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Showing posts with label Ryan Crocker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ryan Crocker. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

re: "State Dept Throws Sink + All Fixtures But One to Fire FSO-Non Grata, Peter Van Buren"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator") had a good summary of Peter Van Buren's situation (as of March 19th).

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps it is comforting to some to hear that the State Department will finally get to penalize Mr. Van Buren for linking to two non-secret cables on WikiLeaks. But we gotta ask -- whatever happened to the 2010 Diplomatic Security investigation on the leak of two secret 2009 Eikenberry cables to the NYT in 2010?

Or for that matter, is anyone investigating the leak of Ambassador Crocker's top-secret cable to Washington in January this year, warning that the persistence of enemy havens in Pakistan was placing the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in jeopardy.
Somebody really should check out the status of these investigations and see if anyone has been prosecuted yet. The public may get the wrong impression that linking to non-secret cables in a blog is more dangerous than the actual leaks of secret and top secret materials to the newspaper of record."

There're leaks, and then there are leaks. Different spanks for different ranks. Sometimes a leak is unofficially official, or perhaps just when it's to the New York Times, well, that's just okay then.

"The comment that we often hear is that, he should have done the honorable thing and resigned from his job before writing this book or before skewering his employer in his blog.

And we understand that sentiment; for the bureaucracy to “function,” it must have order. For order to exist, employees must follow the line and not be going off every which way. If employees disagree with a policy, there is what they call the “Dissent Channel,” to register one’s disagreement with official policy. As an aside, AFSA even gives out awards for what it calls “constructive dissent.” We have it in good authority, by the way, that Mr. Van Buren has been nominated by more than one person for AFSA’s William R. Rivkin Award for midlevel officials. Let’s see if AFSA can find an excuse not to give out the award this year.

In any case, it is worth noting that the State Department is not obligated to share the dissent received with the American public, nor is it obligated to report what action it takes in response to such a dissent. If that fails, resignation from one’s job has been the accepted course of action, a norm drilled into the heads of our State Department folks."


"While we understand what appears to be a prevailing collective desire that the employee who disagrees with policy leave in polite terms, we are wondering if the time has come to rethink that. Getting off the bus quietly is encouraged in that culture, and presumably from the perspective of the organization that’s the best course of action. It avoids controversy and the parties can pretend the separation is like a marriage that no longer works, etc — but is this necessarily good for the paying public? Should the employees ought to just be thankful they have a job and keep quiet? And for those who can’t keep quiet for whatever reason, must they give up their livelihood for pointing out the stinky elephant in the room?"

All good questions and ones going to the heart of the Foreign Service corporate culture.

"Instead of taking this case seriously as a good excuse to look inward and review the policy of reconstruction in war zones, and absent a change of direction, develop more effective metrics and accountability for these projects, the State Department took its fight to the messenger. And wasted time and resources there."

CAA hasn't read Brother Van Buren's book. CAA may never read his book. Not that it's an unworthy book, but.... while CAA's heart may feel that the work of PRTs and E-PRTs was/is good, worthy, and well-intended, CAA's mind has told him from the beginning of GW2 (Gulf War II) that the U.S. was never going to stay long enough, in either Iraq or Afghanistan, for nation-building (as such) to do much good in the long run.

So the money (and the lives) spent were going to go towards buying only temporary successes.

Now, there's a school of thought that posits things like good and evil, success and failure, if they're going to be measures or used as any sort of metric, must be matrixed against time or duration for them to have any sort of useful meaning.

So some temporary success, some lives improved (if only for a few years) are not things to be scoffed-at or disregarded; but they're going to be analyzed against dollars and cents they must include their duration as well.

"The State Department spends much money and effort to recruit and train the “best and the brightest” to represent America overseas, then proceeds to hammer and shape them into, I’m sorry to say, drones, who follow directions, not create waves and most importantly, whose stingers are without barbs."

CAA exists. Ponder that.

Diplopundit closes with a thoughtful question:

"I’m sure the State Department can argue that “enforcing” the rules, however selectively, is done to promote the proper functioning of the Service. But should the proper functioning of the Service trumps everything else? Whether you agree with Mr. Van Buren’s message or not, his method of delivery or not, his case has created a precedent. Throwing the sink and all fixtures at him would help ensure that nothing like this ever happens again. I suspect that would be good for the State Department. Order restored. Life goes on.

But are we, the American public better served?"

3/19


Wednesday, February 29, 2012

re: "Why State is Incompetent at Development"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") reported on Amb. Crocker's return to Kabul and a turf battle to resolve (as of this weekend, he's still there).

Money quote(s):

"One of his first tasks in his new job will be to repair the dysfunctional relationship between U.S. diplomats in Kabul and Afghanistan-based USAID officials, which has hampered U.S. development assistance in the country."

In light of recent developments, this doesn't seem like that big a deal. But given the monetary amounts involved, that perception would be, perhaps, short-sighted.

"(A)ccording to a recent report by the State Department Inspector General's office, the relationship has suffered from bureaucratic and communications issues between aid workers and diplomats.

The report found that the problems between the embassy and USAID in Kabul stem in part from the State Department's idea that chiefs of mission should be in charge of all development issues in their country, as envisioned by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that State released earlier this year."

Where could the State Dept. possibly have gotten this idea, considering that ambassadors are the personal representatives of the president and responsible for all U.S. Government activities in their country-of-assignment (unless there's a MOU or SOFA to the contrary)?

(CAA is being disingenuous, of course.)

"The report went on to say that bureaucratic differences "exacerbate feelings of professional misunderstanding" between CDDEA and USAID, and that officials in Washington need to step in to impose a resolution to these problems."

CAA loves his USAID colleagues, wishing them well even to the extent that he mourns the ever-tightening and anaconda-like envelopment of USAID by the State Dept. It never fails to remind of the similar fate of USIA/USIS.

That being said, if D.C. is called upon to knock-heads on this issue, it's fated to go only one way.

"USAID personnel in Kabul chafe at the embassy's demands for lots of briefings and explanations of their financial management. They also feel like second-class citizens because the embassy doesn't provide them with the best housing and office space, the report said.

On the other hand, the embassy folks don't believe the USAID personnel are on board with the "whole of government" approach, the report states. They think USAID withholds information from them and sometimes creates political messes they are then forced to clean up."

Hmm. Color CAA unsympathetic about USAID personnel not getting the "best housing and office space" in a war zone.

7/27

Friday, July 29, 2011

re: "Another task for Crocker: Fix relations between embassy and USAID"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") has a little something for the new COM's "to do" list.


Money quote(s):


"Ambassador Ryan Crocker was sworn in today as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. One of his first tasks in his new job will be to repair the dysfunctional relationship between U.S. diplomats in Kabul and Afghanistan-based USAID officials, which has hampered U.S. development assistance in the country."


The relationship between State and USAID, to put it opaquely, has been in transition for years. The office of USAID's chief or "Administrator" is held or "dual-hatted" by a senior State Dept. official.


And yet USAID is not (yet) actually an organic or subsidiary agency within the Department of State.


At the same time, except for military or DoD personnel operating under the authority of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that puts them under the authority of a military commander, all official U.S. persons working within a foreign country are supposed to come under the authority of the "chief of mission" or COM (i.e., the U.S. ambassador).


Confused yet? Okay; now imagine you're a USAID staffer working in Afghanistan


"(T)he Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA). The office was meant to oversee USAID's efforts in the country, but according to a recent report by the State Department Inspector General's office, the relationship has suffered from bureaucratic and communications issues between aid workers and diplomats.


The report found that the problems between the embassy and USAID in Kabul stem in part from the State Department's idea that chiefs of mission should be in charge of all development issues in their country, as envisioned by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that State released earlier this year."


Where ever would State get such an idea?


"The IG said that Crocker should work with the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Marc Grossman, Deputy Secretary Tom Nides, and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance to explain to USAID exactly how they should work with the embassy.


USAID personnel in Kabul chafe at the embassy's demands for lots of briefings and explanations of their financial management. They also feel like second-class citizens because the embassy doesn't provide them with the best housing and office space, the report said.


On the other hand, the embassy folks don't believe the USAID personnel are on board with the "whole of government" approach, the report states. They think USAID withholds information from them and sometimes creates political messes they are then forced to clean up.


The USAID mission has responsibility for a large portion what will reportedly be over $71 billion of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan by the end of 2011, making it a significant player in the largest U.S. development mission in the world.


It's been a rough few weeks for the USAID mission in Afghanistan. A report last week by the Government Accountability Office found that USAID is failing to properly oversee aid dollars."