re: "8 myths about American grand strategy"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") thinks about grand strategy (so you don't have to).

Money quote(s):

"Grand strategy appears to be the flavor of the month in the strategic community. I have planned or been invited to numerous conferences looking at the topic and the debates on this topic are as lively as I can remember in a long time. Just recently, I gave a talk to a grand strategy conference at NDU on the myths that afflict the field."

Mr. Feaver listed eight myths; CAA has selected his favorite three for your consideration.

"Myth 1: The U.S. can't do grand strategy

Many critics claim that the United States is simply too disorganized to do strategy on a grand scale.

In fact, we had a coherent grand strategy during the 19th century build around the Monroe Doctrine. We had a coherent grand strategy during WWII built around winning in Europe first. And we had a coherent grand strategy during the Cold War built around the idea of containment." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Myth 3: A grand strategy has to have a 3-syllable label that rhymes with "ainment"

This gets to the heart of why you get the odd argument that we had a grand strategy during the Cold War but we haven't since. When critics say that we haven't had a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, what they really mean is that we haven't had a label like "containment" that enjoys widespread popularity. This is true, but trivial.

In fact, since the fall of the Soviet Union a 5-pillar grand strategy has been clearly discernible:

Pillar I. The velvet covered iron fist. Iron fist: build a military stronger than what is needed for near-term threats to dissuade a would-be hostile rival from achieving peer status. Velvet covered: accommodate major powers on issues, giving them a larger stake in the international distribution of goodies than their military strength would command to dissuade a near-peer from starting a hostile rivalry.

Pillar 2. Make the world more like us politically by promoting the spread of democracy.

Pillar 3. Make the world more like us economically by promoting the spread of markets and globalization.

Pillar 4. Focus on WMD proliferation to rogue states as the top tier national security threat.

Pillar 5 (added by George W. Bush). Focus on terrorist networks of global reach inspired by militant Islamist ideologies as another top tier national security threat, i.e. co-equal with WMD in the hands of rogue states. The nexus of 4 & 5 is the ne plus ultra threat.

No administration described the strategy in exactly these terms. Every single president succumbed to the political temptation to product differentiate and especially to describe one's own actions as a bold new departure from the "failed" efforts of his predecessor. Yet a fair-minded reading of the core governmental white papers on strategy, especially the National Security Strategy reports prepared by each administration, as well as the central policy efforts each administration pursued, reveals a broad 20-year pattern of continuity.

All post-Cold War presidents championed the first 4 pillars. The last two presidents (Bush and Obama) adopted the last 2. And the major grand strategic moves of the period derive from one or more of these pillars: eg. The outreach to India derives from Pillar 1, the invasion of Iraq derives from Pillars 4 and 5, and so on.

Obama campaigned as if he was going to make a grand strategic innovation by adding a 6th pillar: elevating climate change to be co-equal with WMD and terrorism. But he chose to do health care instead." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Myth 7: A grand strategy requires an existential threat

It may be easier to describe the grand strategy when there is an overarching existential threat to concentrate the mind. But as the post-Cold War has shown, it is possible to have a coherent grand strategy even when the threats are dispersed and less-than-existential.

The Cold War was not a time when everything was simple or when everyone knew priorities or everyone agreed on the threat. And it sure wasn't "a time of great stability and security unlike these really dangerous times today," -- a curious view that I hear most often from students who never lived through the Cold War era.

But it was a time when the much more obvious, and by the late 1950's possibly existential threat posed by the nuclear confrontation overlaid on top of a global ideological contest with the Soviet Union circumscribed strategic thinking in a way that is not the case today.

Compared to the Cold War period, we have more slack in our security environment and that introduces a certain amount of indeterminacy in the strategic debate."

Having "won" (i.e., we survived, Russia survived to become, er, Russia, Eastern Europe survived to become "Central Europe," and Western Europe survived to become the Eurozone) the Cold War, it's fun (for values thereof) to see so many latter-day Reaganites coming out of the woodwork to pretend that all along they'd meant to " jump on the team and come on in for the big win ."

11/23

re: "In post-Qaddafi Libya, there's still a lot of work to be done"

Dov Zakheim at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") contrasted post-Qadhafi Libya with post-Saddam Iraq, based upon remarks by Amb. Paul Bremer.

Money quote(s):

"It is noteworthy, and not a little bit ironic, that Ambassador Paul Bremer, he of the late and unlamented Coalition Provisional Authority, identified several criteria for ensuring that the departure of the dictator does indeed lead to a fundamental change in the governance of Libya. He argues, in bold typeface, that "the population must believe that the political change is real and lasting;" that "someone has to provide security;" that "a new political order must be established quickly."

It is difficult to argue with Bremer's main points."

&

"He adds that "unless some system is put in to demobilize the fighters, there is sure to be trouble." But who exactly should be the "someone" who provides security? What plans have been drawn up for a "system" to demobilize the fighters? And who will implement the plan for such a system. Surely not the United States, I hope. We have enough on our plate, both domestically and internationally. The military and financially exhausted Europeans? The Arabs? The United Nations?"

CAA doesn't see that happening, everyone's distracted by what's happening in Syria and what could happen in Iran.

"(W)ho will constitute that political order and what sort of political order will it be? There is no evidence that the current Interim Government has in mind the kind of democratic, pro-Western political order that Bremer seems to be calling for. Nor is it clear that, democratic elections notwithstanding, Iraq is pursuing policies that align with America's interests -- and that is before all American troops have left his country."

10/24

re: "How Ecuador's immigration policy helps al Qaeda"

Otto J. Reich & Ezequiel Vázquez Ger at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") describe an emerging security threat.*

Money quote(s):

"Terrorism, as the United States has learned at a high cost in recent years, comes in many forms and from unexpected sources. The government of Ecuador has once again crossed the line between irresponsible policies and ideologically driven actions that have created a serious security problem not only for its citizens but also for the entire Western Hemisphere. The disarray created in Ecuador's immigration policy has permitted transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups -- possibly including al Qaeda -- to potentially use the country as a base of operations with the ultimate objective of harming the United States.

In June of 2008, the Ecuadorian government opened its borders to foreigners and ended visa requirements to enter its territory. This opened the floodgates to nationals from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (e.g., Afghanistan, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria, Cuba, Pakistan, and Somalia)."

Ecuador, like the U.S., is free to make any immigration or naturalization laws and policies that its own constitution allows. But there remain the consequences therefrom, both domestic and abroad.

"Records shows that large numbers of these immigrants enter to obtain Ecuadorian nationality by naturalization and thus be able to travel freely throughout Latin America and eventually to the United States without arousing suspicion because of their original nationalities. The routes by which they enter the Americas generally include a first stop in Cuba or Venezuela, countries with highly subjective immigration controls. Two routes that are used repeatedly are Pakistan/Afghanistan-Iran-Venezuela-Ecuador, and Somalia-Dubai-Russia-Cuba-Ecuador."

&

"(I)mmigrant groups have developed a criminal infrastructure of sufficient magnitude to keep functioning independently. To bypass the stricter immigration controls, criminal gangs have specialized in forging travel documents, visas, birth certificates, and fake residency permits that ultimately lead to illegally obtaining an Ecuadorian passport. Documents are not difficult to obtain because the Mafiosi suborn government administrators including civil registry officials, judges, and other government officials.

Of particular concern to U.S. security is the case of nationals of third countries who enter Ecuador with passports issued by Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, countries for which Ecuador still does not require visas."

U.S. visa procedures do take account of people's countries of origin, not just their current nationality or passport, but bogus documents can make implementing them more difficult.

"The danger these criminal networks pose is illustrated by two examples, among many: In 2011 an investigation was conducted by the U.S. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) attaché in Quito, Ecuador, the HIS office in Atlanta, the Miami division of the FBI and the Ecuadorian National Police. The operation led to the arrest of Irfan Ul Haq, a Pakistani citizen who according to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) was conducting a "human smuggling operation in Quito, Ecuador, that attempted to smuggle an individual they believed to be a member of the TTP from Pakistan (Tehrik-e Taliban) into the United States." The TTP was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department on Sept. 1, 2010.

A second case, which resulted in the arrest of Yaee Dawit, alias Jack Flora, probably the most important human trafficker in Africa and linked to different cells of al-Qaeda in East Africa, illustrates the good work of international cooperation, but also the importance that Ecuadorian cities have acquired as "hubs" for terrorists and transnational criminals."

&

"While there is no evidence to show that the Correa government established the policy of "open borders" in an effort to attract criminal organizations, that has been the result. On the other hand, there is no evidence of Correa wanting to stem the flow. These examples show how Rafael Correa's Ecuador is becoming a failed state, hosting all sorts of dangerous actors. They also help to understand the context in which various financial, commercial, and energy agreements are being developed by Ecuador with the governments of Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. While many of the agreements are not yet completed, they serve as "government-authorized illicit tunnels" through which anything and anyone can pass, from terrorists and drugs to money and arms."

* Otto J. Reich is president of the consulting firm Otto Reich & Associates LLC. He is a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, and U.S. ambassador to Venezuela.

4/2

re: "The exit is the strategy"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") judged by actions, not words.

Money quote(s):

"(B)oth the White House and Pentagon had been repeatedly emphasizing that negotiations with Iraq were ongoing, that no decision had been made. In truth, the decision was made even before Barack Obama was president: he got elected campaigning that Iraq was the wrong war, not worth the lives and money.

He did what he said he was going to do. He set an end date for combat operations so that he could show "progress" before the midterm elections. Progress not toward consolidating our gains in Iraq, but toward being out of Iraq. Having appointed special envoys for every problem he considered important, there was no special envoy for Iraq, to help build fostering regional relationships and coordinate our policies. He appointed an ambassador who knew nothing about Iraq."

Knowing "nothing about Iraq" is quite an achievement in itself, given the circumstances.

"(T)he withdrawal of troops is a lagging, not a leading indicator of the administration's indifference.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton continues to affirm our commitment to Iraq. The QDDR says "in Iraq, we are in the midst of the largest military-to-civilian transition since the Marshall Plan. Our civilian presence is prepared to take the lead, secure the military's gains, and build the institutions necessary for long-term stability." State grandiosely imagines a wholly civilian mission of 17,000 personnel most of whom will be "third country nationals" supporting 1,750 diplomats and other USG government personnel. Eighty percent of the mission will be contractors. Current plans call for them to operate at five consulates around the country, costing $6 billion a year.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting (including Shadow Government colleague Dov Zakheim), the Government Accountability Office and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee all take a dim view of State's plans for Iraq. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee assessed that "fundamental questions remain unanswered," including whether the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including State Department capacity. They question whether the State Department can sustain its proposed presence without military support and the cost effectiveness of consulates requiring 1,400 security and support personnel for only 120 diplomats. They recommended that if a complete withdrawal occurred, "given the prohibitive costs of security and the capacity limitations of the State Department, the United States should consider a less ambitious diplomatic presence in Iraq." This is likely to end badly."

CAA's formula for right-sizing the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq is akin to what most after-action-reviews of the RMS Titanic's sinking would include: only have as many passengers and crew as you have lifeboat capacity for.

"Members of Congress could be forgiven for wondering why should we provide $5 billion to Iraq in a time of austerity when the Iraqis are so ungrateful. The Wartime Contracting Commission's conclusion that "significant additional waste -- and mission degradation to the point of failure -- can be expected as State continues with the daunting task of transition in Iraq," will also tighten Congressional purse-strings, as it should."

10/22

re: "Writing off Afghanistan, too"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") saw the writing on the wall.

Money quote(s):

"The evident confusion among senior policy makers in the administration prefigures the administration's cratering commitment to win the war in Afghanistan. The White House has narrowed its war aims from defeating all threats to only defeating al Qaeda. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified to Congress this week that the deaths of senior al Qaeda leadership have brought us to a "critical transitional phase for the terrorist threat," in which the organization has a better than 50 percent probability of fragmenting and becoming incapable of mass-casualty attacks.

The White House appears set to use progress against al Qaeda as justification for accelerating an end to the war in Afghanistan. Since the president has concluded that we aren't fighting the Taliban, just al Qaeda, no need to stick around Afghanistan until the government of that country can provide security and prevent recidivism to Taliban control. The president will declare victory for having taken from al Qaeda the ability to organize large scale attacks, and piously intone that nation building in Afghanistan is Afghanistan's responsibility.

This policy will not win the war in Afghanistan. It will not even end the war in Afghanistan. It will only end our involvement in that ongoing war. Because arbitrary timelines do not translate into having achieved the objectives that cause enemies to throw down their weapons. And it is the enemy ceasing to contest our objectives that constitutes winning. Interrogations with prisoners in Afghanistan have caused the American military to conclude that "Once ISAF is no longer a factor, Taliban consider their victory inevitable."" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

2/2

re: "This is no time to cut defense"

Paul Miller at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") can think of several reasons not to cut defense.

Money quote(s):

"There are two major families of threats to U.S. national security today. First, at one end of the state spectrum, are the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers: Russia, China, soon Iran, North Korea as a junior partner, and Pakistan if it falls to jihadists. The latter three are (or will be) new to the nuclear club since the Cold War, and China is vastly more powerful today than it was in 1989. Second, at the other end, is the aggregate global consequences of state failure and anarchy across much of the world -- such as the rise of terrorist groups, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, nuclear smugglers, pandemic disease, and piracy -- that will collectively erode global stability and raise the cost of U.S. leadership. State failure, with its effects magnified by globalization, is also a vastly greater threat that during the Cold War. These two families are the threats we face in the 21st Century."

Pretty good summary of these two "families" of threats.

"Nuclear war with Iran or North Korea would be almost equally dangerous, especially after they have acquired longer-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. allies and even the U.S. homeland. (Yes, the Soviet Union had thousands of warheads, but you only need a few nukes to cause more damage to us than all the wars we have fought in history, combined, and only a few dozen to effectively wipe out the United States. And if I were a new nuclear power, I wouldn't announce my capability until I already had a few dozen to make sure I could withstand an attack on my arsenal. Which means that North Korea and Iran (when it announces) will almost certainly be existential threats). The difference is that war with them or their proxies may be more likely to actually happen. The latter two countries may be less deterrable, less predictable, and more prone to transfer nuclear technology to proxies and non-state groups, given their history of erratic behavior, sponsoring terrorism, and proliferation."

A multi-polar world is, by definition, a more complex one.

"Militarily, the Allies have underinvested in defense for decades-nothing new there. But the situation is actually getting worse, not better."

And it'll get even worse before it gets better.

(That's if there are any allies left at the end of the "worse" part.)

"What worries me is that I am increasingly convinced that we do not have the capabilities to meet the various threats we face today. We don't need to be omnipotent, but we do need to be able to protect ourselves. Can we stave off state failure in Pakistan? Can we prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, or contain it afterwards? Could we prevent Russia from doing to Ukraine what it did to Georgia in 2008? Can we defeat the drug cartels wreaking havoc in Mexico and Columbia? Is al-Qaida really nearing "strategic defeat," as Panetta claims? Are we prepared to handle a collapse in North Korea -- possibly having to fight a sudden war with a desperate regime, contribute to a multilateral occupation and reconstruction afterwards, and handle the delicate diplomacy with the Chinese?

Until we can, this is no time to cut defense."

10/17

re: "Heresy over defense, part 2"

Tom Mahnken at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") responded to Kori Schake.

Money quote(s):

"Kori Schake responded to my call for a debate over defense spending by firing a volley in defense of the new orthodoxy on defense spending. Specifically, she attempts to make the case that the federal debt is a national security threat that demands further defense cuts, that the United States has a large margin of superiority over potential adversaries, and we need to seek greater efficiency in defense.

I agree with Kori that our national debt is an important national security concern, but I also agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey that it is not our most important one. In my view, it would be strategically unsound, even if it were economically possible, to balance the budget on the back of defense.

I agree that defense should not be "out of bounds" in budget matters. But the fact is that in a period that has witnessed a massive expansion of government spending, the Defense Department has already sustained several rounds of cuts, dating back to the first months of the Obama administration. As both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have argued, additional cuts cannot help but affect U.S. security." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Entire departments, not to mention lesser agencies, have little-or-no Constitutional basis. Even Gov. Perry could probably name at least two.

"Some parts of the world (Europe, for example) are clearly safer and more secure than in decades past. But other parts of the world, such as Asia, are less secure. Of particular concern is China's ongoing military modernization, a portion of which is aimed at coercing U.S. allies and denying the United States access to the Western Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere, the United States has consistently underestimated the scope and pace of China's fielding of new weapons, including those designed to counter U.S. power projection forces. Moreover, over the past decade the weapons most needed to respond to such developments have received short shrift in the Pentagon budget. As a result, the United States faces an increasingly unfavorable military balance in the Western Pacific."

Europe, at least the central and western portions, are safer and more secure from threats posed by other central and western European states. And even, it seems, from Russia (hopefully). That still leaves non-state threats as well as NATO's seeming inability to manage, collectively, even their Libyan intervention without lots of heavy lifting by the U.S.

And by "heavy lifting" I mean logistics, ISR, and basic re-supply. Shiny fighter-bombers are just pretty paperweights once you can't re-arm them anymore.

"(T)he post-9/11 military buildup has produced few new weapon systems, and those that have been fielded over the past decade have been geared toward a particular kind of war against a particular kind of foe. For example, the United States fielded thousands of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles for Iraq and a sent a second generation to Afghanistan. Such vehicles are unlikely to be of much use in future wars, however. And the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that have been crucial to U.S. success in combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and targeting terrorists in Pakistan are unlikely to survive in a conflict with an adversary that possesses even a rudimentary air defense network.

Whole parts of the U.S. armed forces have been left out of whatever "rolling modernization" has taken place. U.S. Air Force aircraft are on average more than 23 years old, the oldest in Air Force history, and are getting older. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old, and some may be as old as 70-80 years before they retire. The U.S. Navy is smaller now than it was before the United States entered World War I, and is getting smaller. No "rolling modernization" will reverse these trends; only full-scale recapitalization of the U.S. armed forces will."

The Air Force, like the Navy, suffers from the huge per unit capital outlays needed to launch even a single ship or new airframe.

"(T)he ultima ratio of defense is effectiveness, not efficiency. That is, defense spending ultimately exists to provide security to the American people. Inefficient yet effective defense remains preferable to efficient yet ineffective defense."

10/14

re: "The kind of world Secretary Clinton wants to see"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") dissected the SecState's remarks on soft power.

Money quote(s):

"America's Secretary of State gave a stunning interview this week, in which she defended the Obama administration's foreign policy choices and claimed that soft power was working to reshape America's image in the world. It was a deeply discouraging insight into the philosophy that guides the administration."

Naturally enough, the Secretary supports the administration's "foreign policy choices." That is, after all, part of her job. If she didn't support them, then she's not the right person for the job.

"Clinton is right that the United States has allowed responsibilities to accrue to us that many states benefit from, and that a more evenly distributed burden sharing arrangement would be preferable."

The catch is that some of those who are best-positioned to share "a more evenly distributed burden sharing arrangement" may be either uninterested in doing so or have different notions of their national responsibilities (and interests).

"(A)dvancing America's cause in the world has always been hugely enhanced by the view that whatever our national failings, we stand for freedom and believe ourselves safest when other people also live in freedom."

That view has the utterly charming (and refreshing) virtue of being based on the truth.

"When pressed on whether the administration should demand that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad step down, Clinton replied: "where we are is where we need to be, where it is a growing international chorus of condemnation...I am a big believer in results over rhetoric." But what are the results of our Syria policy? Is what is happening in Syria really the outcome we should want? "

This was written last August. It could have been written yesterday.

"(I)f American soft power were working, wouldn't attitudes toward the United States be improving? Favorability ratings -- especially in the Middle East and South Asia -- have actually declined from where they were during the Bush administration. Wouldn't governments be more inclined to support our policies? Crucial test cases should be Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq -- all of which are less cooperative with the Obama administration than they were with the Bush administration."

&

"That's quite a breathtaking world view for the chief diplomat of the world's most powerful country. We are unimportant in the global debate about freedom and governance, but Saudi Arabia and Turkey have standing.

On one issue Secretary Clinton was unmistakeably correct: "it's not going to be any news if the United States says Assad needs to go." Yesterday, the White House finally issued a statement that Assad should go. And it appears to have exactly the impact Secretary Clinton anticipated: nothing. But doesn't that refute her assertions that soft power and the Obama administration's approach are working?"

8/19

re: "Five myths about the policy-academy gap"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") got to the nuts and bolts of the town vs. gown policy gap.

Money quote(s):

"(A) topic near and dear to my heart: the gap between academic political science and the policy world. This is a longstanding concern that has been the subject of much talk and some action my entire professional life. Since I am also a card-carrying yakademic (a term one of my National Security Council colleagues introduced to me back when I worked in the Clinton White House -- he always smiled when he said it so I am sure it was a term of endearment), I sympathize with much of what they and numerous others (see here and here) have to say."

"(Y)akademic." I love it!

"In my experience, academics are just as biased as, and in some cases more biased than, policymakers. Policymakers have a partisan bias, a worldview bias, and a policy commitment bias (eg., if a policymaker advocated for a policy initially he may be predisposed to support it despite evidence that it is faltering, and vice-versa).

Academics also have a partisan bias and a worldview bias. The chief difference is that academics tend to give jargon terms to their worldviews and they tend to reinforce them with an additional layer of method bias -- that is, viewing the world primarily through the narrow lens of whatever methodological tool they have mastered in the academy. Academics also have policy bias -- if they supported or opposed a policy" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Everyone has biases. Academics as much as policy-makers; nobody gets to pretend to an utterly detached and "objective" opinion. Good intelligence analysts identify their biases upfront.

"Academics have a further source of bias that is not as prevalent in the policymaker world: a skewed marketplace of ideas where the people they spend the most time arguing with come from a very narrow slice of the ideological spectrum."

The non-diversity of worldviews in academia has been done to death in certain circles. Which doesn't mean it isn't real.

"(M)ost of my academic international relations/security colleagues (that is people who do not focus on a specific country or region) do not have any firmer grasp on factual knowledge than the best people I have worked with in government; indeed, for reasons I get to below, they might even have less. What they can bring to the table, however, is a rigor that comes from making theoretical claims explicit and using appropriate methods to evaluate them. The very best academics also can bring to the table a healthy respect for the limits of their methods, and thus for the limits of the claims they and others can make. The chief difference in this regard between policymakers and academics is that policymakers use theory and method implicitly whereas academics use them explicitly (or at least they should)."

The line between academics and policymakers isn't as bright and shining as some would have you believe. Most policymakers, even if they were not tenured professors or even successful grad students, were at least trained by academics at the undergraduate level (or beyond).

And if they lack academic rigor and methodology, exactly whose fault is that?

"Academic research is a good contribution to the policy debate, but it hardly settles the matter (and, in this case, it would hardly surprise the policymaker who knows full well that Iran is unlikely to capitulate through economic sanctions alone). Policymakers have to factor in many more considerations than even very thorough academic research tends to weigh, such as: the need to cultivate political support for a policy line; the need to demonstrate that all avenues, even unpromising ones, have been explored; the need to sequence and/or link measures that an academic study might treat in isolation (or try to "hold constant" in the analysis); the need to consider the possibility that the immediate case might be the exception rather than the rule; and so on." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

7/25

re: "Can Obama claim we're leaving Iraq more responsibly than we entered?"

Peter Feaver at The Shadow ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") drew some parallels.

Money quote(s):

"I haven't seen many attempts to document the ways that the exit is resembling the entry.

A few caveats are worth mentioning up front. The exit is still a work in progress and so there is plenty of time for things to go better (or worse) than might be forecasted now. Any judgment I or anyone else makes on the subject is provisional at best. Moreover, most of the critiques of the entry into Iraq owe more to partisan (or academic) mythology than to actual fact. But they have wide currency -- indeed, in some quarters, they are accepted as self-evident truths -- and so it is worth investigating the extent to which they might apply to the exit."

Mr. Feaver wrote and posted this a month ago (Nov. 7), so the exit has now been completed. And conditions have become, to put it diplomatically, a mite bit shaky, virtually since the moment the withdrawal of combat troops was accomplished.

"At a time when the economy is suffering from some of the worst years since the Great Depression, the echo is unmistakable, and many critics believe that the Iraq decision was dictated by the 2012 election calendar."

Might could be. I did notice that the last of the troops to be pulled out crossed the border into Kuwait before Christmas; it's possible they were even "home before Christmas." Which is a cliché guaranteed to trigger laughter in a military crowd.

"If you find it plausible that Bush let the difficult economic circumstances and the 2002 electoral calendar shape his approach to entering Iraq, shouldn't you find it more plausible that Obama has let his far more daunting economic troubles and the higher stakes 2012 electoral calendar shape his Iraq exit?"

Do electoral politics have an influence on the timing of decisions made by elected politicians? Disbelieving such a thing is beyond CAA's poor powers of naïveté, no matter which party a politician hails from. The better question is to what degree, how much weight such considerations have. Somewhere there's a bright line on this that separates the politicians from the statesmen.

"(T)here is the charge that President Bush put in place the wrong team to handle his Iraq policy and these early failures doomed the effort. Even Secretary Rumsfeld concedes in his memoir that picking Lt.Gen Ricardo Sanchez to head up the military side was a bad choice and Rumsfeld's critique of the civilian head, Ambassador Bremer, is scathing. The team struggled to work together and to understand the situation in Iraq. The crucial early period was squandered, sowing the seeds that reaped the bitter fruit of the sectarian violence of 2004-2006. By all accounts, the Bush administration finally got the right personnel in place when the President tapped General Dave Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to implement the new surge strategy and their ability to achieve unity of effort contributed considerably to the surge's success."

How long did it take Pres. Lincoln to settle on the Meade/Grant command team?

"Midway through his first term, Obama may have finally assembled a solid team with General Ray Odierno and Ambassador Jim Jeffrey. But he started out with a choice that left many people, including myself, scratching our heads: picking Chris Hill to be the Ambassador. Ambassador Hill certainly had a distinguished career, but he had no direct experience with Iraq and so was starting from square one. Sure enough, within months credible reports were circulating about the poor civil-military coordination on the ground. Perhaps the nadir was the description from one of his former subordinates of Ambassador Hill's alleged wasteful distraction to grow a lush lawn on the embassy compound. Perhaps the complaints were petty, but the more fundamental charge that the Obama team squandered valuable time that undermined future success rings nonetheless." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA has, in his own career, noted an occasional but remarkable ambassadorial preoccupation with issues of lawncare, landscaping, and décor. It seems to be symptomatic of micromanagers or, to put it more charitably, of the detail oriented.

If it weren't for the fact that sod and such had to be convoyed under armed guard at risk of IED attack all the way into Baghdad, it would be farcical. As it was, it indicates a dangerous disconnection with reality.

11/7

re: "The top ten unicorns of China policy"

Daniel Blumenthal at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") examined some China-specific cognitive biases.

Money quote(s):

"Much of China policy is also underpinned by belief in the fantastical: in this case, soothing but logically inconsistent ideas. But unlike unicorns, our China policy excursions into the realm of make believe could be dangerous. Crafting a better China policy requires us to identify what is imaginary in our thinking about China."

CAA is not a "China hand." CAA barely speaks "take-out menu Chinese."

(CAA has, however, noticed a phenomenon where, even in non-English, non-Chinese speaking countries, restaurant orders are relayed, using English menu designations, e.g., "Number Seven!")

Rebounding from that tangent, any U.S. intelligence (especially counterintelligence) professional can't fail to notice, and learn a few things about, China.

So take a look at Mr. Blumenthal's "ten unicorns." What do you think?

10/3

re: "State snubs House request to examine Argentina-Iran ties"

José R. Cárdenas at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") assembled a nice summary of the issues.

Money quote(s):

"(T)hree members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) -- Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Subcommittee Chairman Connie Mack (R- FL), and freshman member David Rivera (R-FL) sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressing their concern over information they had received on suspicious activity involving Argentina, Venezuela, and Iran and asking the State Department to investigate whether any nuclear cooperation is at play between the three countries."

This could bear watching. Argentina discontinued its own military nuclear program some years ago. Which is not the same thing as saying they no longer have any military nuclear know-how.

8/10

re: "Is Obama doubling down on a risky gamble in Iraq?"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") had questions about that murky interface between military and national strategy, where political leaders do their decision-making.

Money quote(s):

"According to several unnamed sources, military commanders are "livid" with President Obama's decision to authorize a plan that is resourced at a fraction of the level that the military considered to be the minimum -- and even that minimum would only work "in extremis." Obama's approach appears to involve several multiples of risk beyond what the military consider prudent. Reportedly, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for a level of resources above what Obama appears to have authorized.

Reasonable people can disagree whether it makes national security sense for Obama to adopt such a risky path. For my part, I wish he had invested more effort in the Iraq file, especially working more closely with Prime Minister Maliki to push the process towards an outcome that is more favorable to American (and, I would argue, Iraqi national) interests.

The part that mystifies me is why his team thinks it makes political sense to have taken this course. His administration has already pocketed as much political benefit as there is to be wrung from Bush's surge -- and the media has generously refrained from pointing out that whatever positive developments came in Iraq came because of policies Obama and Biden tried strenuously to thwart in 2007. Given that the administration has already claimed Iraq as a great achievement, why take so risky a course now, one that could result in a great unraveling during the presidential campaign?"

The subtext here is the assumption that elected political leaders (or at least this elected political leader) make their big decisions based upon their personal calculus of electoral politics; rather than, say, the national good.

"The cost savings of denying the military the resources they say they need is trivial compared to the stakes. For that matter, the amount of time and effort it would have taken Obama to invest in Iraq policy so as to achieve greater progress with Maliki was probably trivial, too. Yet it seems that when it comes to Iraq, Obama is determined to do whatever is less than the minimum. "

Bug? Or feature?

9/7

re: "Avoiding Armageddon with China"

Dan Blumenthal, Mark Stokes, and Michael Mazza at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") look at changing U.S. perception of China's intentions.

Money quote(s):

"It is good news that James Traub, a highly regarded journalist and writer, may be startled out of his belief that China is a "status quo" power, based in part on a paper we wrote.

We hope that more writers of Traub's caliber will be similarly startled by China's growing menace. The truth is that like every rising power in history (including the United States) China wants to change rules, territorial delineations, and laws written while it was weak."

CAA is by no means a China (or even an "Asia") "hand." Not my speciality. But for any practicioner or student of foreign, military, or intelligence affairs, China is simply too big to ignore.

Like unto Texas, there are (or should be) more than one China. Probably (again like unto Texas), there should be at least five Chinas. And that doesn't even include Formosa in the count.

"Throughout its history, China has lumbered into disaster after disaster, costing untold sums in lives and treasure (e.g. the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Beijing's war with Vietnam). Certainly as China re-emerged as a power it had its chance to "bide its time and hide its capabilities" as Deng Xiaoping instructed. But instead, it decided to build a highly destabilizing military (see the last decade of Department of Defense reports on China's military power, the latest of which is here) and has proceeded to rattle its saber against Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and, most troublingly, the United States. It has now created the conditions for the encirclement is so fears."

There's this concept of imperial overreach. Make no mistake about it, any China larger than one-fifth of its current mass constitutes an empire and may be expected to behave (and misbehave) accordingly.

Hope for the best, but plan for the worst.

"Responding to years of Chinese harassment of U.S., Japanese, Vietnamese, and Philippine ships, last year Clinton broke new ground by declaring at a summit in Hanoi that "The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea." This is a diplomatic way of telling China that we will continue to exercise our forces inside its exclusive economic zone, consistent with international custom, and we will ensure that our partners in Asia are able to resist Chinese bullying.

This brings us to what seem to be Traub's biggest problem with the paper: that doing what Gates and Clinton proclaimed we need to do (respond with our own military programs and ensure freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons) is expensive. True enough. National security is an expensive endeavor. But as our own history shows (pre-Pearl Harbor, pre-Korean War) military weakness in the face of new threats are more expensive still, in lives and in treasure."

Nothing I read in our nation's capital newspaper(s) give me any confidence that we are any less likely to re-commit our interwar and post-WW2 forefathers' mistakes with respect to military preparedness. And as my WW2 veteran grandfather rather chillingly put it to a much younger CAA, young men end up paying for that with "a bayonet in the guts."

"The Cold War is too simple a metaphor to describe Sino-U.S. relations. China is an economic partner, and Washington is deeply engaged in a diplomacy that tries to convince China to peacefully take its place as a great power. At the same time, we are balancing China's power and hedging against a more bellicose China."

Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. China certainly is, expanding its military and naval capabilities at a rapid pace, becoming in fact the peer-competitor that theorists like to pontificate about.

"The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan."

Engagement works both ways. All the economic levers we attempt to work into our engagement with China run right back to us through our own economy and international economic institutions and arrangements. And China's military theorists aren't shy in their theorizing about the multidimensional nature of any future conflict with the U.S. Forewarned isn't necessarily fore-armed, but it's a start.

"(I)t is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends.

This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon."

(9/6)

re: "Obama's Afghanistan strategy and the right to be wrong"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") considered the U.S. civil-military relationship.


Money quote(s):


"(F)rom the parochial perspective of civil-military relations theory, Obama is within his rights to make the decision in the way that he did, and so far, the senior military have behaved in an exemplary fashion."

That's a good BLUF ("bottom line up front"). Mr. Feaver then ratchets up his granularity a bit.


"(N)ot only will the coalition have fewer forces than the generals believe they require to implement the overall strategy effectively -- probably much fewer, as our allies respond to the dog whistle "retreat" sounding from the president's decision and accelerate their rush to the exits -- but those forces will be facing an enemy that has good reason to believe that time is on its side. The military brass report that the new course just might work, but it will be a very close run thing."

Nobody, least of all our allies, wants to be the last ones on the ground within a shrinking operational footprint. Still, we have the best troops in the world, capable of winning even when resourced to fail.

"Since the military logic of the move is so weak, one naturally looks for some other explanation, such as a political angle. The president's decision to interrupt next summer's fighting season makes no military sense whatsoever; better to let the troops finish the fighting season and come home in the late fall or winter. But that would be after the election. So far as I have been able to determine, that is the only explanation of the timeline that makes sense, but I am open to hearing a convincing counterargument. I am very reluctant to charge a president with elevating domestic political interests over national security ones because I remember how unfairly Democrats made that charge against President George W. Bush -- and that was on a much more flimsy evidentiary basis."

Civility. Accusing a sitting president of playing politics with U.S. soldier's lives is serious business. Sadly, better presidents than this one have done it before.

"(T)here is one aspect of the decision that is legitimate and one that may even warrant praise. The legitimate aspect is that, notwithstanding a torrent of leaks, the decision-making process seems to have conformed more or less to democratic civil-military norms. The military presented a range of options, including options that it did not want to execute; it would have been inappropriate of Gen. David Petraeus to tie Obama's hands by only providing a narrow range of options, minor variants of the military's preferred plan. He didn't do so; instead, he and the rest of the military leadership have saluted and are obeying, and such professionalism is very definitely worthy of praise. To be sure, the military gave its best personal judgment as to the risks inherent in those plans. Obama was fully aware of the military's judgment, and the public, through Congress, is also aware of that judgment. But it is the president's job to balance the risks of battlefield failure against other risks. The military gets to say this is a high-risk plan. The president gets to say that he will accept this risk and impose it on them.

Accept it and impose it he did. That has important political consequences. Before, one could say that he merely chose General Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus's strategy. Now it is unmistakably President Obama's strategy. It is his war. But he will be ordering others to fight his war, which brings me to one bit of unfinished civil-military business."

So there's ownership of the outcome here, however it turns out. And we should all wish our commander-in-chief's plan every success in the world.

"I have been thinking of the troops that will remain. They are locked in the fight of their lives, and they (or at least their commanders) probably paid more attention to the president's speech than did most other Americans. Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory."

That's a real question asked by real troops on the ground. I know I asked it myself and, during the previous administration, I often found various civilian and military officials to be, shall we say, insufficiently serious about their commitment.

"From a civil-military perspective, the president has the right to be wrong. He might well be wrong this time, and if so, that may be evident to all by next fall. In that case, democratic theory points to the duty of others: the voters."

In the democratic model of civil-military relations, the voters get the final word on a commander-in-chief's fitness to lead the nation, to say nothing of the military. However it should never be forgotten that in other lands, at other times, a commander-in-chief's errors have been so serious as to take the civil-military relationship right out of the democratic context. The history or literary-minded will recall "It Can't Happen Here" was a warning, not a promise.