Security Decisions, part the first

Before I wrote my "Foreign Service Family" post, I jotted down a list of possible topics to address concerning matters which I believed must arise from the Benghazi 9/11 attacks and their aftermath.

The topics were:  “Haste to Narrative,” “Calendar,” “War On Terror,” “Free Speech,” “Video,” “Intelligence Failure,” and “Security Decisions.”

Over the following weeks, most of these themes were addressed, in one fashion or another, by other bloggers, pundits, and commentators all around the blogosphere and in professional print and online media (to say nothing of TV and radio bloviators, bloviatrices, and bloviatrics).  Among others, I would direct you to We Meant Well, Diplopundit, DiploMad, and Life After Jerusalem.

Longtime friend and colleague TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat has covered topics relating to actual matters of security quite well.  Specifically, I commend for your reading the following:  "Did I Miss Much While I Was Gone?,""About That Non-Standard, Un-Fortress, Not-A-Consulate In Benghazi," "A Futile Exchange of Letters On Benghazi, But A Bit Of News About The ARB,""How Many Fortress Embassies?,""Benghazi - Not The Worst Place On The Planet,""A Couple Thoughts About the Benghazi Hearing," and "I Love the Smell Of Dip Notes In the Morning."

A great deal of confusion, unintentional if not otherwise, has cascaded from the events of last month.  Among those are the somewhat existential questions relating to the U.S. facility in Benghazi which was attacked and ultimately destroyed.  More than one TV talking head (but I repeat myself in a redundancy) called Benghazi an “embassy.”  An honest mistake, and one which is perfectly understandable given the miserably low levels of education and sophistication evident in today’s media “personalities.”

The U.S. Embassy in Libya is located in Tripoli.  A history of that mission may be found here.

There are no public links for the Benghazi facility but an article at the AmEmb Tripoli page calls it a “mission.”

I know:  what’s the difference?

Well, take it from me that there are a range of security standards and protection measures that apply to State Dept. facilities overseas.  While most are not actually classified, the standards and other regulatory documents themselves are not available for public dissemination.

Within the State Dept., there are two sets of documents which serve as regulations for how things are done.  They are the Foreign Affairs Manual(s) or “FAM” and the Foreign Affairs Handbook(s).  Essentially, the FAM sets out the regulations and the FAH explains in greater detail how to implement those regulations. 

Matters pertaining to diplomatic security are covered in the “12 FAM."

The specific handbook explaining physical security standards for overseas diplomatic facilities is 12 FAH 5.  Its contents aren’t for public dissemination but if you’re a State Dept. reader you already knew that or can research it on your own.

As TSB has pointed out, the procedures for obtaining waivers to security standards are explained in 12 FAM 315.

The point of all this errata is that several somebodies at various levels across more than one bureau (within State Dept.) had to go on record at various times to accomplish such things as deciding to have a DOS facility in Benghazi in the first place and then to sign-off as to what security standards were appropriate to that type of facility.

As as to “type,” that includes not just its purpose but whether its an existing facility (which it apparently was) or whether State built it “to code” (i.e., the highest possible security standards).

Reality rears its ugly head with regards to existing buildings.  There’s only so much that can be done to make a building more robust and attack-resistant.  And there are lots of ways to attack a facility, with there being to guarantees of absolute security no matter what you do to prepare.

TSB explained this quite well.

Some of it can be boiled-down to just two bullet-points, PowerPoint-style.

- Ultimately, the host government is responsible for protecting diplomatic facilities within its sovereign territory.  Blather about embassies and consulates being “sovereign U.S. soil” are so much b.s.  Under treaty and customary international law, embassies are “inviolable.”  They are not extraterritorial.

- Security measures, whether they are physical, electronic, active, passive, or armed, can only provide a measure degree of safety in terms of delaying an attacker until host government forces can restore order.  If the host government doesn’t have effective control of the location in question, than some hard decisions need to be made about whether to have a diplomatic facility there in the first place.

Uncomplimentary Mention

Thanks to Lafadio, commenting at We Meant Well, for the mention (if not the link).

re: "State Department: America’s Increasingly Irrelevant Concierge"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") leveled a criticism of the Department of State (which reminds me of Amb. Bolton's joke about the UN*).

Money quote(s):

"A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released July 16 shows that overall more than one fourth of all State Department Foreign Service positions are either unfilled or are filled with below-grade employees. What should be staggering news pointing out a crisis in government is in fact barely worth a media mention in that State’s lack of personnel is silently tracking its increasing irrelevance to the United States, sliding into the role of America’s Concierge abroad."

&

"At the senior levels, the alleged leaders of America’s diplomacy, the number is 36 percent vacant or filled with “stretch” assignments, people of lower rank and experience pressed into service. At the crucial midranks, the number is 26 percent. Entry level jobs are at 28 percent, though it is unclear how some of those can be filled with stretch assignments since they are already at the bottom."

CAA had always assumed that the midranks (or midgrades) were where the shortages were the worst, and that the Senior Foreign Service was relatively flush.

I stand corrected.

"In fact though, it is much worse. Within State’s Foreign Service ranks, there exists the Consular Bureau and everyone else. Consular stands quite separate from the other Foreign Service Officers in that Consular employees have very specific worker bee jobs processing passports and visas and are not involved in the “traditional” diplomatic tasks we know and love such as maintaining inter-government relations, writing reports, negotiating treaties, rebuilding Afghanistan and all that. Many of these jobs are filled because they have to be, cash cow that issuing visas is for increasingly foreign tourism dependent third world America. That means broken down by function, it is likely that there are even larger gaps in vacancies in traditional diplomatic roles than even the sad percentages suggest."

The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) is unusual within the Department of State for several reasons.

First, CA is the only functional bureau with effective control of the assignments of an entire "cone" (or "career track" in current parlance) within the Foreign Service.

(A quick primer: The Foreign Service comprises FS generalist officers who are commissioned officers of the U.S. Foreign Service as well as a number of cadres of Foreign Service Specialists who have specific skill sets such as couriers, diplomatic security special agents, physicians, nurses, engineers, office managers, &tc. Within the generalist corps, there are five "cones" or "career tracks" by which each FSO is designated: Political, Economic, Management, Public Diplomacy, and Consular.)

So CA controls which FSOs get those FS jobs, domestic and overseas, which are designated as being Consular. Most of those will go to FSO whose "cone" is Consular, but some will go to FSOs seeking to work outside their own "cone" for whatever reason. Since every FSO spends at least a year (usually more like 2-3) doing consular work during their first two overseas assignments, it's not like they're coming to it cold even if it's not their official career track.

There isn't any other bureau within State which manages to do this for any of the remaining four career tracks, no matter what that bureau's name or responsibilities would suggest.

Second, is money. Mr. Van Buren's suggestion that consular work is a "cash cow" is not without merit. Some years ago a deal was struck whereby much of the money collected in consular fees (such as passport and visa fees) would stay with the Department of State rather than going directly to the Treasury Department's general revenue coffers.

By law, visa and other consular fees are adjusted on a regular basis to reflect the actual costs of providing those services, to the best of State's ability to account for them. But that includes a lot of salaries and other costs that would otherwise have to be included in budget requests and congressional appropriations. Maintaining the Department's ability to keep bringing in those dollars is not an insignificant issue.

"GAO says in its report that “Although the State Department is attempting to compensate by hiring retirees and placing current civil service employees in Foreign Service jobs, it ‘lacks a strategy to fill those gaps.’”

(State has 10,490 Civil Service employees and was only able to convert four employees to the Foreign Service. That’s a 0.03813 percent conversion rate to help bridge the gap, so much for that idea. Want another perspective? Here’s why some Civil Servants might pass on the chance to become FSOs.)."

Linking to The Skeptical Bureaucrat is always a good idea. More web logs should follow suit.

"State’s somnolent response to what should be a crisis call (anyone wish to speculate on what the response might be to a report that the military is understaffed by 36 percent at the senior levels?) tells the tale. It really doesn’t matter, and even State itself knows.

What vibrant it-really-matters institution could persist with staffing gaps over time as gaping as State’s? Seriously friends, if your organization can continue to mumble along with over one out of four slots un/underfilled, that kinda shows that you don’t matter much."

To put this into a more longterm perspective, staffing gaps this significant, if not larger, have existed since at least the end of the Cold War and the Clinton Administration, which bade us all to do more with less. The "Peace Dividend" as it was called.

As I heard K.T. McFarland say on the radio one morning, "you don't do more with less, you do less with less."

State had to come up with the staffing for all those new embassies within the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). And they had to do it without adding a single new position.

State not only didn't add a single new position, for some years it failed to even hire enough new FSOs to make up for attrition.

So it attrited.

In some years, the Department didn't even administer the Foreign Service Written Examination (FSWE) since it had so many qualified candidates already sitting on their Register, waiting for "The Call."

That started to turn around when Colin Powell was secstate and he got Congress to provide funding for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI). The DRI was supposed to hire above attrition, to make up for the years of not-particularly-benign neglect.

It was also intended to establish sufficient numbers of FSO above the number of positions needed to be filled that FSOs would be able to complete necessary training (like learning foreign languages) to do their jobs when they got there, without leaving the job positions vacant for too long.

This is known as a "training float."

Of course, 9/11 and the personnel staffing needs of wartime wiped out all that progress, and of the Diplomacy 2.0 follow-on to the DRI.

We're now in "Diplomacy 3.o" and there's no sign that we're all that closer to solving the problem.

"The most obvious sign of State’s irrelevance is the militarization of foreign policy. There really are more military band members than State Department Foreign Service Officers. The whole of the Foreign Service is smaller than the complement aboard one aircraft carrier. Despite the role that foreign affairs has always played in America’s drunken intercourse abroad, the State Department remains a very small part of the pageant. The Transportation Security Administration has about 58,000 employees; the State Department has about 22,000. The Department of Defense (DOD) has nearly 450,000 employees stationed overseas, with 2.5 million more in the US.

At the same time, Congress continues to hack away at State’s budget. The most recent round of bloodletting saw State lose some $8 billion while DOD gained another $5 billion. The found fiver at DOD will hardly be noticed in their overall budget of $671 billion. The $8 billion loss from State’s total of $47 billion will further cripple the organization. The pattern is familiar and has dogged State-DOD throughout the war of terror years. No more taxi vouchers and office supplies for you! What you do get for your money is the militarization of foreign policy." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"(T)he combatant commands are already the putative epicenters for security, diplomatic, humanitarian and commercial affairs in their regions. Local leaders receive them as powerful heads of state, with motorcades, honor guards and ceremonial feats. Their radiance obscures everything in its midst, including the authority of US ambassadors."

Combatant commanders (who used to be called "commanders-in-chief" until a stop was put to it; there can be only one CINC, after all) have a lot more money, people, and other resources than any single U.S. ambassador is likely, ever, to have on tap.

That matters.

Officially, a U.S. ambassador is the personal representative of the president and, in the country to which he (or she) is accredited ranks as the equivalent of a four-star general (or admiral).

Of course, the combatant commanders, who are four-star generals (and admirals) have that rank no matter where they may go.

"The increasing role of the military in America’s foreign relations sidelines State. The most likely American for a foreigner to encounter in most parts of the world now, for better or worse, carries a weapon and drives a tank."

That's why he's called the "strategic corporal."

"Lop off a quarter or so of the Foreign Service for Consular work, which hums by more or less independent of the rest of the State Department.

That leaves for the understaffed Department of State pretty much only the role of concierge. America’s VIPs and wanna be VIPs need their hands held, their security arranged, their motorcades organized and their Congressional visits’ hotels and receptions handled, all tasks that falls squarely on the Department of State and its embassies abroad. “Supporting” CODELS (Congressional Delegations’ visits to foreign lands) is a right of passage for State Department employees, and every Foreign Service Officer has his/her war stories to tell."

Consular work is one of the State Department's core missions, looking after the interests of our U.S. citizens abroad. So it's not something one needs to be apologizing after.

And CAA could tell you about the gang of drunken congressmen who poured off of their VIP flight..... but he won't.

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* Amb. Bolton's joke: "The Secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If it lost ten stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference"

7/18

re: "Write or wrong?"

Steve at Dead Men Working had some sharp criticism of "We Meant Well" author/blogger and FSO Peter Van Buren.

Money quote(s):

"We have been following with interest the blogs and descriptions of the case of Peter Van Buren's book, and we must say, we are becoming increasingly disappointed.

When the case first arose, it seemed open and shut. Mr. Van Buren had written a book, sought Department of State approval, complied with the written procedures, then, after there was no objection during the mandatory time period, submitted it for publication. Months later, after the book was published, the State Department had decided to object, and had contacted the publisher behind Mr. Van Buren's back to accuse him of wrongdoing and ask that the book be recalled.

The State Department clearly looked to be in the wrong. The case raised a number of important issues about how the system worked - or did not. Van Buren looked like a person who had been wronged, and against whom there was a risk of illegal retaliation."

So Van Buren looked like the wronged party up to that point, and DS the black hats.

"Since the story broke, however, Mr. Van Buren has been blogging up a storm, using the media exposure to flog his book. And seizing, it would appear, every opportunity to, at the very least, push further the edge of the already-bursting envelope.

In doing so, he has raised real questions about his behavior and suitability, that have nothing to do with his book.

He has blogged, for example, about his improper refusal to participate fully in the investigation of which he is the subject, and about his refusal to identify his contacts - a requirement of all holders of government clearances.

And he has, apparently knowingly, published links to information which the government, for smart reasons or stupid ones, has toldemployees not to access.

And about how, now that his clearance is suspended (temporarily - while under investigation), he is will be frequenting that andother sites that publish classified materials. "

Brother Van Buren hasn't demonstrated much in the way of being a shy, retiring sort of fellow, nor, perhaps should he. After two tours in the sandbox, working on PRTs, he wrote his book, submitted it per procedures, and was being persecuted, perhaps, for his views despite the Department's failure to use its own publication clearance process in a timely manner.

And he's been howling, essentially, from the rooftops about it, he's that mad/angry.

So might you, perhaps.

CAA thinks Brother Van Buren has gone a bit overboard (for a serving FSO) more than once, such as his unnecessarily offensive characterizations of Sec. Clinton, but then, if they aren't going to treat him like a serving FSO, maybe that's to be expected.

Be sure to read Peter Van Buren's comments at the post cited above.

10/19

re: "My New York Times Mini Op-Ed'

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") shared some observations and predictions.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department’s reduction of staff in Iraq is the final act of the American invasion. The war is now really over.

The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story."

This is due to a couple-three factors.

First, the change in administrations. The Bush administration made the invasion and reconstruction effort in Iraq a national priority or mission. That national priority or mission drove things like causing Iraq embassy and PRT personnel requirements to, along with similar requirements in Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) drive the Foreign Service's human resources engine.

As CAA predicted before the CPA was ever replaced by an actual U.S. embassy mission, Iraq was going to be the tail that wagged our assignments system dog. For better or worse.

The U.S. post-war reconstruction and security effort in Iraq, as of January 2009, became the Obama administration's war to lose.

Second, and deriving from the first, with the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq, what media attention still focused there has dissipated. Until such time as things really go south, and the networks can get footage of helicopters lifting U.S. diplomats from the embassy's rooftops, that not really going to change.

"(O)nly days after the U.S. military withdrawal, the world’s largest embassy watched helplessly as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki tried to arrest his own vice president, who fled to Kurdistan where Iraqi government forces are powerless to intervene."

What's that saying about history repeating itself as farce?

In any case, this episode alone makes the prognostications of others, such as Vice President Biden if I recall correctly, about Iraq best becoming three separate countries, a lot less risible. Likewise for the post-pandemic predictions of John Ringo.

"The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story, and that America’s diplomats cannot survive on their own in the middle of a civil war. The embassy will eventually shrink to the small-to-medium scale that Iraq requires (think Turkey or Jordan). America’s relationship will wither into the same uneasy state of half-antagonistic, half-opportunistic status that we enjoy with the other autocrats in the Middle East. Maliki will continue to expertly play the U.S. off the Iranians and vice versa. U.S. military sales and oil purchases will assure him the soft landing someday of a medical visa to the United States à la Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and not the sanctioned disposal awaiting Bashar al-Assad of Syria."

The prediction piece of Brother Van Buren's article could do with some un-packing. Frankly, the second part of the first sentence is simply not so. The U.S. continues, in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) to expect our diplomats to "survive on their own in the middle of a civil war." They just do. I can't explain it.

2/11

re: "MEK Location Called “Concentration Camp” "

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") has been following the PMOI/MEK relocation issue (and delivers some snark).

Money quote(s):

"(R)esettling the MEK into the former Camp Liberty became a State Department task, and the World’s Largest Embassy was assigned to commit “robust observation” of the facility to ensure proper treatment. State apparently did not robustly observe anything, as the Camp Liberty site is a dump, without water or sewage."

&

"During the war, Camp Liberty was a paradise, home to Iraq’s largest PX and all the amenities. As the Occupation ended, the Camp was abandoned by the US, and the Iraqis promptly and efficiently looted it into its present state.

The MEK-Camp Liberty dilemma is yet another example of US desires hitting reality head on in Iraq. After hoping the MEK issue would just go away for the nine years of Occupation, the State Department threw together an expedient policy, appointed an Ambassador to give it all gravitas and then made false promises of oversight."

CAA personally observed the results of the post-invasion looting of Iraqi military bases by Iraqis themselves and has no reason to doubt Brother Van Buren's statement that Camp Liberty was thoroughly looted into inhabitability following the U.S. withdrawal.

3/5

re: "State Department Fibs About Camp Liberty and MEK"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") has been following the PMOI situation at Camp Liberty.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he US and the UN brokered a deal to move the MEK people from their unsafe and politically volatile Camp Ashraf location to the old US Camp Liberty, where the UN would supposedly process them as refugees. As part of the deal, the US would monitor conditions at Camp Liberty to ensure the MEK were treated well."

So far so good.

"It seemed reasonable for diplomats to make the 45 minutes trip out to Camp Liberty once in awhile, in that the World’s Largest Embassy (c) comes with the World’s Largest price tag, some $3.8 billion (about $2.5 billion of that is for security) a year in operating costs, about a fourth of all State’s yearly costs. The idea of US diplomats visiting MEK completes the circle: the US Dips will be surrounded by massive security to protect them from the Iraqis the US liberated while at the same time using their own presence to protect the MEKs from the liberated Iraqis."

This, by at least some reports, isn't what's happened. According to a report by Allan Gerson (who's got some credibility), the facilities at the former Camp Liberty, for whatever reason, aren't in the sort of shape they would have been when it was a functioning U.S. base.

2/24

re: "Counterinsurgency is not peeing on people…"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") rated this event as unhelpful to the counterinsurgency mission.

Money quote(s):

"The world is awash in urine-soaked statements by various idiots defending the Marines who peed on the bodies of dead Taliban. The defense is either a) the Taliban deserved it because they are our enemies or b) well, the Taliban have done worse things to us."

Just because the two defenses are completely true doesn't make them useful.

"The Taliban aren’t fighting a counterinsurgency war.

We are.

We are the invading foreigners trying to win the support of the people. Pissing on them is not a good way to do that.

This is part of the whole losing proposition of such war– we have to get it right (almost) all the time to have a shot at winning."

And therein lies the rub.

Dave Schuler addresses the root of this problem here. Take a few minutes and give it a look.

(CAA will still be here when you get back.)

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Okay, back yet?

In the corporate world, in any business, you start with the basic question: what business are we in?

Sounds silly, doesn't it?

(It's not.)

It's the reason that lots of corporations (and government entities) have things called "mission statements." They're a good touchstone for determining if something you're considering attempting is something you should be attempting.

In questions of strategy, you face similar questions. What are our goals? What is the end-state we would like to see? What instruments of national power and influence can be brought to bear in support of this mission?

Mr. Schuler believes what CAA has long suspected: nation-building (and the related mission of counter-insurgency) in Afghanistan is not what the U.S. should have attempted there.

So while Brother Van Buren's points about the marine micturition incident (MMI) are on-point and well-taken, they may miss the larger targets. Indeed, much of U.S. policy over the past decade-plus may have done so.

1/13

re: "State Department Fixing the Facts Based on Policy"

Say or think what you want about Peter Van Buren 's wisdom in tilting at State Dept.'s windmills, at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts And Minds of the Iraqi People") he made some on-target points about AmEmb Baghdad.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department can often times be so inward looking that it fixes the facts based on the policy need, making reality fit the vision whether that naughty reality wants to or not. Sometimes it’s funny, sometimes it can be tragic."

There is an institutional tendency at State to, as someone in the military might say, "fake it 'til you make it." Just keep talking the talk, and walking the walk, and perhaps others will follow.

(Other institutional tendencies include what I call "the full employment for ambassadors program" of opening or re-opening missions that we probably ought not, or at least not yet. Another is a forward-leaning bias towards making an agreement, signing a treaty, any agreement or any treaty, just to have something signed and on paper, irrespective of how good a deal it might be for the U.S.)

"(A)s the State Department rushes to replace all of the military support it needs to exist in still-dangerous Iraq without the Army, there are fears that the warping of reality may indeed endanger lives in Baghdad."

Brother Van Buren posted this in December (my apologies for the time-delay) so the previously-mentioned military support has vaporized. Gone. Pined for the fjords.

"Currently every item of food for the Embassy, from sides of beef to baby carrots, is procured in “safe” Kuwait and convoyed up to Baghdad. It is an expensive system, one that occasionally even entails the loss of life protecting boxes of Raisin Bran, but it has ensured the safety and cleanliness of the food for almost nine years.

The State Department, facing the crazy costs of this system without the nearly bottomless budget of the Defense Department, is once again swaying the facts to fit the policy. Undersecretary for Management Pat Kennedy told Congress in mid-November that seeking to cut costs in Iraq, State is looking to locally purchase some of the food its personnel will eat, breaking with the U.S. military’s practice of importing. Nothing has changed on the ground vis-a-vis food security, but to save money, State is warping that reality to fit its own needs."

Regular readers will note that this developing situation has already born somewhat bitter fruit (or lettuce) in terms of a tightening stranglehold on our Baghdad mission's logistics and support.

"Much has been made of State’s plan to hire over 5500 mercenaries as security guards for its Iraq-bound diplomats. However, while numbers do matter, the skills that those merc possess matter more. Currently in Iraq, with the US Army in place, a State Department convoy ambushed can call on a QRF, an Army quick reaction force. On standby 24/7, these soldiers are literally the cavalry that rides in to save the day."

"(M)ercenaries" is a bit of a loaded/pejorative term, which I believe is Br. Van Buren's intent. While technically correct on some levels, they might more accurately be called "auxiliaries" if the official terminology of "security contractor" seems to euphemistic.

That being said, he's quite correct in his larger point.

"There remain other concerns harder to nail down in an unclassified environment — security at the Baghdad Airport once control leaves U.S. hands, availability of a blood supply (another contractor, who will have to create a logistics schema with the Armed Services Blood Program) and proper trauma care for the diplomats (yet another contractor), particularly should someone suffer the horrific burns now too common in IED attacks. Under the military system, even during an attack, an injured soldier would receive first aid from a trained buddy, be helicopter evacuated from the site within minutes, stabilized at a specialized trauma unit and on a med flight to a hospital in Germany within an hour or two. While the danger on the ground in Iraq will remain the same (if not more dangerous given the lack of American troop presence), State in no way will be able to replicate the vast resources the military can bring to bear."

Allowing for the OBE ("overcome by events") nature of his observation (which is my fault, not his), these are all potentially fatal (and I mean that quite literally) vulnerabilities of our diplomatic mission in Iraq.

Whatever you might personally think of the wisdom of current (or past) U.S. policies in Iraq or of just how good an idea it is to have an embassy of this (or any) size there, or your possibly prejudiced views about diplomats in general, the ground truth there is that the U.S. has stationed civilian personnel overseas on its behalf, on your behalf, to be about America's business. The diplomats and other staff assigned in Baghdad (and other places in Iraq) are there because our elected government determined they must be there.

"State’s responses have been weak. Can’t travel safely outside the Green Zone? “The Embassy will attempt to mitigate the loss of tactical intelligence by establishing closer working relationships with the Government of Iraq.” Although Embassy medical plans do not currently include the capability for handling a mass casualty event, Embassy officials magic-wanded the problem away by stating that “even the US military’s current combat support hospital can be overwhelmed by a large enough number of casualties.” Meanwhile, State “will continue to explore possibilities for mitigating the impact of a mass casualty event.”

In other words, again the policy seems to be warping the reality on the ground. Only this time, it’s not politics, it’s personal, or maybe, without irony, personnel, at stake."

12/7

re: "Robust Briefing on Camp Ashraf and the Robust MEK"

Peter at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") brought us up-to-date on our PMOI friends.

Money quote(s):

"Ambassador Daniel Fried is the Special Advisor for Camp Ashraf. He is tasked with overseeing a nice ending to a problem the US (and Iraq) have conveniently put off for almost nine years during the Occupation.

The MEK people are still living in Iraq, at a place called Camp Ashraf, and Iraq would generally prefer that they all die, or disappear or die and disappear. The US has run the gamut of emotions and policy positions on MEK (it’s complicated), but prefer that they just disappear without the being massacred by Iraqis part."

The motivation for massacre comes in two parts: first is resentment/revenge on the part of the Iraqi themselves; the second is acting on behalf of the nearby Iranian regime.

"The UN has come up with a solution that might work. The MEK people will move from distant, tainted and often rocketed Camp Ashraf into the recently-abandoned Camp Liberty. Once the home of Iraq’s largest PX store during the Occupation, Liberty now has lots of openings for new residents. The nice thing is that Liberty is pretty close to the World’s Largest Embassy (c) and so the US can play a “monitoring” role, basically visiting once in a while to deter the Iraqis from just rolling in and killing everyone one night. The UN is later supposed to arrange something for the 3,200 MEK folks– refugee status, immigration, Publisher’s Clearing House prize, anything to get them out of Iraq before they all are ground into sausage meat by the democracy there."

Moving the PMOI to the-Camp-formerly-known-as-Liberty makes it much less likely that they will suddenly "commit suicide" one dark night (at the hands of other than themselves). Proximity to our embassy and to U.N. missions tasked with their welfare means the problem doesn't get massacred or wished away.

"A statement by people in Camp Ashraf said that as a first step, a group of 400 are ready “to move to Camp Liberty with their vehicles and moveable belongings on December 30.” The transfer, however, did not happen as the Iraqi government stepped in to require that people did not carry more than a travel bag to the new looted camp which now lacks basic infrastructure and drinking water.

Ambassador Fried (his real name) held a briefing at the State Department that was quite informative, with a transcript now online. Among the many complications, he reveals that there are at least two (Iranian-) Americans among the Camp Ashraf residents. The briefing sidesteps the messy question of MEK’s status on the US terrorist list and keeps the focus on the humanitarian side, which is probably the best way out."

The PMOI has considerable in the way of moveable assets, equipment, personal belongings, everything from kitchen implements to their museum, even possibly their dead (there is a cemetary). They would, naturally enough, like to take as much of what makes their life survivable and livable with them, as well as their non-combat vehicles, with them. Anything left behind will be looted and/or desecrated, possibly as they exit the camp gates.

Another issue will be route security. Moving 3,200 people or so from Camp Ashraf to Baghdad is a non-trivial task in a combat zone, which Iraq sadly remains.

12/31

re: "State Still Not Prepared to Bully Iraq, Might Lose Lunch Money"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose The Battle For The Hearts And Minds Of The Iraqi People") is keeping up with his old neighborhood.

Money quote(s):

"No matter what form of US military is left in Iraq by year’s end, the State Department takes over the mission from the Army on October 1 (don’t anticipate any parades, maybe a press release or infomercial) and will have to fend for itself in Iraq."

This is more than a little scary. It's sort of like pulling all the occupation troops out of Germany after World War II, only with Nazis still in Poland and France.

"State would like to hire its own army, 5500 mercs, dropping a couple of billion in protection money so that Sadr doesn’t steal the embassy’s lunch money. Congress may or may not ante up (it looks like things are covered for part of the next FY) but the task of supervising all those bad boys and filling in the security gaps the Army will leave falls on State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or “DS” if you’re cool in a nerdy kind of cool way."

All due props to DS (and CAA loves him some DS), this goes way beyond what anyone ever expected DS to do. Secure a reconstruction effort, diplomatic and consular missions in a war zone. If they manage to do it at all, they still won't be able to do it well.

"Among other tasks, the diplomats themselves will somehow be responsible for “downed aircraft recovery, explosives ordnance disposal, route clearance, and rocket and mortar countermeasures,” all of which they “have had little or no experience in providing.”

The horrible death of a State contractor last week in Iraq may be a sad portent of things to come.

Choose your Iraq assignments wisely and stay thirsty my friends."

I've quietly asked fellow officers, from time to time, whether or not they were prepared to be on that embassy roof, waiting for that last chopper, a la Saigon.

Perhaps that scenario should now be amended to omit the helicopter.