re: "Kandahar"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor ("The Original Blog and Daybook") examined unintended longterm consequences.

Money quote(s):

"The average Army deployment is supposed to be one year, but the effective deployment period has been 15 months since 2007. That is a long time to be in a combat zone. In World War II once one was sent overseas it was generally for the duration, but there were some periods of relief from combat: not just R&R away from the front – there was, after all, a front – but in transport between operations. There were some secure zones in Italy and later in France, because by that time USAAF had established effective air superiority, and the civilian population wasn’t hostile. In Iraq and Afghanistan even our fortresses and enclaves are not really safe. Being in one of our enclaves is not quite the same as being in a trench in the Battle of the Sarne, but it is certainly more stressful than being in operations out on some lonely atoll during our Pacific war in 1943.

Stress and its results are among the costs of long wars fought with professional soldiers. Conscripts in a democracy generally can’t be kept deployed that long. Volunteer troops can be and are. Long term deployments in danger zones are stressful."

"But they volunteered!" is not an answer, nor does it cure the ills to which the flesh (and the mind) is vulnerable.

"I note that one of the answers given to Congressional inquiry on justifications for deployment of US troops without a formal declaration of war is international authorizations: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=5zNwOeyuG84 Of course this has been true since the Korean War.

The American way of war has been all-out effort after a war is declared. That view was reinforced after our experiments in the Philippines – a nation building effort that was partially successful, but at a very high cost. “Let him never dream that his bullet’s scream went wide of its island mark, Home to the heart of his darling land where she stumbled and sinned in the dark.” We returned to the American War (sic) of War after that, but the return was eroded after Korea under what was perceived as the new international condition. The Cold War continued, but when it ended we found ourselves in the Balkans, with the troops unable to know who were the good guys, who the bad, or what the devil we were doing over there, and why the United States. We widened the gap with Russia, but for what object we never knew.

President George H W Bush rightly understood the costs of a long term involvement on the ground in the Middle East. I thought the first Gulf War a mistake – better we should spend the money developing our resources and winning independence from the Middle East – but at least we got in and got out again.

Then came the second Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq, followed by victory in Afghanistan and following that quick victory a long expedition without clear objectives." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Go big or go home.

This has been CAA's concern about Afghanistan (and Iraq) since before the Second Gulf War began: that the U.S. would engage in a long-term "nation building" effort in either or both places for which it simply does not have the national or political attention span to see to a successful conclusion.

3/12

re: "Counterinsurgency is not peeing on people…"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") rated this event as unhelpful to the counterinsurgency mission.

Money quote(s):

"The world is awash in urine-soaked statements by various idiots defending the Marines who peed on the bodies of dead Taliban. The defense is either a) the Taliban deserved it because they are our enemies or b) well, the Taliban have done worse things to us."

Just because the two defenses are completely true doesn't make them useful.

"The Taliban aren’t fighting a counterinsurgency war.

We are.

We are the invading foreigners trying to win the support of the people. Pissing on them is not a good way to do that.

This is part of the whole losing proposition of such war– we have to get it right (almost) all the time to have a shot at winning."

And therein lies the rub.

Dave Schuler addresses the root of this problem here. Take a few minutes and give it a look.

(CAA will still be here when you get back.)

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Okay, back yet?

In the corporate world, in any business, you start with the basic question: what business are we in?

Sounds silly, doesn't it?

(It's not.)

It's the reason that lots of corporations (and government entities) have things called "mission statements." They're a good touchstone for determining if something you're considering attempting is something you should be attempting.

In questions of strategy, you face similar questions. What are our goals? What is the end-state we would like to see? What instruments of national power and influence can be brought to bear in support of this mission?

Mr. Schuler believes what CAA has long suspected: nation-building (and the related mission of counter-insurgency) in Afghanistan is not what the U.S. should have attempted there.

So while Brother Van Buren's points about the marine micturition incident (MMI) are on-point and well-taken, they may miss the larger targets. Indeed, much of U.S. policy over the past decade-plus may have done so.

1/13

re: "On Nation Building"

Andrew at Abu Muqawama ("a blog that focuses on small wars and insurgencies in addition to regional issues in the Middle East") considers the do-ability of nation-building.

Money quote(s):

"I firmly believe that when you decide to go to war, you should be prepared to use any and all means at your disposal to effect victory. If that means building institutions of the state, as we have done in both Iraq and Afghanistan, okay. You can't "win" in either place, after all, without at least creating strong police forces to take your place and keep public order so that a peaceful political process and economy can thrive. You have to create a secure environment in any post-conflict state, and unless you plan on staying forever, that means building up competent local security forces. That's a form of nation-building that I can support."

I remain unconvinced that victory is unattainable unless some sort of nation-buiding is implemented by the military victor. Of course, if you make that part of your definition of victory, then the prophecy becomes self-fulfilling. Or self-defeating.

Clearly, if our invasion of Iraq was actually tied to GWOT-related goals, then "draining the swamp" so that whatever replaced Saddam is no longer a supporter and enabler of terrorism has to be part of your war aims. And at least a limited reconstruction is then required. This goes double for Afghanistan but is complicated by Pakistan's role as both a sanctuary and a supporter for the Taliban. Similarly, our efforts in Iraq are complicated by Iran's operations against us there and, to a lesser extent, by Syria's.

"(E)mploying whatever means you need after the United States enters a conflict and deciding to intervene in the first place are two different things. I, for one, in large part because I am all too familiar with what a "resource suck" wars can become, am reluctant to intervene in places like Libya in the first place. And, had anyone asked me about Iraq in 2002 or 2003, I would have offered the same opinion there. But I whole-heartedly endorse the U.S. decision to rebuild and train Iraqi military and polices forces after the invasion."

This is why the differences between a punitive raid or expedition and an invasion are so critical. U.S. (and Coalition) forces immediately develop a "footprint" that becomes a magnet for those who would do us harm, either as a local resistance or as transnational actors.

" In Afghanistan, at least, our aid and development projects have arguably exacerbated the drivers of conflict. We have created a rentier state on steroids, and as we begin to withdraw the majority of our aid and development funds, it will take a minor miracle to avoid Afghanistan's economic collapse. The only area in which we are reasonably competent is in building military organizations, which we have a lot of experience doing, but even there, we are better at building military organizations in our own image rather than the kinds of police/gendarme forces countries like Afghanistan really need.

Why do we suck at nation-building? A lot of reasons. Here are just a few: (1) We are ignorant. We do not know enough about the cultural, political and social contexts of foreign environments to fully appreciate how our interventions will affect those environments. Thus our aid and development spending (and military operations, to be fair), meant to ameliorate drivers of conflict, often exacerbate them. (2) We do not provide enough oversight and accountability for the projects we initiate. This is boring but important. We have spent ungodly sums of money in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have not provided enough contracting officers to effectively oversee the money we have spent. How do we just give tens of millions of dollars to agencies and departments in the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan without any oversight? Lack of contracting officers. How are contracts in Afghanistan divided up between shady sub-contractors and sub-sub-contractors, with tax-payer money falling into the hands of the Taliban and warlords? Lack of contracting officers. (3) We do not have any patience -- and we have limited resources. Nation-building takes time. Where we can nation-build at relatively low-cost over an extended period of time, as in Colombia, we can be successful. But asking Americans to spend massive amounts of money for an extended period of time in Iraq or Afghanistan is a recipe for ... turning your average U.S. tax-payer into an isolationist. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Disclosure: CAA is not a contracting officer. Not anymore, at least.

re: "Unfinished Business"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") knows who's been naughty.

Money quote(s):

"Iran is stepping up their nasty little tricks in neighboring Iraq"

Well, why wouldn't they? Is there an imaginable possible downside?

"(W)hile it’s true that the military’s nation building capacity is already stretched to its limits, much of our nation breaking capacity is idling. As an oil exporting country that is hugely reliant on imported processed fuel, Iran is vulnerable at sea and in the air. Just four weeks of the kind of effort undertaken against the strategically meaningless Libyan regime would bring the mullahcracy to its knees and help liberate the creative energies of a rising generation that has no personal memory of the SAVAK, the shah or the revolution.

We have expended enormous sums of blood and treasure rebuilding Iraq, and what happens there as we draw down forces matters. The Iranians simply cannot be trusted to play a useful role. And whether you call it a Global War on Terror, a War Against Violent Extremism or Overseas Contingency Operations, there is little doubt that we have been very much trimming around the edges of the problem rather than digging at its roots. Iran supports terrorists in the Levant who attack a US ally, and the country’s leadership is elbow deep in the blood of US soldiers – it has been for decades."

Iran has been consistent in implementing its policy stance (i.e., implacable hostility) towards the U.S. since the revolution overthrew the Shah's government.

"The bottom line comes down to this: Iran is in a de facto state of war with the United States.

There ought to be a reckoning."

Gotta love those Serenity/Firefly allusions.

re: "Can we afford the Afghan war?"

Kori Schake at Shadow Governments ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") dissects a bad idea.

Money quote(s):

"The White House has opened a new front in the Afghan war - or, rather, in their effort to shed the burden of the Afghan war. The Washington Post reports that cost will be a new and major element for consideration. The $113 billion spent this year for Afghanistan is described as unsustainable; the article concludes, "To many of the president's civilian advisers, that price is too high."

This is preposterous from an administration that budgets a tripling of our national debt by 2018. President Obama has twice submitted budgets that never eliminate deficit spending, yet now claims it cannot sustain the $107 billion to fight a war the president described as "no idle danger; no hypothetical threat," but a vital national security interest to our country. The Obama White House is trying to seize on conservative momentum to reduce federal spending by cutting the only government program they don't support: winning the war."

All that is required, at this point, from our military efforts in Afghanistan and in Iraq is that we not lose.

That's all.

Much of the heavy lifting has been done. It's now a matter of finishing what we started and not letting ourselves be run out, by either Afghan or Iraqi insurgents or by our own "anti-war" faction at home, until we say we're done.

(After all, it's not over 'til we say it is.)

"The American military is not culturally predisposed to nation building. They undertake it because it creates the highest likelihood of achieving our military objectives. What the White House is attempting to do is paint that approach as profligate, contrasting it to the cost-effectiveness of a narrower counter-terror approach. They ought to ask themselves why none of our military leadership is supporting the approach."

&

"Responsible people can advocate different approaches to defending ourselves against the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. They can also advocate further cuts to defense spending. But it is dangerous to argue the cost of prosecuting a war that, while high, is marginal to our expenditures and by no means the driver of our debt, cannot be afforded. "

re: "Gates: Any DefSec Who Proposes Wars Similar to Iraq and Afghanistan "Should Have His Head Examined" "

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ reacts to SecDef Gates' recent West Point speech.

Money quote(s):

"He also talks about "reshaping" (that is, cutting) the Army's and Marines' budget because he thinks a large conventional mechanized-units-vs.-mechanized-units war is unlikely.

I don't know about that last part. I'd say we'll have few of those wars. And more of the smaller-unit/guerilla war. But I'd say the likelihood of either is pretty high. The former's at like 70% and the latter's at 100%. Just because most fights will be small-unit engagements doesn't mean large-scale warfare isn't going to happen."

There's a way to break down threats like this, into four quadrants, where you evaluate possible events in terms of both probability (i.e., likelihood) and risk (i.e., hazard or cost) as being either High or Low. So you get Low Probability - Low Risk, High Probability - High Risk, Low Probability - High Risk, and High Probability - Low Risk.

The probability that major mechanized combat is going to happen in any given year may be low, but the risk is so high that you have to prepare for it. After all, you can't just excrete a major mechanized force and the ability to project it globally on 11 months notice; it takes literally decades to build.

"After eight years of pacifying Iraq and Afghanistan, I'm not at all sure we were right to depart from the basic idea that nation-building was a bad idea.

This is less about Iraq and Afghanistan and more about the next war, which just might be Iran. Personally, I'd be on board for military action, but I would strongly prefer to leave the pacification and nation-building to the Iranians. Pay 'em, arm 'em, give them targeting lasers to paint targets for jet strikes, but I wouldn't support a massive, decade-long police action in a country with more than twice as many people as Iraq.

We used to do this a lot. We would arm indigenous fighters, train them, feed them intelligence, offer assistance. After 9/11, I think the decision was made that we had to show a very, very bright-line distinction between the real soldier -- professional, uniformed, acting under orders, scrupulously avoiding (to the extent possible) civilian collateral damage -- and the terrorist, and that led us to conclude, I think, that we couldn't just depart Iraq after smashing the Baathist state and let the Iraqis fight it out. Because there would be a whole lot of terrorist, civilian-targeting attacks, and we'd be on the hook for that."

"American troops are of course the most disciplined, ethical, and heroic in the world. So heroic, in fact, we typically expect them to put their own lives in danger for the purpose of reducing the chance of collateral damage. Few other troops would even consider such rules of engagement; our guys might complain about it, but in the end, they follow orders.

So if American troops are the primarily force in a country, we can expect the lowest possible number of civilian collateral casualties. But the question I'm asking myself now is: How much do I really care about the fewest number of civilian collateral casualties? In Iraq, if the deaths of 3000 American soldiers (in the later post-war campaign) saved, let's say, 60,000 Iraqi civilians -- was that a good trade? Or, more importantly, because the more important thing to me is the doctrine going forward: Would I be willing to make that trade in a hypothetical pacification campaign in Iran? Would I trade 3,000 US soldiers to make sure the fewest Iranian civilians died in the chaos that ensued after a decapitation of the state?

I think I'd say the Iranians will have to fight it out themselves."

Gates is only reprising MacArthur's (and Vizzini's) "never get involved in a land war in Asia" dictum. Odd how no one noticed both Iraq and Afghanistan are Asiatic countries before now.

The mathematics are a bit cold. Thinking the unthinkable is like that. But the calculus is necessary.

"I wouldn't support an Iraq-style American-troops-as-primary-combatants pacification.
And I don't even think that it matters what I think -- I don't think any President, Republican or Democrat or Tea Partier, is going to propose such a thing. Which makes this question very important, because unless the country can accept that arm-your-proxies style of limited warfare, I think we're going to have a Vietnam Syndrome going forward. Given the choice between no military action at all and full-scale invasion plus pacification/nation-building, I think the country will select, by large margins, "no military action at all," and I think that is very dangerous.

We will need to fight another country again, most likely sooner rather than later. We need a doctrine about such a war that can actually gain popular support.

I just don't believe the country will undertake another Iraq or Afghanistan you-break-it-you-bought-it plan, at least not for a long time. So I think those who believe that warfare must always be a possible tool available to us (even if only occasionally used) must formulate a doctrine in which the post-war pacification campaign is specifically ruled out and our goals in the post-war scenario are achieved by means other than heavy presence of American troops as primary combatants.

I just don't think the Iraq model of post-war pacification is an option in the next five to ten years, at least, for political reasons."

Frankly, I suspect we'll have U.S. troops, at some level of strength, in both Iraq and Afghanistan for at least five of those years, so I'd envision that, barring a catastrophic event that "resets" U.S. grand strategy, five to ten years is a very conservative estimate.

"(I)f we actually want to credibly threaten a country like Iran -- and do more than merely threaten, should it come to that -- we need a doctrine that has a chance of getting the nation behind it, and we have to begin conditioning the nation to realize what happens when disciplined, heroic American troops are not the primary combatants -- a lot of civilians are going to die, most likely, because only American troops (and some other professional Western-tradition troops) are brave enough to put the lives of civilians before their own."