

(Which doesn't exactly jibe with this new-fangled "responsibility to protect" doctrine begin shopped around currently.)

"My point today is simple. British foreign policy and leadership can make positive changes in unpropitious foreign situations. But simply wanting to make a difference does not get results. Making that happen requires a powerful combination of strong policy determination, operational nimbleness and fine professional technique, an area where the FCO obviously declined under Labour. Plus some money." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Airbrush out the specifically British elements in that last and you've got some bood advice worthy of wide application by a democracy seeking to use its diplomatic strengths wisely and justly.