re: "A Traveler In The Foreign Service: You Say You Want a Revolution? We All Want To Change The World"

Dave Seminara at A Traveler In The Foreign Service offered some good advice to prospective FSOs.

Money quote(s):

"When I meet people who are interested in joining the State Department's Foreign Service, I always ask them why they're motivated to serve. Everyone has their own reasons, but one common motivation shared by many is a desire to help shape U.S. Foreign Policy. Many of these same people are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and how we conduct ourselves on the global stage, and believe that by joining the Foreign Service, they can play some role in creating change.

There's no doubt that we all need to be informed and engaged on global issues so that we can vote for politicians who will support the type of approach to global affairs we favor. But I wouldn't recommend joining the Foreign Service if your primary goal is to influence how U.S. Foreign Policy is conducted. Those who think they're going to be creating policy are often disappointed and disillusioned when they realize that Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) are tasked with implementing policy, not creating it."

Yes, yes, YES!

Dave gets it, but then he was one of us not so long ago.

FSOs do not create U.S. foreign policy, we carry it out.

Military folks should understand this well enough; except at the very highest levels (and this is also true of FSOs), military personnel do not create defense policy or make strategy, they make it happen.

"FSO's are often called Foreign Policy foot soldiers. They receive marching orders and they carry them out. This doesn't mean that FSO's play no role in shaping policy at all. The insights provided by FSO's on the ground overseas via cables, memos, and in-person briefings can help influence decision-making in Washington."

There's nothing wrong or dishonorable with being a "foot soldier." And Dave correctly remarks on the considerable influence FSO reporting from overseas can have on decision-making back in D.C. CAA can attest to the remarkable respect that diplomatic reporting cables garner among intelligence analysts around the beltway; readers of wikileaks (CAA is not, can not, be one) may be able to back me up on that.

"(I)f you enter the Foreign Service thinking you're going to be calling the shots on how to shape the bilateral relationship with the country you're posted in, you're going to be disappointed. Even if you rise to the level of Ambassador, you're still going to need to seek approval from Washington before proceeding on all matters of substance.

The practicality of this reality is that passionate, idealistic, crusaders with very strong opinions don't always make the best diplomats. You're free to have your own opinions and the State Department has a formal "dissent" channel whereby FSO's can voice their objections to U.S. government policies, but as a representative of the United States government, you really have to keep your politics to yourself, particularly while serving abroad. Not all FSO's follow this rule but the most effective senior level diplomats do."

Please note that CAA is not a senior level diplomat.

Also note that CAA keeps his politics to himself at work, particularly when serving overseas.

"I'd estimate that a majority of FSO's lean Democratic, and given the fact that the George W. Bush administration was at times openly hostile towards the State Department, it should come as no surprise that there were plenty of dissenters in the Foreign Service during the W years. The war in Iraq and the subsequent mass diversion of human and material resources to our mega mission in Baghdad created lots of malcontents, but only a few, like Brady Kiesling, resigned on principle.

Kiesling and others followed their conscience, but I think that when you join the Foreign Service, you have to expect that you'll probably serve under Presidents you dislike who will implement policies you disagree with. If you're not the good soldier type who can live with that, the Foreign Service probably isn't a great career choice for you."

Like the military, you trust in the system (that you're an integral part of) to proceed in a lawful, Constitutional manner that reflects the will of the American people as embodied by their elected representatives.

It's a terrible system, no doubt, the worst possible one, of course, except for all the worse ones.

"The bottom line is that the Foreign Service is a highly structured, chain-of-command focused bureaucracy, not that unlike the military. If you're not capable of holding your nose and delivering a message you find personally repulsive, don't sign up."

5/2

re: "State Dept Throws Sink + All Fixtures But One to Fire FSO-Non Grata, Peter Van Buren"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator") had a good summary of Peter Van Buren's situation (as of March 19th).

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps it is comforting to some to hear that the State Department will finally get to penalize Mr. Van Buren for linking to two non-secret cables on WikiLeaks. But we gotta ask -- whatever happened to the 2010 Diplomatic Security investigation on the leak of two secret 2009 Eikenberry cables to the NYT in 2010?

Or for that matter, is anyone investigating the leak of Ambassador Crocker's top-secret cable to Washington in January this year, warning that the persistence of enemy havens in Pakistan was placing the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in jeopardy.

Somebody really should check out the status of these investigations and see if anyone has been prosecuted yet. The public may get the wrong impression that linking to non-secret cables in a blog is more dangerous than the actual leaks of secret and top secret materials to the newspaper of record."

There're leaks, and then there are leaks. Different spanks for different ranks. Sometimes a leak is unofficially official, or perhaps just when it's to the New York Times, well, that's just okay then.

"The comment that we often hear is that, he should have done the honorable thing and resigned from his job before writing this book or before skewering his employer in his blog.

And we understand that sentiment; for the bureaucracy to “function,” it must have order. For order to exist, employees must follow the line and not be going off every which way. If employees disagree with a policy, there is what they call the “Dissent Channel,” to register one’s disagreement with official policy. As an aside, AFSA even gives out awards for what it calls “constructive dissent.” We have it in good authority, by the way, that Mr. Van Buren has been nominated by more than one person for AFSA’s William R. Rivkin Award for midlevel officials. Let’s see if AFSA can find an excuse not to give out the award this year.

In any case, it is worth noting that the State Department is not obligated to share the dissent received with the American public, nor is it obligated to report what action it takes in response to such a dissent. If that fails, resignation from one’s job has been the accepted course of action, a norm drilled into the heads of our State Department folks."

Diplopundit has an entire post, dedicated to how the AFSA creative dissent awards turned out this year.

"While we understand what appears to be a prevailing collective desire that the employee who disagrees with policy leave in polite terms, we are wondering if the time has come to rethink that. Getting off the bus quietly is encouraged in that culture, and presumably from the perspective of the organization that’s the best course of action. It avoids controversy and the parties can pretend the separation is like a marriage that no longer works, etc — but is this necessarily good for the paying public? Should the employees ought to just be thankful they have a job and keep quiet? And for those who can’t keep quiet for whatever reason, must they give up their livelihood for pointing out the stinky elephant in the room?"

All good questions and ones going to the heart of the Foreign Service corporate culture.

"Instead of taking this case seriously as a good excuse to look inward and review the policy of reconstruction in war zones, and absent a change of direction, develop more effective metrics and accountability for these projects, the State Department took its fight to the messenger. And wasted time and resources there."

CAA hasn't read Brother Van Buren's book. CAA may never read his book. Not that it's an unworthy book, but.... while CAA's heart may feel that the work of PRTs and E-PRTs was/is good, worthy, and well-intended, CAA's mind has told him from the beginning of GW2 (Gulf War II) that the U.S. was never going to stay long enough, in either Iraq or Afghanistan, for nation-building (as such) to do much good in the long run.

So the money (and the lives) spent were going to go towards buying only temporary successes.

Now, there's a school of thought that posits things like good and evil, success and failure, if they're going to be measures or used as any sort of metric, must be matrixed against time or duration for them to have any sort of useful meaning.

So some temporary success, some lives improved (if only for a few years) are not things to be scoffed-at or disregarded; but they're going to be analyzed against dollars and cents they must include their duration as well.

"The State Department spends much money and effort to recruit and train the “best and the brightest” to represent America overseas, then proceeds to hammer and shape them into, I’m sorry to say, drones, who follow directions, not create waves and most importantly, whose stingers are without barbs."

CAA exists. Ponder that.

Diplopundit closes with a thoughtful question:

"I’m sure the State Department can argue that “enforcing” the rules, however selectively, is done to promote the proper functioning of the Service. But should the proper functioning of the Service trumps everything else? Whether you agree with Mr. Van Buren’s message or not, his method of delivery or not, his case has created a precedent. Throwing the sink and all fixtures at him would help ensure that nothing like this ever happens again. I suspect that would be good for the State Department. Order restored. Life goes on.

But are we, the American public better served?"

3/19

re: "DIPLOMAT Articles on All and Sundry"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("A digital hybrid of blog and memoir presented on a daily basis, or not.") provides a nice block of excerpts from his recent article at DIPLOMAT, "Diplomatic Drafting and Wikileaks."

Money quote(s):

"(T)the Wikileaks document dump exists in a category of its own.

The material is so powerful precisely because it blows away Assange’s banal anti-Americanism. Yes, it’s horribly embarrassing for Washington that all these cables have leaked. Confidences have been ruined. Sources endangered. In terms of writing style the cables often err on the dense and overlong side.

However, far from exposing the dark side of American/Western policies they show as never before the strengths and values of the Western Anglosphere diplomatic method. The documents uncover mile after mile of sensible, balanced, practical, timely and reasonable analysis and comment by American diplomats, often with amusing extra insights and personal touches..." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Which is nice of him to have said. One tries, after all.

"The UK has of its own free will (at least as expressed through Parliament when ratifying the Lisbon Treaty) accepted EU voting rules which allow this to happen, just as the Treaty also provides a procedure to enable a Member State to leave the Union and get back all its sovereignty once again.

Nonetheless, as the eurozone crisis gathers momentum, the existential question of sovereignty is coming back to the fore even in placid, postmodern Europe. What claims, if any, do (say) Greeks have on (say) German resources and hard work by virtue of EU ‘solidarity’? What claims do eurozone members have on (say) the UK, smugly watching the disarray from across the Channel? Tricky."

These are not exactly idle questions nowadays.

11/3

re: "The Margins of the Upper Limits"

Sass and Sweet ("In Search of a Better Exchange Rate... Observations about life as a Diplomat.") has finished her consular assignment.

Money quote(s):

"I *love* Visa work. I find it fascinating. I enjoy the contact with different people from different walks of life. One of my co-workers self-refers to himself as a "rules based life form". I get that. I like doing a job where I can "interpret the law"."

That is kind of cool. There's the law. 8 U.S.C. The INA. There's the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). Plus Department cables providing explanatory guidance.

But "at the end of the day," it's just you, your understanding of the laws and regulations, the visa applicant, and your assessment of how that person's (and you should never forget that applicant's personhood and individual dignity) unique situation and purpose of travel. So it comes down to exercising your powers of judgment.

Sass goes on to provide some humorous indicators.

"You know you're on your home stretch when....

1.) Every time you ask someone why they are travelling to the US and to explain their plans - and they answer: "to travel" - you begin to imagine having a red button next to your desk which, when pushed, opens up a shoot below the applicant leading to a shark pond.

2.) Every time you ask someone about their previous refusal they answer: "not enough document" - you begin to imagine a red button next to your desk which, when pushed, opens up a shoot below the applicant leading to a shark pond.

3.) Every time you ask someone to describe the work they do they answer: "business" - you begin to imagine... well, you get the idea.

4.) Every time the "interpreter" refuses to interpret because they think the question is dumb - you begin to imagine ......

5.) Every time someone says "that [crime] shouldn't count, I'm only going to Vegas..."

6.) Every time someone says ...

Ok, I'll stop now - I think I've reached the burn out point and it's time for a break. Plus, I'm committed to following and obeying the law - I suppose "dropping people into shark pits" is probably outside the bounds of the law.

I will absolutely miss Visas. Probably. Maybe. Someday. (Oh, I will - they are in my blood....) - but not for a while."

We used to say that it's a good thing the bullet-resistant windows work both ways.

re: "The Effects of WikiLeaks on Those Who Work at the State Department"

Samuel Witten at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") has written the best two-paragraph explanation of a cable that I've ever seen.

Money quote(s):

"The diplomatic cable, a tool used by many governments, provides an official channel for U.S. diplomats abroad to report back to Washington and for Washington to instruct diplomats on how to approach relationships with foreign governments, the public overseas, international organizations and many other audiences. Many cables to and from our diplomatic posts include analyses of complex issues of foreign policy and diplomacy. Others provide candid recommendations of ways to advance U.S. interests against steep odds in dangerous and uncertain places. Some seek urgent guidance and identify sensitive information and options to address contingencies. Others offer insights into the character and motivations of foreign leaders, potential U.S. allies and opponents, opposition political parties, human rights activists, and dissidents.

Cables are a fundamental part of the State Department’s core culture, an essential component of how State Department diplomats and lawyers do business. The process of obtaining “clearance” on a proposed cable within the State Department (or from other concerned federal agencies) ensures that messages and instructions reflect all of the interests at stake and have the benefit of cumulative experience. Cables also create an official, historical record of the U.S. Government’s international actions and help ensure accountability for decisions."

"When overseas, I sent cables discussing and analyzing meetings or negotiations I attended or seeking guidance from Washington on possible options and instructions. When in Washington, where I was based, I made every effort to ensure that our outgoing cables were clear and detailed enough that colleagues around the world would benefit from precise analysis and assistance.

Damage from WikiLeaks disclosures go well beyond the immediate consequences reported in the media. The releases undermine the essential ability of our foreign affairs professionals to do their jobs. The leaks compromise the acquisition and flow of information around the world, reduce the effectiveness of our international outreach, and may put lives at risk."

"Putting aside the anti-Americanism of some supporters, there are those who suggest that the leaks promote a kind of openness, giving the public a better understanding of how diplomacy operates and clarifying the interests and goals of the United States and foreign governments. Some may argue that the knowledge of a potential leak – which always exists – may enhance the analytic and reportorial rigor of our diplomats abroad. In this respect, some suggest that the cables, overall, provide an advertisement for a State Department full of excellent professionals advocating and defending American interests around the world. There is certainly much truth in the latter. But to the extent there is any value in these public disclosures, that value, in my opinion, is far outweighed by the substantial negative impacts."

&

"The U.S. has aggressively sought to contain the diplomatic and strategic damage resulting from WikiLeaks disclosures. In this respect, any negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy that have resulted from WikiLeaks could well be compounded by additional disclosures, but may be ameliorated in many cases by the passage of time and subsequent events. Similarly, some of the negative professional and practical consequences at the State Department and in our international relations will improve over time.

That said, the profound unease and anxiety about the breach in our system through the unauthorized leaks may never disappear entirely. For the foreseeable future, foreign officials and private persons will understandably be worried about whether their dialogues with the State Department will be secure. Some candor and critiques by our own professionals may go unwritten or held in narrow channels of distribution."

If no one is willing to talk to us, we’re not going to be able to do much in the way of promoting mutual understanding. Or much of anything else.

The impact of this simply can’t be over-stated. No one can possibly believe their identities and the information they provide us will be held in confidence. We simply will no longer be trusted to pass information to the right ears and no further.

Any cable-drafter already knows that the potential readership of any given cable is quite large. Potentially, anyone within (and in some case outwith) the State Dept. possessing the right accesses could become a reader, either today or next week, next month, or next year. Cables are forever, communications-of-record; if nothing else their contents will become summarized and encapsulated in reports which trickle ever upwards.

Nothing levels our side of the playing field quite so drastically as when our mail is being read, even long after the fact. Candor and plain-talking are essential or you’re just spinning your wheels.

Time and again I’ve instructed report-writers to tell the facts, what they know and how they know it, what they saw and heard, as distinct from what they think and deduce from it (but include that too, clearly differentiated) and let “higher” do the second-guessing from their position of access to a wider ranger of information. Don’t self-adjudicate.

I must confess I’ve done this myself, pre-Wikileaks. Not writing everything I know or have heard about something, but passing the information (less the specific identity of a source) to “higher” through channels as secure (actually, in hindsight much more secure) as cable traffic but without the same paper trail. I thought I was just being paranoid about protecting my sources, but it’s true what they say: Paranoia Is Its Own Reward.

It also deprives “higher” with the fuller appreciation of that information which knowing the actual source can provide.

re: "The Effects of WikiLeaks on Those Who Work at the State Department"

Samuel Witten at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") has a great analysis on the Wikileaks fallout at the State Dept.

Money quote(s):

"The diplomatic cable, a tool used by many governments, provides an official channel for U.S. diplomats abroad to report back to Washington and for Washington to instruct diplomats on how to approach relationships with foreign governments, the public overseas, international organizations and many other audiences. Many cables to and from our diplomatic posts include analyses of complex issues of foreign policy and diplomacy. Others provide candid recommendations of ways to advance U.S. interests against steep odds in dangerous and uncertain places. Some seek urgent guidance and identify sensitive information and options to address contingencies. Others offer insights into the character and motivations of foreign leaders, potential U.S. allies and opponents, opposition political parties, human rights activists, and dissidents.

Cables are a fundamental part of the State Department’s core culture, an essential component of how State Department diplomats and lawyers do business. The process of obtaining “clearance” on a proposed cable within the State Department (or from other concerned federal agencies) ensures that messages and instructions reflect all of the interests at stake and have the benefit of cumulative experience. Cables also create an official, historical record of the U.S. Government’s international actions and help ensure accountability for decisions."

The above is without doubt the best two-paragraph explanation of a cable that I've ever seen.

Left out are the categories of cable which are, I believe, excluded from the Wikileaks breach, which are the relatively non-sexy cables having to do with official orders (such as travel or assignments, promotion lists, &tc.), law enforcement and consular-related communications which incorporated personally identifying information.

"Damage from WikiLeaks disclosures go well beyond the immediate consequences reported in the media. The releases undermine the essential ability of our foreign affairs professionals to do their jobs. The leaks compromise the acquisition and flow of information around the world, reduce the effectiveness of our international outreach, and may put lives at risk."

"Our foreign affairs professionals can do their jobs properly only when they can exchange information in confidence with foreign leaders, would-be leaders, academics, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens. Many interlocutors are willing to engage with American diplomats only because of implicit or explicit understandings that the exchanges will be kept confidential."

If no one is willing to talk to us, we're not going to be able to do much in the way of promoting mutual understanding. Or much of anything else.

"It seems inevitable that many officials from foreign governments or international organizations, not to mention private persons at risk, will be more reticent in their contacts with the United States. The releases already made thus are likely to put a chill in our normal diplomatic dialogues; in some cases, it may take years to restore confidence and underlying relationships."

This is huge. The impact of this simply can't be over-stated. No one can possibly believe their identities and the information they provide us will be held in confidence. We simply will no longer be trusted to pass information to the right ears and no further.

"Diplomats are asked from the first day of their training to think critically. Their job is not merely to report on what they see and hear, but to evaluate, challenge conventional wisdom, and recommend strategies for advancing U.S. interests in complex situations."

"(E)xperts in Washington benefit from “atmospheric reporting” (such as reports of what people are saying informally or what the public mood might be in some locations) because it helps them put other information in context. Candor and creativity in reporting and analysis could well be casualties of the shadow cast by WikiLeaks."

Any cable-drafter already knows that the potential readership of any given cable is quite large. Potentially, anyone within (and in some case outwith) the State Dept. possessing the right accesses could become a reader, either today or next week, next month, or next year. Cables are forever, communications-of-record; if nothing else their contents will become summarized and encapsulated in reports which trickle ever upwards.

"Cables are both vehicles for instructions to our negotiating delegations and part of the record of our negotiations."

Nothing levels our side of the playing field quite so drastically as when our mail is being read, even long after the fact. Candor and plain-talking are essential or you're just spinning your wheels.

"Candor, creativity and “out of the box” views are appropriately sought – and needed – by decision makers. Thanks to WikiLeaks, cable-drafters are now seeing their candid words, thoughts, and analysis, all intended for internal consumption, splashed on the front pages of newspapers and circulated around the world on the internet. Concerned for perhaps the first time in their careers that they have damaged U.S. interests, at least some of these employees could be more cautious in the future."

Time and again I've instructed report-writers to tell the facts, what they know and how they know it, what they saw and heard, as distinct from what they think and deduce from it (but include that too, clearly differentiated) and let "higher" do the second-guessing from their position of access to a wider ranger of information. Don't self-adjudicate.

Mr. Witten concludes:

"For the foreseeable future, foreign officials and private persons will understandably be worried about whether their dialogues with the State Department will be secure. Some candor and critiques by our own professionals may go unwritten or held in narrow channels of distribution."

I must confess I've done this myself, pre-Wikileaks. Not writing everything I know or have heard about something, but passing the information (less the specific identity of a source) to "higher" through channels as secure (actually, in hindsight much more secure) as cable traffic but without the same paper trail. I thought I was just being paranoid about protecting my sources, but it's true what they say: Paranoia Is Its Own Reward.

It also deprives "higher" with the fuller appreciation of that information which knowing the actual source can provide.

re: "US diplomats brief Obama: Wilders "no friend of the US," foments "fear and hatred of immigrants" "

Robert at Jihad Watch ("dedicated to bringing public attention to the role that jihad theology and ideology plays in the modern world, and to correcting popular misconceptions about the role of jihad and religion in modern-day conflicts") has something from Dutch coverage of Wikileaks.

re: "Pause"

Katie at Adventures in Good Countries ("Getting along in the Foreign Service")givens an impression from the field.

Money quote(s):

"I have often stopped myself from writing things on my blog because I was uncertain of the potential impact. That's been true from the beginning of my foreign service career, but more true since I've been stationed here. It's one thing to talk about funny visa stories; how can I talk about human rights issues in my host country?"

True that. As you begin to climb the ladder in the Foreign Service, your stories can become a lot less generic (as in, that story could have come from anywhere) and a lot more targeted (as in, this story can get someone hurt).

"(I)t's been hard to watch the wikileaks story. On the surface of it, what officer hasn't wanted to run screaming down a hallway with a cable in hand demanding that people consider an issue she or he thinks is being overlooked or lightly treated? I'm sure there are no small number of people secretly wishing that their cables DO get a mention -- that finally that particular issue they had championed and worked on and cried over would be exposed and people would take action. It's a hopeful viewpoint -- or maybe a frustrated viewpoint. We want our work to bring about change. Not later, not gradually, not patiently, but now."

"Civil liberties, legal protections, the right to defend yourself and your actions: these don't exist in so many places. So many places that you wouldn't guess. So many places that you might take a nice vacation to and look around and think "this seems like a pleasant enough country" and never give another thought to what's beneath the surface. Places where, to mention certain things, you have to do it in private. Where information is not a tool, but rather a weapon to be turned against people.

It is heart-wrenching to hear wikileaks demand to know who they have put in danger, and it's astounding to me that they can't get past the thrill of 'embarrassing' the United States to see that what they are doing is dangerous -- and that they will never hear about the people who are punished for it. The person who is whisked away in the night for "questioning" won't be mentioned online or in the papers... and now, might not even be mentioned in cables meant to inform our government and help stop abuses."

Thank you, Katie, for speaking one of those unspeakable truths which will be overlooked by the media in its wealth of wikileaks coverage.

&

"This is not whistle-blowing. It's just voyeurism. At best, I thought it might lead to the sort of informed discussion on the issues that cable writers so fervently dream of inspiring. It seems that people just aren't interested. More fun to poke at the American straw man you've constructed than to to think critically about the ramification of things.

And for the record, wikileaks isn't embarrassing the United States. None of us are embarrassed about doing our job."

Well said. And as has been noticed by no few in the punditry, U.S. diplomats are doing the jobs they're expected to do.

I'm not sure what they thought we really do, unless they really are trapped in those sixty-year-old stereotypes about striped pants, ivy league trust funds, and cocktail parties.

re: "A week of WikiLeaks and not one mention of the State Department's "cookie pushers" "

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("Just one obsessive observer, diplomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and the worldwide available universe.") notes a missing element among the scribes, punditry, and ink-stained wretches.

Money quote(s):

"Apparently coined by US diplomat Hugh S. Gibson in 1924, the term Cookie Pusher has been applied as a reference to diplomats in general and members of the United States Foreign Service in particular, and not in a good way.

Whenever the State Department diplomats made the news in our 24 hour news cycle, some journalists, commentators and opinion makers more often than not, bring up the pejorative term to refer to our diplomats."

Usually it's paired with "striped-pants" to make "striped-pants cookie-pushers."

This refers, presumably, to the striped pants which are still a component of formal day wear for men.

The which I've worn only once in my entire life, as a groomsman, for a formal day wedding (my brother's).

"This past week, after days of classified embassy cables dripping out of selected news outlets and the WikiLeaks servers when they were not under denial of service (DoS) attacks, there was no single mention of US diplomats as "cookie pushers."

Not one single one.

Of course, NYT's Mark Landler in From WikiLemons, Clinton Tries to Make Lemonade, made up for the media's oversight by describing our diplomats as "pinstriped authors who pour their hearts and minds into cables that are filed to Washington and often not even read by desk officers, let alone senior diplomats or the secretary herself."

But -- still no mention of the "cookie pushers ..." "

&

"Perhaps one of the strangest thing to come out of this -- is that in releasing these diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks have succeeded in redrawing the "unfortunate caricature of our profession" in the words of Nick Burns, into a fuller picture of what it is to be an American diplomat -- the "thoughtful, well-informed and dedicated servants of the American interest" -- dealing with problems in a global scale."

Still not worth the candle, but gratifying in a not-so-strange sort of way. After all, what writer doesn't value praise, however grudging?

re: "WikiLeaks Shows the Skills of U.S. Diplomats"

Fareed Zakaria at TIME has some of the best writing I've seen in that magazine (since I stopped reading it years ago).

Money quote(s):

"A remarkably broad consensus has formed that WikiLeaks' latest data dump is a diplomatic disaster for the U.S. While there are debates over how the Obama Administration should respond, everyone agrees that the revelations have weakened America. But have they? I don't deny for a moment that many of the "wikicables" are intensely embarrassing, but the sum total of the output I have read is actually quite reassuring about the way Washington — or at least the State Department — works."

"The WikiLeaks documents.... show Washington pursuing privately pretty much the policies it has articulated publicly. Whether on Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan or North Korea, the cables confirm what we know to be U.S. foreign policy. And often this foreign policy is concerned with broader regional security, not narrow American interests. Ambassadors are not caught pushing other countries in order to make deals secretly to strengthen the U.S., but rather to solve festering problems.

The cables also show an American diplomatic establishment that is pretty good at analysis."

&

"When foreigners encounter U.S. diplomats and listen to their bland recitation of policy, they would do well to keep in mind that behind the facade lie some very clever minds."

Go ahead and read the whole thing: it won't hurt you.

re: "WikiLeaks Accidentally Helps U.S."

Leslie Gelb at The Daily Beast had some very nice things to day about us.

Money quote(s):

"Time and again, as one actually reads these cables, one has to be heartened by the professionalism and the insights of U.S. diplomats. What are they doing? They are not lying, and U.S. leaders are not lying. They are actually, believe it or not, trying to solve problems. That seriousness of purpose and the professionalism to execute it is what jumps out at you in these materials.

So, the naïve say, it’s good to show the effectiveness of our diplomats. Give me a break. Ask any American diplomat to choose between looking intelligent in leaked cables and making progress toward avoiding war."

re: "WIKILEAKS and the Need to Know"

Patricia H. Kushlis at Whirled View asks some educated questions.

Money quote(s):

"(A) once-bitten, twice-shy State Department announced it had restricted the flow of its cable traffic to the Department of Defense. It’s a little like closing the barn door after the horse has escaped, but I don’t blame State for clamping down on the flow of sensitive information outside the department just as I think neither State, DOD nor the US government as a whole should permit the copying of classified documents to personal CDs, DVDs or other mobile devices."

In general, that's true. But there are exceptions which must be made in exceptional circumstances.

In particular, I can recall a certain military intelligence unit which operated, including its headquarters element, well beyond the bounds of established bases where such things a secure communications and cable networks were available. Said unit was collecting a truly massive amount of data, including biometrics like fingerprints and photographs, on a daily basis, and was without a reliable means of electronically transmitting that information to the rest of the army. In those circumstances, copying to a disk or thumb drive and then couriering the data, by armed convoy, to a major base, was the only way to accomplish the mission.

Fortunately, that unit had computer equipment which hadn't been "dumbed down" so that it couldn't be used to perform a basic computer function. That sort of one-size-fits-all lobotomy of the military's data processing capability may cause more problems than it solves.

"One dilemma is where “the need to know” doctrine should begin and end with government secrets and non-secrets. Another is the whole issue of classification."

Pat is absolutely correct in terming this a dilemma, since there really isn't a clear answer, despite posturing by pundits and politicians (and I'm including general officers in that label since to become a general one must, by definition, also be a politician).

"(C)onfidential assessments about other governments, negotiations, leaders and political and economic situations likely are – and it can be particularly damaging when the reporting gets into the gratuitous and names are named and names are called or when negotiating positions and bottom-lines are revealed in public. That's a good way to turn an almost done deal into a dead one.

As far as I’m concerned, however, a PfC in Iraq does not need to be knowledgeable about the internal workings of US relations with much of the rest of the world or, for that matter, have access to someone in the State Department’s pet names for Russian or German or any other country’s leaders. I’m not sure pet names even belong in any department’s cable traffic – but that’s another story."

Said PFC may or may not have been in a billet or job position designated for such a junior rank. Certainly "intelligence analysts" exist at that rank, but they should be learning their trade under the supervision of more experienced officers and non-comms. Sometimes that doesn't happen, due to operational or leadership issues, or as a consequence of the army's personnel management system, which treats people as interchangeable parts. Clearly not all intelligence analysts are created equal.

But someone performing intelligence analytical functions for a commander on the ground may actually need a fairly broad access to all sorts of intelligence data and information. Certainly an all-source analyst must, by definition, have very broad access to "all sources." Missions change, new factors intervene, and dumbing down an intelligence analyst's accesses on the basis of a risk averse management decision made in a higher headquarters than the unit on the ground is a recipe for dumbed-down analysis.

"Information sharing and access to confidential reports among employees of different US government agencies can be crucial for this nation's security – depending on the topic and the employees’ need to know.

But Gulfstream-sized rivers of cables – not to mention e-mails and other forms of communication between Embassies in the field and Foggy Bottom where the really cutesy stuff likely exists in profusion are hardly job-related for a soldier in a field unit in Iraq or elsewhere who should, in my opinion, be focusing on a much smaller universe that above all concerns his or her unit’s tasks and survival."

&

"(W)hy and when the DOD decided to engage in such undiscriminating, free-flow of information among the troops and who made the decision or decisions to permit this to happen are questions among many others awaiting answers – if that is, they are being asked."

re: "Glass Houses"

Walter Jon Williams focuses his creative lense on the whole mess.

Money quote(s):

"The cables reflect pretty well on the State Department. These diplomats are doing what they’re trained for. They’re collecting local information, they’re reporting the candid views of foreign sources, and they’re providing information about personalities, sometimes hilariously— you’ve gotta love the detail about the Chechen dictator dancing at a wedding with his gold-plated pistol hanging out of his waistband.

It has to be said, though, that the big news is that this information was so easily obtained. The Pentagon’s Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet) is a worldwide US military network to which the State Department and its embassies have access. It runs on Windows XP, not exactly your best model of Internet security. Anyone with a Secret clearance has access not only to the diplomatic cables, but to everything else."

"SIPRNet is a classic example of a good idea gone haywire. The idea was to put every document related to terrorism on a single source, so that it could be accessed by anyone who needed it. But they dumped in loads of unrelated stuff as well, and now their own system has well and truly bitten them on the butt."

Actually, SIPRNet predates the GWOT by quite a few years, although Mr. Williams is correct (I think) if what he's getting at is State's inclusion of classified cable traffic. That came well after SIPRNet's establishment.

"It occurs to me that Russia may only exist because a few important people have decided that it does. And if those props are knocked out, does Russia just become another Iceland?"

It occurs to me that Russia already is another Iceland.

Except, of course, for all the things that make it so much more (and so much less) than Iceland.

No offense meant, Iceland.

"So for my money, the question now, is whether government and finance is only possible if the vast majority of the citizenry is kept in complete ignorance of what they are doing? If Secretary Rice, for fear of exposure, prevents her own analysts from analyzing anything, does that mean that government can no longer conduct the kind of debate and internal dialog that is necessary for a clear-sighted view of its future and its own operation? If the government can’t talk to itself for fear that someone’s listening, do we actually have a government, or just 2.15 million civil servants operating in a complete vacuum, unaware that a bigger picture even exists?"

Mr. Williams is getting to the heart of what I worry will be an over-reaction to the Wikileaks leaks; hamstringing our intelligence analysts and decision-makers through too-zealous or cookie-cutter application of need-to-know policies. After all, how does an intelligence analyst tell you he needs to know something if he doesn't already know about it? Kind of hard to do that if he's kept from knowing about it, isn't it?

This sort of thing spells "intelligence failure." Intelligence analysts know that there are, after all, only two kinds of military outcomes: operational successes and intelligence failures.

(Just to be clear, Mr. Williams knows that Sec. Rice no longer runs the State Dept.; he's mentioning her in the context of a story I didn't snippet from his post.)

re: "WikiLeaks winners and losers: Early edition"

David Rothkopf at FP's new Wikileaked ("Inside the State Department's Secret Cables") puts some thought into not only who the ultimate beneficiaries of the leaked cable traffic are, but may surprise you with who they aren't.

Be sure to read the whole thing.

re: "THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICS OF WIKILEAKS"

Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit exhibits an admirable degree of suspicion.

Money quote(s):

"There’s not a lot of damage here to the country, but there’s a lot of damage to the bureaucratic establishment. If I were more suspicious, I would say that this is someone’s effort — perhaps someone burned by leaks in the past Administration — to teach the career bureaucrats who were behind those leaks that leaking may be a bad thing, and that a world in which any statement may be leaked to the press is not a world that’s good for them."

I'm not saying he's right (how would I know?), but Prof. Reynolds' suspicious streak is reaching professional strength.

re: "The Upside of WikiLeaks: Russia Next?"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ presents the Acean analysis (as only he can).

Money quote(s):

"Assange is a coward who only wishes to preen as a dangerous rebel with states that will not kill him (such as America), and thus capitalize on unearned status -- he likes to play the hunted revolutionary without having to actually be hunted."

I can't much quibble with the above.

"This is one of the greatest powers of the presidency -- the president may decide what is and what is not a foreign policy threat or crisis. If he wishes to take action against such a state, he outs the information about it (as we did in the case of Iraq).

On the other hand, if he doesn't wish to act, he also doesn't want the public clamoring for action he has no intention of carrying through on, so he simply suppresses information about how much of a threat a nation poses. This doesn't make the threat go away -- it only takes it off the front pages. It removes the threat only from the public debate.

George W. Bush suppressed information about how truly bad-behaving North Korea was, because he was not ready to kick that particular hornet's nest, and Obama has continued doing so.

In this case, WikiLeaks has outed information we should have known all along -- that North Korea is providing advanced missiles to Iran, for example. The reason to withhold this information had little to do with protecting America's foreign policy interest; it had instead to do protecting the current and past administrations' political interest.

No president wants it talked about in the press that there's a pressing foreign threat that he intends to studiously ignore, and that the nation's real policy regarding that threat is to cross fingers and hope for the best."

That's a level of political analysis beyond what I normally expect from Ace. It's cynical, but I like cynical. Let's call it realist.

&

"The ironic thing is that Assange has outed more information about the bad behavior of hostile foreign states than about his true enemy, America. But perhaps that's predictable, since America is a well-behaved state. Perhaps a little too well-behaved for its own good."

What would Jame Refief do (to say nothing of Jason Bourne)?

re: "Digital security problem is bigger than Assange and PFC Manning"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") gives an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Prior to September 2001, administrators within the U.S. government had their reasons for stubbornly hoarding their agency’s secrets. In the wake of the latest Wikileaks episode involving classified State Department cables, some of those reasons are again apparent. The 9/11 Commission concluded that insufficient cross-agency sharing was partly to blame for the disaster. But we are now reminded that sharing brings its own risks. With a million people thought to have access to U.S. Secret-level correspondence and over 800,000 cleared for Top Secret access, the only surprise is that there are not more leaks. The problem of digital security extends beyond Mr. Assange and PFC Manning. Digital transmissions through the existing internet "cloud” will continue, but will increasingly consist of only the most inconsequential data and reports. The transmission of anything really sensitive will revert (if it hasn’t already) to pre-Internet methods – a hand-delivered document, a telephone call, or a face-to-face conversation in a secure room.

The fact that there have been so few surprises in the latest Wikileaks data dump is the best evidence that State Department cable-drafters, consciously or not, knew that these cables would have a very large audience. And the wider the audience becomes, the greater the incentive to be careful with secrets in the drafting. With so few differences between the content of these cables (admittedly classified no higher than Secret) and the content in the news media, we should conclude that U.S. diplomacy is already remarkably open and transparent."

&

"We should expect “Balkanization” of digital communications, with those needing high security dropping out of the existing system and setting up their own. The Defense Department’s SIPRNet has been an inadequate attempt at this answer, as the Wikileaks affair has revealed. DARPA (ironically the original inventor of the internet) now recommends that the Defense Department establish its own network hardware and software, a system that would emphasize security and would presumably be incompatible with the existing internet.

Users who need high security but who can’t afford their own custom network would be wise to revert to the pre-Internet age of the courier, the telephone, and for the most sensitive of thoughts, the face-to-face meeting. This should not be much of an adjustment for those possessing either suspicious minds or experience."

re: "Wikileaks"

The Armorer at Castle Argghhh! gives a pretty professional assessment.

Money quote(s):

"I for one, am not stunned by what PFC Manning managed to get access to, as anyone with a modicum of ability with access to the SIPRnet can attest. The goodness from this will probably be quicker tightening of security within the classified networks, by the expanded institution of some simple-to-implement checks on the "need-to-know" side of things.

Access to classified information has two parts - clearance at the appropriate level, *and* need-to-know. All "clearance" does is vet that your life-to-date has been examined and there are no huge warning signs that you aren't trustworthy to be considered for access to defined levels of information."

"Manning clearly had access to things he had no "need-to-know" reason to be accessing. For those who have been operating in that environment there has been steady and stuttering-but-inexorable movement to stitching up those seams, all tempered by a real desire to make information available to people who need it without going through a huge number of hoops to get it in a timely fashion in a time of war."

&

"It has been an interesting look into the State Department's world, and how things going on behind the scenes oft-times have little bearing to what's happening on the public side of things, as all governments have reason to present a public face that differs from the private. Sausage-making isn't pretty, but there didn't strike me that there was/were horrible revelations in there. More of it was along the lines of, "Yep, okay, that doesn't surprise me." and "People still don't get that some things should be said face-to-face and not in potentially record communications." But I don't believe that exposing what amounts to working papers is a good idea."

re: "@ Wikileaks"

O at The Angry Drunk Bureaucrat ("The Optimist says: "The Glass is Half Full." The Pessimist says: "The Glass is Half Empty." The Bureaucrat says: "What we need are 5 glasses, 1/10th the size." The Angry Drunk Bureaucrat says: "Where's my damned bourbon?" ") clears up some confusion.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he folks at Wikileaks have published a metric assload of Department of State dispatches and communiques, detailing everything from a future reunification plan for the Koreas to Col. Gaddafi's fear of upper floors. It's a fascinating little peak into a world of diplomacy that most U.S. citizens never really come in contact with."

Be sure to read his "confession."

re: "Good Question On Wikileaks"

Rand at Transterrestrial Musings ("Biting Commentary about Infinity…and Beyond!") shares some left-handed praise.

Money quote(s):

"(I)t’s nice to see that the administration and State Department aren’t as utterly clueless in private as they are in public."