Friday, June 22, 2012
re: "Abdicating Iraq"
Thursday, June 21, 2012
re: "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi"
re: "Ann Coulter Says, and I Am Not Making This Up: “Three Cheers for Romneycare!” "
re: "Publishing In A Handbasket"
"“I entered our section offices through a washroom booth in MacArthur Station. You won’t find our offices in the phone lists. In fact, it does not exist. Probably I don’t exist either. All is illusion. Another route is through a little hole-in-the-wall shop with a sign reading RARE STAMPS & COINS. Don’t try that route either – they’ll try to sell you a Tu’ penny Black.” Robert A. Heinlein, The Puppet Masters."
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
re: "Afghanistan: America's Willful Deception"
The American population have been exposed to military jargon they don't understand as well as historically incorrect details about Afghan society and Islam, and they have been force-fed these carefully manicured stories of successful encounters with Afghan society for at least eight years." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Damning assertions one and all, and none of them incorrect.
It was an American general, once upon a time, who said "There is no substitute for victory."
We've come a long way from that time, but not all progress necessarily represents an improvement.
"(W)e have had further confirmation of an ongoing effort by U.S. representatives to reconcile with the Taliban and to release battle-hardened Taliban fighters back to Afghan society. While we have chosen to abandon the battlefield in a quest for a magic potion to make the Taliban like us, they, are doing their level best to "explain" to us that they have no interest in peace, an example of which is the killing an Afghan "peace negotiator." They are also exploiting our weakness on the battlefield due to our apparent unwillingness to bring the fight to them!"
&
"(M)any questions are raised by all of this, but none is as important as this one: why did we ever let this government convince us that rebuilding Afghanistan was somehow better for the United States? This question is important simply because there are those of us who are serving in that part of the world who have been led to believe they are there for the security of the United States. Regardless of the apparent inanity of the mission, the overwhelming evidence of IED placement, VBIED traffic, the obvious lack of measurable support from the local population, and the incessant stories of moral and ethical failure in the Kabul government, these war fighters press on. The government that has compelled them to serve in a hostile environment owes them at least the ability to defend themselves when fired upon. The ROE, however, denies them use of the basic tools of the trade: artillery, close air support, use of organic weapons systems like the 60mm mortar, and even small arms fire if their proximity to civilians cannot absolutely guarantee safety for the civilians."
This is a legitimate question: Is rebuilding Afghanistan necessarily to the advantage of the U.S. and, if so, in what way? Simply making the assertion doesn't make it so.
"(T)he conditions in Afghanistan are hardly normal, and no matter how much the general grade officers and their counterparts in D.C. want Afghanistan and Afghans to reflect their vision for them, it isn't going to happen. One thing is certain: as the number of service members in Afghanistan is drawn down, the real threat to our war fighter community will grow exponentially." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
&
"The truth is, in spite of the narrative, the actual evidence suggests that things in Afghanistan are turning in favor of the Taliban. The danger to our forces will not only continue, but will grow in intensity as more and more control of the battle space is handed to the Taliban. And this giving over of control is a direct consequence of our having chosen not to hold the Taliban accountable on the battlefield -- a battlefield created by a failure on the part of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other like-minded Islamic cells to choose peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. It is also a complete failure of the remainder of the so-called peaceful Muslim ummah to denounce the violence perpetrated by these groups." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)
A negotiated withdrawal with a Taliban-dominated (or coalition government which includes them), with the kind of exposed lines of supply and communications we endure in Afghanistan, is a recipe for catastrophe, subject to the meagre mercies of one history's most merciless foemen.
"Those in the highest levels of governance in this country and appointed to highest echelons of authority in the DOD have willingly rendered their consciences and their minds incapable of considering the threat, the motivation, and the determination of this enemy, and the proper response to the threat. Instead, they have done what too many men in this age have done. They have been seduced by a lie that allows their weakened character to take the less painful road rather than the road that would have led to victory.
And in so doing, they have purposefully deceived a nation and a nation's most valuable asset: its war-fighting community."
re: "Punching Down"
re: "Clinton asks Kerry for help on budget"
Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") was following the back-and-forth at budget request time.
Tuesday, June 19, 2012
re: "Quote of the Day"
"The enemy of my enemy isn't really a terrorist if his lobbying is really, really good."
re: "Pearl Harbor Considered"
re: "This is no time to cut defense"
Paul Miller at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") can think of several reasons not to cut defense.
Monday, June 18, 2012
re: "Reclaiming State Department Clarity on Jihad and Sharia"
Glaring examples of this corrosive State Department apologetic on Islam have been provided by the two most recent Secretaries of State, Condoleeza Rice, and the current Secretary, Hillary Clinton." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)
Mr. Bostom provided some examples before continuing.
"(O)bsequious pandering to Islam--despite the daily confirmed, abject failure of these efforts to provide any strategic benefit to the US--was not always enshrined State Department "policy."
Edward A. Van Dyck, then US Consular Clerk at Cairo, Egypt, prepared a detailed report in August 1880 on the history of the treaty arrangements (so-called "capitulations") between the Muslim Ottoman Empire, European nations, and the much briefer US-Ottoman experience. Van Dyck's report--written specifically as a tool for State Department diplomats--opens with an informed, pellucid, and remarkably compendious explanation of jihad and Islamic law (Sharia):
In all the many works on Mohammedan law no teaching is met with that even hints at those principles of political intercourse between nations, that have been so long known to the peoples of Europe, and which are so universally recognized by them. "Fiqh," as the science of Moslem jurisprudence is called, knows only one category of relation between those who recognize the apostleship of Mohammed and all others who do not, namely Djehad [jihad[; that is to say, strife, or holy war. Inasmuch as the propagation of Islam was to be the aim of all Moslems, perpetual warfare against the unbelievers, in order to convert them, or subject them to the payment of tribute, came to be held by Moslem doctors [legists] as the most sacred duty of the believer. This right to wage war is the only principle of international law which is taught by Mohammedan jurists; ...with the Arabs the term harby [harbi] (warrior) expresses not only an unbeliever but also an enemy; and jehady [jihadi] (striver, warrior) means the believer-militant. From the Moslem point of view, the whole world is divided into two parts--"the House of Islam," and the House of War;" out of this division has arisen the other popular dictum of the Mohammednas (sic) that "all kinds of unbelievers from but one people." "
re: "Diplomatic Political Reporting: Say What You Think?"
- if you want it to be read, make it readable
- some things are important - but don't matter
- no stupid words!
- don't be boring"
So just as it is right to try to keep HQ up to date, Embassies also need to remember that HQ usually won't be that interested in anything which significantly changes the 'narrative' unless it is dramatic enough to catch the headlines in the HQ country.
