re: "Democrats, Who Spent Months Arguing for "Compromise," Now Insist Obama "Throw Down The Gauntlet" "

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ vented more spleen.

Money quote(s):

"Is this worth a post? I don't know. It's more of the same, isn't it? While they mau-mau Republicans to pray at the altar of compromise, they demand Obama fight, fight, fight.

Why, it's almost as if they are entirely lacking in principle or intellectual integrity and are just freelance political strategists in service of the DNC and Organizing for America, eh?

The point is so obvious (and so obviously true) it's a waste of time to even spend pixels on it.
But yes, the devotees of compromise are now promoting the slogan "If you're not with me, you're with the economic terrorists.""

9/6

re: "Can Kerry save the State Department on the “supercommittee”?"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") asked a very important question.

Money quote(s):

"Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA) will be on the "supercommittee" that's charged with slashing government spending, but will he use that power to rescue the State Department from its looming budget nightmare?"

The world waits.

"Kerry, who always denies he is jockeying to replace Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she steps down (probably after the 2012 election), certainly looks like the leading candidate for the post. He has traveled frequently to hotspots like Afghanistan and Pakistan on behalf of the administration, led the push for Senate ratification of New START nuclear arms reductions, and is beginning a new push to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. He even toed the administration's line that the war in Libya does not amount to hostilities.

The State Department, meanwhile, is preparing for what could be its worst budget year in a very long time. After two years of budget increases during the Obama administration, the dire fiscal situation has placed diplomacy and development funding on the chopping block. In April, the Obama administration voluntarily cut $8 billion from the State Department budget as part of the deal to avoid a government shutdown."

Sen. Kerry certainly seems, at least in the major media, to be a leading candidate to succeed Sec. Clinton if and when she decides she's spent enough years heading-up the State Dept. But presidents sometimes surprise with their appointments. And by "sometimes" I mean most-of-the-time.

(Well, at least I'm always surprised.)

"Whether Kerry is able to stand up for diplomacy and aid funding, in opposition to his GOP counterparts, will determine the functionality of the State Department he one day hopes to lead. "

(8/9)

re: "Why call it 'Pakistan'?"

The Anti-Jihadist at Jihad Watch ("dedicated to bringing public attention to the role that jihad theology and ideology plays in the modern world, and to correcting popular misconceptions about the role of jihad and religion in modern-day conflicts") had some tough words for Pakistan (and Sudan).

Money quote(s):

"South Sudan's hopeful creation as a new nation is a glorious moment, as well as a sobering one. We should remember as to why South Sudan's existence became necessary in the first place. We must remind the world over and over that the birth of South Sudan as a independent state was long required precisely because Muslims cannot long live amicably with followers of other belief systems."

Sudan is (or was) an amalgamation of, roughly, four (now three) historical kingdoms, sultanates, or whathaveyou and could probably use a little more devolution, leaving even less of its territory (and people) in the hands of "President" Bashir.

"South Sudan's secession from Sudan is in many way a mirror image of another 'secession' that took place over 60 years ago. In the waning days of the British Empire, British India was to be divided into two countries, a Muslim one and a Hindu one, and India was to be cleaved forever into those two parts."

A distorted mirror image, but a mirror image to be sure. The historical differences (and parallels) would suffice for a master's thesis (if not a doctoral dissertation).

"While the larger Hindu India has found a modicum of political stability, has enjoyed decades of economic success, and exports its vibrant culture via its booming film industry worldwide, its Muslim counterpart Pakistan flirts with failed-nation status.

Pakistan is in fact a nightmare of state-sponsored jihadist terrorism inside and outside of its borders. Except for a tiny elite, the country only offers unimaginable squalor and poverty for its people. It has featured a string of unbelievably incompetent and corrupt governments that have exported Islamic terrorism to distant continents, as far as the UK and the USA. Pakistan harbors the world's top terrorists who are allowed to live inside its borders with impunity, free to continue conspiring and plotting mass murder. Pakistan has launched three wars of aggression in its blood-soaked history, all against India, all of which Pakistan lost. Pakistan builds nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles, which it sells the technology for to any and all comers, no questions asked. Pakistan sucks up gifts such as weapons and supplies, intelligence data from the US, and especially financial aid packages from the rest of the world, and either squirrels the money away into various numbered accounts, or passes along as loot to jihad terrorists and other enemies of the Free World. Barbarous shariah laws viciously run riot and leave an ever-growing pile of broken and dead bodies in its wake. Pakistan's police and military murder journalists who question how and why such a horrid state of affairs has come to pass. And on and on."

Pretty damning stuff, to be sure.

"(M)ay I humbly suggest that Pakistan no longer be referred to as "Pakistan", the so-called 'Land of the Pure". Merely mentioning the name is, in a way, tacitly accepting its existence, which right-thinking people everywhere should instantly reject. So, from this point onwards, let us call that place by a more culturally and historically correct name: "Muslim-occupied India". For India was a Hindu land for thousands of years before the invading barbarians of Islam appeared to seize Hindu lands and slaughter its inhabitants, which laid the groundwork for the eventual Muslim calamitous maladministration of that same land."

(7/9)

re: "Understanding Germany"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("strives to be the center for news analysis and thoughtful online discussions on contemporary transatlantic relations issues ranging from defense to economics and culture") examined a Wall Street Journal piece on Germany.

Money quote(s):

"(M)ost Germans are not convinced that America's current wars are advancing our security significantly. We are war-weary rather than pacifist. To understand why most Germans do not want to send troops, I would add to the above reading recommendations the movie Das Boot, which is based on the book by Lothar-Günther Buchheim. The battle of Stalingrad is still very strong in the collective memory and informs many Germans' positions on contemporary wars IMHO, but I don't know if any movie or book is responsible for it."

If the U.S. was only sixty years (two generations) past the last time the U.S. had been on the losing side of a major land war, we might have a similar stance. That we didn't, historically, is probably due to our being both sides of the American Civil War.

6/27

re: "The Pound of Flesh"

Richard Fernandez at Belmont Club examines where sub-state warfare is heading.

Money quote(s):

"Warfare is older than the modern state. When the Strategy Page described what it calls “vigilante warfare” by Israeli settlers on members of Hamas it might have been talking about a process of “going native”. In the Middle East the tradition of pre-Westphalian warfare is strong. Private war, from the action of clans against other clans to the sponsorship of belligerence by warlords never completely went out of style."

It took centuries for it to go "out of style" even in the Westphalian-style nation-states of Western Europe, where it never truly died out. Inter-state warfare is something of a historical curiousity really, sort of like jousting.

"One of the great innovations of the Westphalian system was that private individuals who had previously been responsible for visting retribution, were supposed to leave justice — and warfare — to the state. For as long as the population trusted the King (or the State) to punish criminals and protect them from foreign attack, private individuals were content to leave things in the hands of uniformed officialdom.

But a strange thing happened on the way to the 21st century: political correctness as imposed by a variety of lawyers, human rights activists and the like progressively reduced the power of the state to defend its population against external aggressors to the point where it failed to provide an adequate level of protection. When private individuals could no longer rely on uniformed officialdom to protect them, they did the natural thing. They took the matter of warfare back into their own hands."

The truly scarey thing isn't mentioned by Mr. Fernandez; what happens when political correctness so contrains Western law enforcement that Western citizenry again takes up torches, pitchforks, and hayrakes? We're likely to see this sooner in places like France, the Benelux, Nordic states, and British isles before here (but I could be wrong about that).

"(I)n doing away with the Westphalian system, political correctness unintentionally — or perhaps unthinkingly — undermined the Laws of War. The whole panoply of uniforms, ranks, discipline and obedience — so hated by pacifists — were all Westphalian mechanisms designed to ensure some kind of law and order on the battlefield. By taking the armies out of the game, the disciples of political correctness didn’t end war; they merely ended the old rules of war and returned the field to private warfare.

Maybe that isn’t too bad. If the 20th century is any gauge, Westphalian Armies did precious little to prevent widespread loss of life. Indeed World War 2, a Westphalian War, was the most devastating episode of belligerence in human history. For all its ugliness, one might argue that private war sheds less blood than the regular kind per unit of time. Unfortunately it also did away with that other Westphalian innovation, Victory. World War 2 for all its destructiveness had one great virtue. It ended. Today wars are far less destructive. The bad news is they never end.

Today warfare is no longer entirely a matter of soldiers fighting each other under the Geneva Convention. Instead, it every man for himself; it is the knife in the dark, the molotov cocktail thrown from the passing car and the IED along the road."

Modern armies operating under the Geneva Conventions as various international jurists would have them interpret it do suffer from systemic disadvantages. But the laws of warfare, as written, aren't actually intended to disadvantage those who follow them.

"It is what happens when vigilantes take a leaf out of Hamas’ book and start waging non-Westphalian warfare on the international agencies that should keep them up at night. The Strategy Page notes that nonstate actors have long had recourse to methods of intimidation denied to Westphalian states."

State actors have their own advantages, but they must be willing to exercise them.

"At the limit non-state actors can simply frighten the UN or the humanitarians into agreeing to their demands out of pure fear. The Canal Hotel bombing, directed by al-Qaeda in Iraq against the United Nations, killed a top UN bureaucrat and 22 others and ultimately led to the withdrawal of most UN staffers from Baghdad. The UN responded by declaring The World Humanitarian Day — they could have hardly taken a hard line against the private warfare directed against them."

This is why lots of people no longer view many international and "humanitarian" actors as being neutrals. There's a reason why the Colombians (IIRC) were able to rescue some long-held hostages by posing as members of an NGO whom the kidnappers believed to be neutral-in-their-favor.

10/31

re: "Why I Like "Pan Am" "

Robert at Atlantic Crossings ("Between the Hudson Highlands and the South of England…") makes some excellent points about the new TV lineup this Fall.

Money quote(s):

" “Pan Am” struck a personal chord: my first international flight (a lot more, ahem, recently than 1963!) was on Pan Am.

But “Pan Am” sparked my interest not only owing to that. Pan Am was murdered by terrorists; and its memory since has been stolen by that terrorism. So in a wider sense it is damn well about time we were all reminded the real Pan Am was not only about Lockerbie.
For just as the life of any murder victim is NOT — and absolutely should NOT be — only about his or her murder, Pan Am had had quite a “life” before 1988; and that deserves to be remembered too. That existence stretched back to an era that is recalled fondly as constituting a “golden era” in international flight."

CAA is of an age to not only have experienced (as a child) some of what it was like when there truly was a certain "glamour" to air travel but to have witnessed first-hand (as an airline employee) what it was like when deregulation (among other depredations, like Texas Air and Frank Lorenzo) began the not-so-slow destruction of America's flagship passenger carriers.

Present-day consular officers will already be aware of how the Lockerbie/Pan Am bombing changed, for the better, how we do some of our own work.

"(T)hat past is certainly viewed on the ABC screen at times through rose-tinted glasses, but that does not make those memories any less worthy of reflecting on. To those today accustomed to air travel as hardly better than buses in flight, catching glimpses of when commercial jet travel was barely a decade old, VERY special and the preserve of those who had money, is only to reveal various historical truths. While there is no way we should want to return to that era in its entirety for reasons too numerous to list here, that also does not mean that era was utterly devoid of any positives whatsoever and doesn’t deserve dramatic portrayal.

The pilot was stylish, pacey, likeable and contained enough touches of the serious to show the program has potential if the storywriting and character development proves itself solid longer-term."

10/1

re: "Is Obama doubling down on a risky gamble in Iraq?"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") had questions about that murky interface between military and national strategy, where political leaders do their decision-making.

Money quote(s):

"According to several unnamed sources, military commanders are "livid" with President Obama's decision to authorize a plan that is resourced at a fraction of the level that the military considered to be the minimum -- and even that minimum would only work "in extremis." Obama's approach appears to involve several multiples of risk beyond what the military consider prudent. Reportedly, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for a level of resources above what Obama appears to have authorized.

Reasonable people can disagree whether it makes national security sense for Obama to adopt such a risky path. For my part, I wish he had invested more effort in the Iraq file, especially working more closely with Prime Minister Maliki to push the process towards an outcome that is more favorable to American (and, I would argue, Iraqi national) interests.

The part that mystifies me is why his team thinks it makes political sense to have taken this course. His administration has already pocketed as much political benefit as there is to be wrung from Bush's surge -- and the media has generously refrained from pointing out that whatever positive developments came in Iraq came because of policies Obama and Biden tried strenuously to thwart in 2007. Given that the administration has already claimed Iraq as a great achievement, why take so risky a course now, one that could result in a great unraveling during the presidential campaign?"

The subtext here is the assumption that elected political leaders (or at least this elected political leader) make their big decisions based upon their personal calculus of electoral politics; rather than, say, the national good.

"The cost savings of denying the military the resources they say they need is trivial compared to the stakes. For that matter, the amount of time and effort it would have taken Obama to invest in Iraq policy so as to achieve greater progress with Maliki was probably trivial, too. Yet it seems that when it comes to Iraq, Obama is determined to do whatever is less than the minimum. "

Bug? Or feature?

9/7

re: "Dear London"

Confederate Yankee ("Because liberalism is a persistent vegetative state.") authored a heartfelt testament to the Second Amendment.

Money quote(s):

"Our Creator endowed me with certain unalienable rights—stop me if you've heard this—and also the responsibility to defend the life he gave me from oppressors, tyrants, and thugs.
That right extends to defending the lives of my family, and our home. No one has the right to take away my home or threaten my family, and I have the God-given responsibility to ensure their safety and survival by any means necessary.

We're quite adamant about that, and have taken up arms against entire governments on more than one occasion to ensure our liberties, and will likely do so again at some point." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

8/9

re: "Unhappy Medium: The Perils of Annoyance as Your Strategic Default"

Joseph Fouche at Chicago Boyz examined some intellectual sandtraps to which American strategic thinkers are irresistably drawn.

Money quote(s):

"In its nineties heyday, techno-opiates promised a future where U.S. forces moved freely like network packets across an antiseptic information battlespace. These force “packets” would be effectively omniscient since enemy forces would continue to unheedingly mass Soviet style forces in large formations across flat, treeless, and unpopulated terrain. There the enemy could be anesthetized in detail with precision, with laser-guided fluffy down pillows lulling enemy soldiers gently to sleep. The American military would simply interpret resistance “as damage and route around it“. The result of such thinking was an American military that could deter a large country, destroy a medium-sized country, or occupy a small country.

This policy shift from the mass armies of mid-century America to its smaller and more élite just-in-time replacement assumed a strong ability to accurately see the future. This is understandable: part of any defense plan is building the force you want that lets you do what you want to create the future you want. Unfortunately, the most neglected yet important part of a defense plan is building the force you need to survive what you don’t want to do in a future you don’t want. Building a magic bullet force assumes you’ll always enjoy the luxury of fighting whoever, whatever, wherever, whenever, and however you want, protected by an all-seeing eye so powerful and so pervasive that it provides perfect predictive power. The power of prophecy will free you from the margin of safety supplied by the quantitative outputs of the 20th century with just-in-time margins supplied by the qualitative outputs of the 21st.

If the last decade should have taught Americans anything, it should have taught them that contemporary American can’t predict the future. However, the correct solution (stop treating false prophecy as gospel) has been widely ignored in favor of the wrong solution (bet everything on false prophecy, only this time more aggressively)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA)

In the era of specialization (and over-specialization), military capabilities are best kept across a range of generalizations. To do otherwise creates opportunities for an assymetric opponent.

"In the wars of the 21st century, thousands died and trillions were spent based merely on the authority of prophecy that was little more predictive than the steely glint of Donald Rumsfeld’s bespectacled eyes and the firmness of his jaw. The result was a force that manfully struggled its way to relative operational success despite the obstacles the Pentagon put in its way. The military danced dreadfully close to the edge but escaped operationally unscathed. Strategically, however, the military’s combat forces are depleted by repeat overseas visits, its hospitals are packed with lifelong (patients), and its weaponry has a decade of wear and that will be expensive to replace if it ever is replaced. Such is the fate of a magic bullet force that found itself in wars that were more manpower and resource intensive than anticipated by Pentagon prophets."

Remember going "to war with the army you have"? And that bit of wisdom came from someone who'd had some considerable time to design and develop the sort of army he should have, rather than continuing on his pre-war quest for transformation.

( I was hotly furious when I first heard that soundbite from Sec. Rumsfeld and remain at least coldy so even today.)

" It may turn out that alternative forms for applying social violence like the mass participatory conscript armies that dominated between the American Civil War and Vietnam and the mass participatory electorates that coalesced to sustain them are obsolescent in today’s political economy as the Mongol hordes or the Greco-Macedonian phalanx.

The general principle remains: Master Sun wisely advised the warring kings of the late Spring and Autumn period to mix orthodox and unorthodox to produce victory. However, he would have never advised them to be all unorthodox all the time. The emphasis on élite formations on the scale envisioned by America’s most enthusiastic magic bulletheads seeks to institutionalize the unorthodox. Master Sun would have scoffed at this long-nosed red-headed Eastern barbarian idiocy. He knew that the unorthodox, when overemployed, ceases to be unorthodox and becomes orthodox." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

7/9

re: "I Love the Swiss"

LTCOL P at OPFOR ("Fair Specimens of Citizen Soldiers...") proposed the following:

"Think Swiss. Act Swiss."

Here's why:

"The Swiss have a long tradition of muscular self-defense, and are now intent on beefing up the size and strength of their army. …"

6/27

re: "Wet Work is Better"

Grim at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") gives credit where credit is due.

Money quote(s):

"(T)his is better than what we are doing, with our drone-and-airstrikes program of targeted killing, in at least three ways.

1) It is the mark of a more competent intelligence service."

Some inside baseball here: an intelligence service collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence; turning raw data and information from a variety of overt and covert sources into contextualized and/or actionable intelligence then putting it in the hands of those who should have it. There's a bit more to it than that, i.e., the intelligence cycle, but that's the gist of it.

A secret service may do all that, may also include security and counter-intelligence functions, and may go beyond covert and overt collection into the realm of covert action. Covert action is not, strictly speaking, part of the intelligence cycle any more than, say, dropping bombs is part of the intelligence cycle.

This function, if you will, of a secret service puts me in mind of Soviet battle doctrine regarding how to jam radio transmitters: with artillery.

"2) It is more discriminating."

There is that. Of course, even assassins sometimes hit the wrong target or cause collateral damage, even when they're using the up-close-and-personal approach.

"3) It cuts down on political consequences."

Sure, it injects some uncertainty into the scenario. There's not a lot of plausible deniability for the U.S. when a Predator drone drops a Hellfire missile into a remote compound or an AQ convoy somewhere; at this point only one player is known to have and employ them. When it's unclear who's responsible then the blame and its consequences may be avoided; uncertainty also gives other actors, who may privately approve, enough political elbow room to avoid having to publicly condemn the U.S. in order to appease domestic or international constituents.

"If we're going to wage war through the targeted killing of individuals, we ought to engage in 'wet work' instead."

It's an approach. And I don't mean that sarcastically. There's nothing in the Constitution that forbids it, after all, just an executive order and, perhaps, some legislation that makes getting approval a non-trivial exercise, IIRC. When phrases like "all options remain on the table" are used, that includes the option of "direct action" as well.

11/2

re: "Was it legal to kill al-Awlaki?"

Neo-Neocon ("slowly but surely leaving the fold and becoming that dread thing: a neocon") is asking the right questions.

Money quote(s):

"Was it legal to kill al-Awlaki without due process, courtesy of drone?

Some will say “who cares? Good riddance.” But they are ignoring the importance of the issue and the possible danger of the precedent, while those who question the mission’s legality are asking a question that is necessary to confront: under what circumstances can a president order the liquidation of an American citizen (or possible former American citizen) without any courtroom procedure, even a military tribunal?"

Obviously, this question is only of interest to those 300,000 or so folks who happen to be U.S. citizens.

"Fighting international terrorism presents us with a different kind of war. That does not mean we can do whatever we want. But it does mean that the rules need developing and clarifying."

(10/1)

re: "Congress’s Constitutional Power to Establish National War Policy in Violation of International Law – A (Belated) Response to Professors.... "

John Dehn at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") summarized the play-by-play on some international law back-and-forth.

Money quote(s):

"Opinio Juris hosted an excellent discussion of an important new book, International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, a well-edited collection of essays about the Supreme Court’s approach to international law. Professor David Golove’s contribution asserting that post-9/11 Supreme Court “War on Terror” decisions are consistent with what he called our “Just War constitutional tradition” drew significant attention. In Professor Golove’s view, both the President and Congress are constitutionally required to comply with at least some international laws of war. Professor Andrew Kent critiqued the essay here, arguing that Golove’s claims, particularly those involving Congress, are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent recognizing Congress’s power to set national policy in violation of international law.
I agree with Golove’s assertion that the executive branch must generally comply with any applicable international laws of war. Like Professor Kent, I am quite circumspect of the claim that Congress must as well. Harlan Cohen responded to Professor Kent’s post, suggesting that Professor Golove and Professor William Dodge (one of the book’s editors) may believe that all nations, including ours, are “absolutely bound” by certain rules of international law, those that the well-known (to the Framers and to academics) and influential Eighteenth Century international law commentator Emmerich de Vattel categorized “voluntary law.” " (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

There's actually no such thing as "international law."

Don't get me wrong; there is a body of customary, traditional, and treaty-based law (for values of "law") comprising a body of specialized knowledge which is generally termed "international law." But that "law" doesn't even come close to passing the common sense tests that would make it equivalent to other forms of actual law.

"After reading Professor Golove’s contribution to the book, Professor Ramsey’s response, and Professor Dodge’s related essay, I think there may be confusion regarding the obligatory nature of what Vattel denominated “voluntary law” and its relationship to both the contemporary laws of war and the war powers of Congress.

I believe Congress possesses the constitutional power (in conjunction with the executive, when necessary) to establish national war policy contrary to relevant international law so long as it does not violate the text of the Constitution. To the extent that Professor Golove’s unpublished research may have uncovered “longstanding understandings in Congress” that it must follow certain international laws of war, I suspect those understandings to be based in morality or wise policy, not necessarily constitutional law. Golove has to date given only scant evidence of what seems an elegant argument in favor of granting constitutional status to any such congressional understandings.

I agree that there are (and were) rules of international law that nations were believed “absolutely bound” to observe. They included what Vattel denominated the “perfect rights” of nations. Perfect rights were those “accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfill the correspondent obligation” through armed force. However, the absolute “bindingness” of these rules existed only in international law." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

There are some issues (more than some, but bear with me) with this perspective on the "bindingness" of international law.

For one thing, the perspective is astonishingly narrow in scope.

What we in the West call "international law" is a body of artifacts whose only relevance is within the larger context of the post-Westphalian international system. It is the height of civilizational and cultural chauvanism to suppose that it is truly global in application.

"(A) national policy, even one properly established under domestic law, may permit a violation of international law. But it cannot excuse that violation from the perspective of international law. In such cases, the policy is lawful in the domestic (municipal) legal system, but remains a violation of international law.

In my view, the key question is not whether the U.S. has ‘the power but not the right’ (to paraphrase Louis Henkin) to violate international law; it does. The key question is: which branch(es) of the U.S. government may constitutionally establish national policy contrary to international law? My research leads me to believe that in most contexts, including war, Congress does. In some very narrow circumstances it has been (and may still be) the executive alone." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The thing about violations of international law which are legal within a domestic legal system is the limited scope for enforcement. Who or what gets to enforce "international law" within another sovereign state and using what means or mechanisms?

"(T)he bulk of the contemporary international law of war (both jus ad bellum and jus in bello or international humanitarian law (IHL)) consists of customary and conventional constraints on conduct the natural law-based law of nations permitted. Therefore, contemporary IHL is not properly equated with Vattel’s “voluntary” law, which is law evidenced in or derived from natural law principles, generally observed for its utility, and obligatory on civilized states through their presumed (rather than express or implied) consent.

Vattel identifies three other categories of international law, (1) necessary, (2) customary and (3) conventional. Only necessary law, which consisted of the direct application of natural law to nations, was immutable or absolute. Vattel classified the other three types, including voluntary law, as composing the “positive law of nations” because “they proceed from the will of nations.” It defies logic to say that any species positive law cannot be altered at the will of the same nations that establish it." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

"(T)o the extent that any rules in the contemporary law of war might be properly categorized “voluntary” law, the Constitution expressly assigns Congress the power to derogate from or abrogate such law. Importantly, this includes the power to infringe the “perfect rights” of other nations. Nothing in the constitutional text expressly requires Congress to exercise its powers to declare war or grant letters of marque (or reprisal, see below) in a manner consistent with relevant international law. This is why the Court did not, in its early decisions, review a congressionally established general or partial war for compliance with the law of nations."

The OJ article included a nice quote from Chief Justice Marshall (Talbot v. Seeman) to back up that last claim:

“The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry [into whether France was properly deemed an enemy].” (emphasis added)

"Of course, none of these observations directly addresses Golove’s claim: that Congress believed itself to be limited by the law of nations when exercising its powers, and that this sense of obligation had a constitutional dimension or basis. There are, quite obviously, many reasons why members of Congress or Congress as a body might have boisterously made such claims. Chief among them would be to claim the legitimacy of law for proposed or adopted legislation infringing the perfect rights of other nations. Given the widely accepted origins of the natural law, some might also have felt morally obligated to observe it in spite of having constitutional discretion not to do so."

(9/6)

re: "Packing my UAB"

Digger at Life After Jerusalem ("The musings of a Two-Spirit American Indian, Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer") offered some enormously practical advice for FS folks on the move.

Money quote(s):

"(I)t is important to get a list from your post of what is in your welcome kit and to find out whether you get to keep it until your HHE arrives. Because if you have to return it once you get your UAB, that changes everything."

HHE (or HHB) = Household Effects/Baggage. This is the stuff that gets to you by "slow boat" via China (unless you're going to China; in those cases, your HHE is routed via Tierra Del Fuego).

UAB = Unaccompanied Baggage. This is stuff that gets air-freighted to you (from you, before you leave) and, ideally, gets where you're going within a few days of your arrival. It's to tide you over between what's in your actual luggage and the arrival of your HHE.

(On one occasion, my UAB was already at post, at my new house in fact, before I myself arrived. That was way cool.)

A "welcome kit" is each post's idea of what you'll need to get by in your new home until your own stuff arrives. It typically includes pots and pans, dishes and flatware, sheets and towels, &tc.

"Check with your post about whether the welcome kits include a tv...this could be vital if you have kids (I don't but I still want one. My post actually includes a tv, but I am probably bringing mine in the UAB anyway if I have the weight). Also bring toys and maybe some favorite snacks for your kids and pets. It will ease their adjustment. I am also bringing sheets, pillows and towels. Yes, the embassy provides those, but I bet they won't feel as nice as the ones you sleep on at home. In fact, I actually mailed myself a set of sheets and a mattress pad (embassy bedding is notoriously uncomfortable, at least in my experience. I am actually bringing my own bed, and I am putting a set of sheets for it in my UAB so that I don't have to unpack all of my HHE before I can make the bed when it arrives.)"

Okay, so you're getting the idea, perhaps, that a Foreign Service deployment isn't exactly like a military one, and you'd be correct. It's somewhat more akin to a PCS move to Germany/Italy/Korea/Japan would be for military folks, IF military folks PCS-ed to Upper Revolting, Carjackistan, and Lower Slobovia on a regular basis (and some, defense attache types, do). You're moving. You're moving your household (kids, spouse, pets, &tc.) every 2-3 years, and trying to make each little homestead your honest-to-gawd home every time.

It's a little more complicated than "home is where you hang your hat." You want a safe harbor, a refuge, where you can unwind from whatever the stress-du-jour at the embassy turns out to be on each given day. And your spouse/kids need a home. Especially if you're trying to raise your world-vagabond offspring to be honest-to-Heck Americans, without the benefit of raising them in their own country for much of their childhoods.

As I've occasionally mentioned to Madam-At-Arms, my home is where she (and the Wee Consular Beastie) is/are. That's the bottom line for me. When I get home from a jail/morgue visit, or from spending the day identifying plane crash victims, I like a little homelike space where I can take a slug of Kentucky sour mash before I actually have to tell her about my day at/out-of-the- office.

(Of course, when I headed for the whiskey shelf as item #1 of my just-got-home checklist, she pretty much already knew where I'd spent my day.)

"And of course my electronics...though they will be in my carry on...my computer, ipad, kindle (gotta have books!), ipod (gotta have music!)...plus all of my important documents, like passports, animal health certificates, etc, will be in my carry on."

Superlative advice about the things which you really don't want to let get further than arm's reach during an international move. Bravo!

(8/9)

re: "Say Yes to Endless Campaigning: Let Obama Be Obama"

Vanderleun at American Digest ("Dispatches From The New America") said something curious:

"So to all those pundits cluck-clucking about Obama’s campaigning crimping his productivity, I say: “Just. Shut. Up.” "

Read why.

(7/9)

re: " "German Soldiers Can't Shoot" "

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") considered how the Bundeswehr must transform.

Money quote(s):

"We constantly hear about the Bundeswehr's huge transformations since unification in 1990, but I am beginning to wonder how much of that was rhetoric. I am not underestimating how much the world has changed since the Cold War and how difficult it to transform military institutions and doctrine, but the fall of the Berlin Wall was more than 20 years ago. Two decades is a long time for Christ's sake. Soon we will mark the ten's anniversary of 9/11. I am getting tired of German pundit's talking about the post-Cold War world or even the post-9/11 world."

Most of the Bundeswehr's "transformation since absorbing the East German Volksarmee has been to downsize. When I was briefed a few years ago on just how far that had progressed, I was (as a former NATO inhabitant) truly shocked.

"1 percent of GDP is still a lot of money. We have to change faster, more creative, pool resources with allies to develop military capabilities more efficiently.

There was not enough pressure to reform the Bundeswehr in the past. One of the reasons for the lack of urgency was (and still is) the popular perception that a) finally we don't have enemies, but are surrounded by friends, b) we cannot increase our security with military means at the moment, and c) US led wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are not enhancing Germany's security, thus we do not need to contribute much. Very shortsighted indeed."


(6/27)

re: "Alabama vs. Illegal Immigration [ArthurK]"

Open Blogger at Ace of Spades HQ watched a video about Alabama's new anti-illegal immigration law.

Money quote(s):

"I have a heart. But I still want them out of the country. Sometimes you gotta do stuff that makes you sad."

That is ofttimes the essence of immigration-related (including consular and visa) work. I don't want to work with consular officers who have no heart, I just want them to make their adjudicational decisions with all of their decisional faculties: heads, hearts, and gut.

Real life ain't bean-bag. You can't please everyone, after all; you're sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution (and laws) of a particular country.

"The question is always asked, "How are you going to remove 12 million undocumented?" Here's an answer - cut off the reasons they come here (jobs (via that online id check) schools)and they'll remove themselves."

Self-deportation works.

(10/1)

re: "Commanders Livid As Obama Orders Reduction of Iraq Troop Strength To... 3000"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ cut to the heart of the matter.

Money quote(s):

"How can 3000 men in a foreign country accomplish anything, even securing their own safety?

This seems, yet again, to be a purely political decision, made without regard to any security goal or even the affected troops' safety.

If you're hollowing out the force to the point where they are no longer tasked with anything except defending themselves from terrorist attacks, why are they there at all?"

Lipstick on a pig?

(9/6)

re: "So what do I do, again?"

Japansen at White Waters & Black ("Adventures in Diplomacy aka Life in the Foreign Service") made an excellent explanation.

Money quote(s):

"The Foreign Service is the diplomatic arm of the US government. We live and work abroad, representing the interests of the US and its business and providing support for American citizens overseas. We are a service corp (sic), similar to the military. We are members of the Department of State and are most recognizable by the Secretary of State and the myriad ambassadors that represent the President at missions overseas. Historically about 2/3 of US ambassadors have been career foreign service officers with political appointees comprising the rest. We work at embassies and consulates. There is only one embassy in any country; consulates primarily provide consular services but also have reporting sections as well."

True, true. There are sometimes more than one U.S. mission (complete to ambassador) located geographically in a particular country (e.g., Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland) but those are diplomatic missions to international organizations and the like, not embassies to another sovereign state.

"Consular officers execute the consular duties of embassies and consulates. They adjudicate visa applications and provide services to American citizens overseas. These services include replacing lost passports, registering new citizen births, and assisting in cases of distress, often involving arrests or deaths. On the visa side, there are two basic types, immigrant and non-immigrant visas. Immigrant visa interviews are much more exhaustive and have different standards of adjudication..... There are almost as many classes of immigrant visas as there are letters of the alphabet, depending on the purpose of travel. US law establishes the criteria for qualification for everything from diplomats and government workers to visitors to students to religious workers to refugees and victims of violence.

My job then is to review each non-immigrant applicant and interview them to determine if they meet the criteria established by US law. Fundamentally consular officers need to establish that applicants are bona fide non-immigrants and aren’t just intending to stay in the US once they get there. We have to make sure that the appropriate visa is applied for and that they meet the criteria for eligibility.The biggest challenge is the volume."

&

" There aren’t all that many of us, about 8000 Officers and 5500 Specialists. The Department of State is one of the smallest in the government, with a budget about 1/20 of the Department of Defense."

(8/8)

re: "South Sudan"

David Warren at David Warren Online ("my daily newspaper articles for the time since Sept. 11th, 2001") shared some nearly specialist-level area knowledge of South Sudan.

Money quote(s):

"The frontiers are not yet secure, and the ultimate shape of this new country depends on the resolution of the conflict with (northern) Sudan, over possession of the large district of Abyel, which is a melding zone between the Muslim north and Christian-Animist south, both geographically and demographically."

"Melding zone" is one way of looking at it. Abyei, within South Kordofan (the name itself is a form of arabization-inspired north Sudan cultural imperialism), is part of Islam's "bloody borders," marking the bleeding edge of moslem conquest as it marches (and rides, and raids) further and further up the Nile valley.

"Only in the 19th century did European adventurers become fully aware of regions like southern Sudan, thanks more to private missionary efforts than to imperial ambitions. It was an afterthought to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, extending their rule into the swampland of the White Nile, a very long way from Cairo; and also to British East African officials, curious to find what lay beyond Uganda.

History, and in this case the imperial histories that underlie so many contemporary world issues, is unfortunately no longer taught except to ideological specialists, which is how I excuse this very general briefing. The British in fact saw the problem coming, of putting millions of tropical rainforest-dwelling black Africans under the rule of desert-dwelling Arabized Muslims, at least a century ago. Their intention to make the region an extension of Uganda, instead of Sudan, was defeated by "events."

So much of today's sprawling political and economic catastrophe through sub-Saharan Africa can be traced not to imperialism, per se, but to the imperial authorities' eagerness to leave around the signal year of 1960. It was an appalling cat's cradle of quick fixes they left behind.

The rest could be attributed to the people they put in power, or dangerously near power, during this evacuation: a generation of African statesmen educated in places like the London School of Economics, or the École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer, on what were then the latest Fabian and socialist principles.

Add nascent African nationalisms - also encouraged by the chic, departing Europeans - and stir. In retrospect, the reduction of sub-Saharan Africa, with its extraordinary natural resources and diversity of alert and capable peoples, to desperate poverty and a violent hash, was just what we should have expected."

The preceding five short paragraphs encapsulate the historical truths it took me week, and volumes, to conclude. (Nice work.)

"Africa is not a mess because it is black. Africa is a mess because it was made into an immense Petri dish for asinine Utopian experiments, by people who walked when they started going wrong."

Simplistic and incomplete, but not untrue.

(7/9)

re: "MAJOR NIDAL HASAN AND THE FORT HOOD TRAGEDY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMED FORCES"

Clint Watts at the Foreign Policy Research Institute ("Putting Ideas in Service to Our Nation since 1955") posted a very useful bulletin at FPRI.

Read the whole thing.


(6/27)

re: "The Left's Rage Over 'Assassination' Of US Citizens Begins"

Jason Bradley at Big Peace addresses some of the proper issues surrounding "Triple-A" 's death.

Money quote(s):

"Assassinating US citizens without due process is in fact wrong. But there is nothing basic about the kind of terrorists’ threats we face daily. We do not have drones patrolling the skies of Los Angles and we are not targeting American civilians in all out military offensive. These terrorists are not simply breaking laws. They are more than just your common criminal or gangbanger. They are continuously plotting to kill as many Americans as possible. They are financed and organized by governments and terrorists organizations that stretch the globe and have plenty of resources from which to operate. That makes them threatening in such a way that due-process would actually be a hindrance in protection of the homeland.

Al-Awlaki’s ‘citizenship’ is the product of an outdated and erroneous interpretation of the 14th Amendment. He is about as much of a citizen of the US as Osama bin Laden was. If he was truly a US citizen he would live here, pay his taxes, and be a productive member of society. If individuals like al-Awlaki can be considered a US citizen with a straight face, then perhaps there is need to approach the ideas that constitute citizenship. Al-Awlaki stopped being a US citizen the moment he sat down with terrorists and collaborated with them to kill American citizens."

1. Al-Awlaki got precisely the due process (under the laws of land warfare) that any other enemy of the United States gets; not a trial by jury in a courtroom, to be sure, but by targeteers and military commanders performing their lawful duties.

2. There are those who make this fairly reasonable argument, that children born to foreign citizens who are not themselves legal residents (a broader category than illegal aliens, by the way) in the U.S. aren't due American citizenship under 14th Amendment authority. So far this hasn't been the interpretation of the SCOTUS, but it's not that unreasonable an interpretation.

3. Mr. Bradley's point with regards to expatriation (i.e., loss of U.S. nationality), is meaningful and well-taken. There are existing laws, on the books, to strip U.S. citizenship from those who wage war against America. They ought to exercised.

(10/1)

re: "Mickey Kaus: Perry's Positions on Immigration Are Even Worse Than I Thought"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ has his own ideas about immigration reform.

Money quote(s):

"I've long been in favor of a guest worker program. Liberals hate this idea because they want immigrant workers voting in elections, and also supporting the American social welfare system (because, being citizens, they'd be beneficiaries). The unions hate the idea because they don't like the idea of immigrants with legal status competing for jobs.

Many conservatives don't like the idea because they want illegal immigrants stopped, period."

Like a lot of consular officers who work hard and conscientiously in implementing lawful immigration programs, illegal immigration pretty much burns my shorts. (We are not amused!) There's an in-joke that plays on the predominently liberal flavor of our diplomatic corps: new foreign service officers are liberal, but after their first tour interviewing (and adjudicating) visa applicants they're still liberal, but not when it comes to immigration.

"(T)here is a fact on the ground that cannot easily be ignored that American agriculture relies, to a serious extent, on immigrant farm workers coming in to collect the harvests. There is a glib response to that -- "We'll just encourage Americans to take those jobs!" -- and I suppose that's possible, but the American public of 2011 is not the American public of, say, 1932. Whereas once American workers might take a bus to the heartland and work the fields for a season, American workers no longer feel they need to do that, as government unemployment programs don't require them to change jobs or to travel long distances for work. So, in the main, they don't." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

If things got bad enough (and here's hoping they don't), that lack of needful feeling could change drastically. But for now, with the modern welfare state (and the option of moving back home to your parent's house) American citizen labor is unlikely to be quite that mobile.

"(P)art of the reason there aren't any serious immigration reforms -- and I mean on the enforcement side, here -- is because neither side is particularly willing to confront the facts on the ground. Liberals demand an amnesty and citizenship to goose their vote share (and further drain our social welfare finances), which is a non-starter for conservatives. Business-oriented conservatives, however, block real immigration enforcement, because they feel those enforcement efforts don't take into account the fact that many businesses have come to rely on immigrant workers, and would be disrupted by any kind of crackdown that was more than superficial (which is what our current raids mostly are).

To me, the best solution is to permit guest-worker visas but only for those industries that have long relied on immigrant illegal workers (agriculture, mainly), with a smaller pool of visas for industries that have recently begun to rely on such workers (hotels, restaurants), and none at all for industries which are just recently beginning to indulge in illegal hiring.

Then start reducing the visas for the middle category (the hospitality industries), to begin ratcheting this practice down in a slow way, forcing them little by little to stop hiring illegals.
Such guest worker visas should only be generous for the one industry that seems to be historically dependent on seasonal workers (agriculture).

That is, less of a war on illegal immigration, and more of a containment and rollback model."

Ace seems considerably more in touch with public sentiment on this issue, in severe contrast to our elected/appointed leadership which seems bent on expanding categories of worker programs.

"I think our laws do not reflect the reality that immigrants pick crops, and there aren't a huge number of Americans ready and able to step in were they to stop. Businesses will hire them illegally because they have to, and then the political structure will turn a blind eye to all of this because they know it's necessary, and the situation continues, with no support on either side for any kind of actual governing law.

Because there is no majority for any scheme of law here, we've all collectively decided, essentially, to keep the old "law" in place and just ignore the fact it's being broken left and right."

(9/6)

re: "State: Libyan rebels can have the embassy … but not the money"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") was following the money.

Money quote(s):

"The Libyan rebels, who are represented in Washington by former Qaddafi envoy Ali Aujali, have been working out of donated office space in northwest Washington for months. The State Department signed an order last week handing control of the Libyan embassy, located in the Watergate complex, over to the rebels."

The Watergate, as well as being famous as a Nixon administration crime scene and the onetime residence of Monica Lewinsky, is only a relatively short distance from Main State (i.e., "Foggy Bottom") and the rest of official Washington.

"There is probably only about $150 to $200 million of frozen Qaddafi money in U.S. banks, but even that money is affected by the U.N. sanctions. The rest of the $30 billion is held outside the U.S. banking system."

A few hundred million here, a few hundred million there; pretty soon you're talking about real money.

"(T)he State Department continues to communicate privately to the TNC that the investigation into the killing of their military commander, Abdel Fatah Younis, last month is crucial to maintaining the TNC's credibility and reputation.

Publicly, Nuland portrayed the killing and the reorganization of their cabinet as a watershed moment in the TNC's evolution into a functioning, democratic organization ‘So, frankly, while the killing was an awful event, the fact [is] that the TNC has not just stood pat but has really taken this as an opportunity for internal reflection, for renewal," she said.

One of the State Department press corps members responded to her, "I'm not sure I've ever heard a glass-half-full explanation better than that one in a long time." "

Mr. Rogin originally posted this back in August. That's a lifetime (several, actually; especially if your family name is Qadhafi) in terms of the Libyan civil war. Does anyone even remember this particular murder? Does anyone, in light of the late dictator's fate, think the TNC got any valid "lessons learned" from Younis' assassination?

(Other than that they could get away with it?)

(8/9)

re: "An awkward independence day for diplomats in South Sudan"

Edmund Downie at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors Of Foreign Policy") noted a little problem of an ICC warrant being out on one of the invited guests.

Money quote(s):

"The International Criminal Court's March 2009 indictment alleged that Bashir was responsible for war crimes in the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Recent violence in border states Abyei and South Kordofan hasn't endeared him to the international community either. Bashir and rebel leaders pledged in late June to pull troops out of Abyei before the referendum, but Bashir's ambassador to Kenya reaffirmed yesterday the north's claim to the region."



(7/8)

re: "Maybe your country is at war, but not mine"

Murdoc at Murdoc Online found a paucity of martial ardor in our NATO allies.

Money quote(s):

"There was a time when Murdoc thought that the primacy of the UN as the main international body was over than that an expanding NATO would someday fill its place in global politics. That time is long, long past.

NATO isn’t completely worthless. But it seems to inch closer and closer to that state every day.

Though, to be fair, sometimes (a lot of times?) it’s hard to tell that America is at war, too."

America isn't at war. America is "at the mall."

(6/26)

re: "Obama to reduce Iraq strength to 3,000, lose election… "

Moe Lane at RedState ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") is crystal-balling some crystal-balling.

Money quote(s):

"(S)et up the bank shot in 2016 for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton"

Since this post, the target troop strength for the end of this year has dropped another couple of zeros, to (essentially) nothing. The primary official U.S. presence by 2012 in Iraq will be the State Dept. mission there. This actually would seem to put the "blame line" firmly on Sec. Clinton's desk, should anything not go spectacularly well.

(Does anyone actually, seriously, forecast things going spectularly well in Iraq after our withdrawel?)

This would seem to defeat the purpose in setting up a bank shot for her.

(Unless it was a double bank shot intended to sink her.)

"(T)his would work as a long term strategy. Accept that the election’s lost, set up a disaster for the Republican President to inherit and take the blame for, and put the one brave truth-teller in position to come over in 2016 and save the day. It’s not optimal, but then it’s going to take a couple of years for the Democrats to fix everything that Obama’s done to their party. They might as well sabotage things for the GOP in the meantime."

It's not that political strategists can't/don't plan this far ahead, but this is shading past strategizing into the realm of conspiracy.

(Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity and incompetence.)

(9/6)

re: "RAF Trainer Is Muslim Convert"

Mr. E. Blogger at The Jawa Report ("Sand people, get it?") spotlighted an interesting British character.

Money quote(s):

"A Royal Air Force training college dean, Dr. Joel Hayward, is a Muslim convert who has criticized NATO efforts in Libya, likened Winston Churchill to Mohammad, asserted that fewer Jews were killed by the Nazis than generally thought and said Holocaust gas chambers were British propaganda.

Needless to say, Hayward engenders concern and suspicion on the part of RAF colleagues. He has been dubbed the "Air Force Ayatollah." "

Likening "Winston Churchill to Mohammad"?

(In "a nice way," one presumes.)

"Dr. Hayward reminds me of the alleged Fort Hood shooter, Army Major Nidal Hasan."

There are some particulars in the Jawa Report post excerpted from the Mail (U.K.) article that make this less implausible than it might otherwise seem.

(8/9)

re: "Unhappy Medium: The Perils of Annoyance as Your Strategic Default"

Joseph Fouche at Chicago Boyz discussed some pitfalls of U.S. strategizing.

Money quote(s):

"This policy shift from the mass armies of mid-century America to its smaller and more élite just-in-time replacement assumed a strong ability to accurately see the future. This is understandable: part of any defense plan is building the force you want that lets you do what you want to create the future you want. Unfortunately, the most neglected yet important part of a defense plan is building the force you need to survive what you don’t want to do in a future you don’t want. Building a magic bullet force assumes you’ll always enjoy the luxury of fighting whoever, whatever, wherever, whenever, and however you want, protected by an all-seeing eye so powerful and so pervasive that it provides perfect predictive power. The power of prophecy will free you from the margin of safety supplied by the quantitative outputs of the 20th century with just-in-time margins supplied by the qualitative outputs of the 21st.

If the last decade should have taught Americans anything, it should have taught them that contemporary American can’t predict the future. However, the correct solution (stop treating false prophecy as gospel) has been widely ignored in favor of the wrong solution (bet everything on false prophecy, only this time more aggressively)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The application of business concepts to military organizations has been a U.S. characteristic since at least the U.S. mass mobilization of World War II. War on an industrial scale invited industrial engineering solutions. The over-influence of corporate business concepts on America's conduct of the Vietnam War need not be further discussed, except when/where lessons-learned are stubbornly resisted.

"In the wars of the 21st century, thousands died and trillions were spent based merely on the authority of prophecy that was little more predictive than the steely glint of Donald Rumsfeld’s bespectacled eyes and the firmness of his jaw. The result was a force that manfully struggled its way to relative operational success despite the obstacles the Pentagon put in its way. The military danced dreadfully close to the edge but escaped operationally unscathed. Strategically, however, the military’s combat forces are depleted by repeat overseas visits, its hospitals are packed with lifelong, and its weaponry has a decade of wear and that will be expensive to replace if it ever is replaced. Such is the fate of a magic bullet force that found itself in wars that were more manpower and resource intensive than anticipated by Pentagon prophets." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

(7/9)

re: "An Alpine Superpower?"

Baron Bodissey at Gates of Vienna ("At the siege of Vienna in 1683 Islam seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe.We are in a new phase of a very old war.") noted a limited outbreak of rationality in Europe.

Money quote(s):

"The European Union’s lack of military capability has made it somewhat of a joke in recent years. Among the various member states of the EU there are some exceptions — Denmark comes to mind — but, generally speaking, Western Europe lacks the capacity to defend itself without the help of the United States. If the American hegemon were to withdraw or collapse, Europe would become vulnerable to foreign predation long before it could rearm.

Not so Switzerland. The Swiss have a long tradition of muscular self-defense, and are now intent on beefing up the size and strength of their army."

Our NATO allies have continued cashing their peace dividend checks long past the end of actual peace. Witness their limited capabilities in support of whatever their Libyan objectives actually were.

So, while in absolute terms calling Switzerland a "superpower" is a bit of a stretch, in comparison with their neighbors, perhaps not so much of a stretch.

"In defiance of all European trends to saving, there will again be 100,000 soldiers prepared to defend the country."

(6/26)