Living the Dream.





Friday, November 4, 2011

re: "Was it legal to kill al-Awlaki?"

Neo-Neocon ("slowly but surely leaving the fold and becoming that dread thing: a neocon") is asking the right questions.


Money quote(s):


"Was it legal to kill al-Awlaki without due process, courtesy of drone?


Some will say “who cares? Good riddance.” But they are ignoring the importance of the issue and the possible danger of the precedent, while those who question the mission’s legality are asking a question that is necessary to confront: under what circumstances can a president order the liquidation of an American citizen (or possible former American citizen) without any courtroom procedure, even a military tribunal?"


Obviously, this question is only of interest to those 300,000 or so folks who happen to be U.S. citizens.


"Fighting international terrorism presents us with a different kind of war. That does not mean we can do whatever we want. But it does mean that the rules need developing and clarifying."


(10/1)

re: "Congress’s Constitutional Power to Establish National War Policy in Violation of International Law – A (Belated) Response to Professors.... "

John Dehn at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") summarized the play-by-play on some international law back-and-forth.


Money quote(s):


"Opinio Juris hosted an excellent discussion of an important new book, International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, a well-edited collection of essays about the Supreme Court’s approach to international law. Professor David Golove’s contribution asserting that post-9/11 Supreme Court “War on Terror” decisions are consistent with what he called our “Just War constitutional tradition” drew significant attention. In Professor Golove’s view, both the President and Congress are constitutionally required to comply with at least some international laws of war. Professor Andrew Kent critiqued the essay here, arguing that Golove’s claims, particularly those involving Congress, are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent recognizing Congress’s power to set national policy in violation of international law.
I agree with Golove’s assertion that the executive branch must generally comply with any applicable international laws of war. Like Professor Kent, I am quite circumspect of the claim that Congress must as well. Harlan Cohen responded to Professor Kent’s post, suggesting that Professor Golove and Professor William Dodge (one of the book’s editors) may believe that all nations, including ours, are “absolutely bound” by certain rules of international law, those that the well-known (to the Framers and to academics) and influential Eighteenth Century international law commentator Emmerich de Vattel categorized “voluntary law.”
" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


There's actually no such thing as "international law."


Don't get me wrong; there is a body of customary, traditional, and treaty-based law (for values of "law") comprising a body of specialized knowledge which is generally termed "international law." But that "law" doesn't even come close to passing the common sense tests that would make it equivalent to other forms of actual law.


"After reading Professor Golove’s contribution to the book, Professor Ramsey’s response, and Professor Dodge’s related essay, I think there may be confusion regarding the obligatory nature of what Vattel denominated “voluntary law” and its relationship to both the contemporary laws of war and the war powers of Congress.


I believe Congress possesses the constitutional power (in conjunction with the executive, when necessary) to establish national war policy contrary to relevant international law so long as it does not violate the text of the Constitution. To the extent that Professor Golove’s unpublished research may have uncovered “longstanding understandings in Congress” that it must follow certain international laws of war, I suspect those understandings to be based in morality or wise policy, not necessarily constitutional law. Golove has to date given only scant evidence of what seems an elegant argument in favor of granting constitutional status to any such congressional understandings.


I agree that there are (and were) rules of international law that nations were believed “absolutely bound” to observe. They included what Vattel denominated the “perfect rights” of nations. Perfect rights were those “accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfill the correspondent obligation” through armed force. However, the absolute “bindingness” of these rules existed only in international law." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)


There are some issues (more than some, but bear with me) with this perspective on the "bindingness" of international law.


For one thing, the perspective is astonishingly narrow in scope.


What we in the West call "international law" is a body of artifacts whose only relevance is within the larger context of the post-Westphalian international system. It is the height of civilizational and cultural chauvanism to suppose that it is truly global in application.


"(A) national policy, even one properly established under domestic law, may permit a violation of international law. But it cannot excuse that violation from the perspective of international law. In such cases, the policy is lawful in the domestic (municipal) legal system, but remains a violation of international law.


In my view, the key question is not whether the U.S. has ‘the power but not the right’ (to paraphrase Louis Henkin) to violate international law; it does. The key question is: which branch(es) of the U.S. government may constitutionally establish national policy contrary to international law? My research leads me to believe that in most contexts, including war, Congress does. In some very narrow circumstances it has been (and may still be) the executive alone." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


The thing about violations of international law which are legal within a domestic legal system is the limited scope for enforcement. Who or what gets to enforce "international law" within another sovereign state and using what means or mechanisms?


"(T)he bulk of the contemporary international law of war (both jus ad bellum and jus in bello or international humanitarian law (IHL)) consists of customary and conventional constraints on conduct the natural law-based law of nations permitted. Therefore, contemporary IHL is not properly equated with Vattel’s “voluntary” law, which is law evidenced in or derived from natural law principles, generally observed for its utility, and obligatory on civilized states through their presumed (rather than express or implied) consent.



Vattel identifies three other categories of international law, (1) necessary, (2) customary and (3) conventional. Only necessary law, which consisted of the direct application of natural law to nations, was immutable or absolute. Vattel classified the other three types, including voluntary law, as composing the “positive law of nations” because “they proceed from the will of nations.” It defies logic to say that any species positive law cannot be altered at the will of the same nations that establish it." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)



"(T)o the extent that any rules in the contemporary law of war might be properly categorized “voluntary” law, the Constitution expressly assigns Congress the power to derogate from or abrogate such law. Importantly, this includes the power to infringe the “perfect rights” of other nations. Nothing in the constitutional text expressly requires Congress to exercise its powers to declare war or grant letters of marque (or reprisal, see below) in a manner consistent with relevant international law. This is why the Court did not, in its early decisions, review a congressionally established general or partial war for compliance with the law of nations."


The OJ article included a nice quote from Chief Justice Marshall (Talbot v. Seeman) to back up that last claim:


“The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry [into whether France was properly deemed an enemy].” (emphasis added)

"Of course, none of these observations directly addresses Golove’s claim: that Congress believed itself to be limited by the law of nations when exercising its powers, and that this sense of obligation had a constitutional dimension or basis. There are, quite obviously, many reasons why members of Congress or Congress as a body might have boisterously made such claims. Chief among them would be to claim the legitimacy of law for proposed or adopted legislation infringing the perfect rights of other nations. Given the widely accepted origins of the natural law, some might also have felt morally obligated to observe it in spite of having constitutional discretion not to do so."



(9/6)

re: "Packing my UAB"

Digger at Life After Jerusalem ("The musings of a Two-Spirit American Indian, Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer") offered some enormously practical advice for FS folks on the move.


Money quote(s):


"(I)t is important to get a list from your post of what is in your welcome kit and to find out whether you get to keep it until your HHE arrives. Because if you have to return it once you get your UAB, that changes everything."


HHE (or HHB) = Household Effects/Baggage. This is the stuff that gets to you by "slow boat" via China (unless you're going to China; in those cases, your HHE is routed via Tierra Del Fuego).


UAB = Unaccompanied Baggage. This is stuff that gets air-freighted to you (from you, before you leave) and, ideally, gets where you're going within a few days of your arrival. It's to tide you over between what's in your actual luggage and the arrival of your HHE.


(On one occasion, my UAB was already at post, at my new house in fact, before I myself arrived. That was way cool.)


A "welcome kit" is each post's idea of what you'll need to get by in your new home until your own stuff arrives. It typically includes pots and pans, dishes and flatware, sheets and towels, &tc.


"Check with your post about whether the welcome kits include a tv...this could be vital if you have kids (I don't but I still want one. My post actually includes a tv, but I am probably bringing mine in the UAB anyway if I have the weight). Also bring toys and maybe some favorite snacks for your kids and pets. It will ease their adjustment. I am also bringing sheets, pillows and towels. Yes, the embassy provides those, but I bet they won't feel as nice as the ones you sleep on at home. In fact, I actually mailed myself a set of sheets and a mattress pad (embassy bedding is notoriously uncomfortable, at least in my experience. I am actually bringing my own bed, and I am putting a set of sheets for it in my UAB so that I don't have to unpack all of my HHE before I can make the bed when it arrives.)"


Okay, so you're getting the idea, perhaps, that a Foreign Service deployment isn't exactly like a military one, and you'd be correct. It's somewhat more akin to a PCS move to Germany/Italy/Korea/Japan would be for military folks, IF military folks PCS-ed to Upper Revolting, Carjackistan, and Lower Slobovia on a regular basis (and some, defense attache types, do). You're moving. You're moving your household (kids, spouse, pets, &tc.) every 2-3 years, and trying to make each little homestead your honest-to-gawd home every time.


It's a little more complicated than "home is where you hang your hat." You want a safe harbor, a refuge, where you can unwind from whatever the stress-du-jour at the embassy turns out to be on each given day. And your spouse/kids need a home. Especially if you're trying to raise your world-vagabond offspring to be honest-to-Heck Americans, without the benefit of raising them in their own country for much of their childhoods.


As I've occasionally mentioned to Madam-At-Arms, my home is where she (and the Wee Consular Beastie) is/are. That's the bottom line for me. When I get home from a jail/morgue visit, or from spending the day identifying plane crash victims, I like a little homelike space where I can take a slug of Kentucky sour mash before I actually have to tell her about my day at/out-of-the- office.


(Of course, when I headed for the whiskey shelf as item #1 of my just-got-home checklist, she pretty much already knew where I'd spent my day.)


"And of course my electronics...though they will be in my carry on...my computer, ipad, kindle (gotta have books!), ipod (gotta have music!)...plus all of my important documents, like passports, animal health certificates, etc, will be in my carry on."


Superlative advice about the things which you really don't want to let get further than arm's reach during an international move. Bravo!


(8/9)

re: "Say Yes to Endless Campaigning: Let Obama Be Obama"

Vanderleun at American Digest ("Dispatches From The New America") said something curious:

"So to all those pundits cluck-clucking about Obama’s campaigning crimping his productivity, I say: “Just. Shut. Up.” "


Read why.



(7/9)

re: " "German Soldiers Can't Shoot" "

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") considered how the Bundeswehr must transform.

Money quote(s):

"We constantly hear about the Bundeswehr's huge transformations since unification in 1990, but I am beginning to wonder how much of that was rhetoric. I am not underestimating how much the world has changed since the Cold War and how difficult it to transform military institutions and doctrine, but the fall of the Berlin Wall was more than 20 years ago. Two decades is a long time for Christ's sake. Soon we will mark the ten's anniversary of 9/11. I am getting tired of German pundit's talking about the post-Cold War world or even the post-9/11 world."

Most of the Bundeswehr's "transformation since absorbing the East German Volksarmee has been to downsize. When I was briefed a few years ago on just how far that had progressed, I was (as a former NATO inhabitant) truly shocked.

"1 percent of GDP is still a lot of money. We have to change faster, more creative, pool resources with allies to develop military capabilities more efficiently.

There was not enough pressure to reform the Bundeswehr in the past. One of the reasons for the lack of urgency was (and still is) the popular perception that a) finally we don't have enemies, but are surrounded by friends, b) we cannot increase our security with military means at the moment, and c) US led wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are not enhancing Germany's security, thus we do not need to contribute much. Very shortsighted indeed."


(6/27)

Thursday, November 3, 2011

re: "Alabama vs. Illegal Immigration [ArthurK]"

Open Blogger at Ace of Spades HQ watched a video about Alabama's new anti-illegal immigration law.


Money quote(s):


"I have a heart. But I still want them out of the country. Sometimes you gotta do stuff that makes you sad."


That is ofttimes the essence of immigration-related (including consular and visa) work. I don't want to work with consular officers who have no heart, I just want them to make their adjudicational decisions with all of their decisional faculties: heads, hearts, and gut.


Real life ain't bean-bag. You can't please everyone, after all; you're sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution (and laws) of a particular country.


"The question is always asked, "How are you going to remove 12 million undocumented?" Here's an answer - cut off the reasons they come here (jobs (via that online id check) schools)and they'll remove themselves."


Self-deportation works.



(10/1)

re: "Commanders Livid As Obama Orders Reduction of Iraq Troop Strength To... 3000"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ cut to the heart of the matter.


Money quote(s):


"How can 3000 men in a foreign country accomplish anything, even securing their own safety?


This seems, yet again, to be a purely political decision, made without regard to any security goal or even the affected troops' safety.


If you're hollowing out the force to the point where they are no longer tasked with anything except defending themselves from terrorist attacks, why are they there at all?"


Lipstick on a pig?



(9/6)

re: "So what do I do, again?"

Japansen at White Waters & Black ("Adventures in Diplomacy aka Life in the Foreign Service") made an excellent explanation.

Money quote(s):


"The Foreign Service is the diplomatic arm of the US government. We live and work abroad, representing the interests of the US and its business and providing support for American citizens overseas. We are a service corp (sic), similar to the military. We are members of the Department of State and are most recognizable by the Secretary of State and the myriad ambassadors that represent the President at missions overseas. Historically about 2/3 of US ambassadors have been career foreign service officers with political appointees comprising the rest. We work at embassies and consulates. There is only one embassy in any country; consulates primarily provide consular services but also have reporting sections as well."


True, true. There are sometimes more than one U.S. mission (complete to ambassador) located geographically in a particular country (e.g., Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland) but those are diplomatic missions to international organizations and the like, not embassies to another sovereign state.


"Consular officers execute the consular duties of embassies and consulates. They adjudicate visa applications and provide services to American citizens overseas. These services include replacing lost passports, registering new citizen births, and assisting in cases of distress, often involving arrests or deaths. On the visa side, there are two basic types, immigrant and non-immigrant visas. Immigrant visa interviews are much more exhaustive and have different standards of adjudication..... There are almost as many classes of immigrant visas as there are letters of the alphabet, depending on the purpose of travel. US law establishes the criteria for qualification for everything from diplomats and government workers to visitors to students to religious workers to refugees and victims of violence.


My job then is to review each non-immigrant applicant and interview them to determine if they meet the criteria established by US law. Fundamentally consular officers need to establish that applicants are bona fide non-immigrants and aren’t just intending to stay in the US once they get there. We have to make sure that the appropriate visa is applied for and that they meet the criteria for eligibility.The biggest challenge is the volume."


&


" There aren’t all that many of us, about 8000 Officers and 5500 Specialists. The Department of State is one of the smallest in the government, with a budget about 1/20 of the Department of Defense."



(8/8)

re: "South Sudan"

David Warren at David Warren Online ("my daily newspaper articles for the time since Sept. 11th, 2001") shared some nearly specialist-level area knowledge of South Sudan.


Money quote(s):


"The frontiers are not yet secure, and the ultimate shape of this new country depends on the resolution of the conflict with (northern) Sudan, over possession of the large district of Abyel, which is a melding zone between the Muslim north and Christian-Animist south, both geographically and demographically."


"Melding zone" is one way of looking at it. Abyei, within South Kordofan (the name itself is a form of arabization-inspired north Sudan cultural imperialism), is part of Islam's "bloody borders," marking the bleeding edge of moslem conquest as it marches (and rides, and raids) further and further up the Nile valley.


"Only in the 19th century did European adventurers become fully aware of regions like southern Sudan, thanks more to private missionary efforts than to imperial ambitions. It was an afterthought to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, extending their rule into the swampland of the White Nile, a very long way from Cairo; and also to British East African officials, curious to find what lay beyond Uganda.


History, and in this case the imperial histories that underlie so many contemporary world issues, is unfortunately no longer taught except to ideological specialists, which is how I excuse this very general briefing. The British in fact saw the problem coming, of putting millions of tropical rainforest-dwelling black Africans under the rule of desert-dwelling Arabized Muslims, at least a century ago. Their intention to make the region an extension of Uganda, instead of Sudan, was defeated by "events."


So much of today's sprawling political and economic catastrophe through sub-Saharan Africa can be traced not to imperialism, per se, but to the imperial authorities' eagerness to leave around the signal year of 1960. It was an appalling cat's cradle of quick fixes they left behind.


The rest could be attributed to the people they put in power, or dangerously near power, during this evacuation: a generation of African statesmen educated in places like the London School of Economics, or the École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer, on what were then the latest Fabian and socialist principles.


Add nascent African nationalisms - also encouraged by the chic, departing Europeans - and stir. In retrospect, the reduction of sub-Saharan Africa, with its extraordinary natural resources and diversity of alert and capable peoples, to desperate poverty and a violent hash, was just what we should have expected."


The preceding five short paragraphs encapsulate the historical truths it took me week, and volumes, to conclude. (Nice work.)


"Africa is not a mess because it is black. Africa is a mess because it was made into an immense Petri dish for asinine Utopian experiments, by people who walked when they started going wrong."


Simplistic and incomplete, but not untrue.

(7/9)

re: "MAJOR NIDAL HASAN AND THE FORT HOOD TRAGEDY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMED FORCES"

Clint Watts at the Foreign Policy Research Institute ("Putting Ideas in Service to Our Nation since 1955") posted a very useful bulletin at FPRI.

Read the whole thing.


(6/27)

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

re: "The Left's Rage Over 'Assassination' Of US Citizens Begins"

Jason Bradley at Big Peace addresses some of the proper issues surrounding "Triple-A" 's death.


Money quote(s):


"Assassinating US citizens without due process is in fact wrong. But there is nothing basic about the kind of terrorists’ threats we face daily. We do not have drones patrolling the skies of Los Angles and we are not targeting American civilians in all out military offensive. These terrorists are not simply breaking laws. They are more than just your common criminal or gangbanger. They are continuously plotting to kill as many Americans as possible. They are financed and organized by governments and terrorists organizations that stretch the globe and have plenty of resources from which to operate. That makes them threatening in such a way that due-process would actually be a hindrance in protection of the homeland.


Al-Awlaki’s ‘citizenship’ is the product of an outdated and erroneous interpretation of the 14th Amendment. He is about as much of a citizen of the US as Osama bin Laden was. If he was truly a US citizen he would live here, pay his taxes, and be a productive member of society. If individuals like al-Awlaki can be considered a US citizen with a straight face, then perhaps there is need to approach the ideas that constitute citizenship. Al-Awlaki stopped being a US citizen the moment he sat down with terrorists and collaborated with them to kill American citizens."


1. Al-Awlaki got precisely the due process (under the laws of land warfare) that any other enemy of the United States gets; not a trial by jury in a courtroom, to be sure, but by targeteers and military commanders performing their lawful duties.


2. There are those who make this fairly reasonable argument, that children born to foreign citizens who are not themselves legal residents (a broader category than illegal aliens, by the way) in the U.S. aren't due American citizenship under 14th Amendment authority. So far this hasn't been the interpretation of the SCOTUS, but it's not that unreasonable an interpretation.


3. Mr. Bradley's point with regards to expatriation (i.e., loss of U.S. nationality), is meaningful and well-taken. There are existing laws, on the books, to strip U.S. citizenship from those who wage war against America. They ought to exercised.



(10/1)

re: "Mickey Kaus: Perry's Positions on Immigration Are Even Worse Than I Thought"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ has his own ideas about immigration reform.


Money quote(s):


"I've long been in favor of a guest worker program. Liberals hate this idea because they want immigrant workers voting in elections, and also supporting the American social welfare system (because, being citizens, they'd be beneficiaries). The unions hate the idea because they don't like the idea of immigrants with legal status competing for jobs.


Many conservatives don't like the idea because they want illegal immigrants stopped, period."


Like a lot of consular officers who work hard and conscientiously in implementing lawful immigration programs, illegal immigration pretty much burns my shorts. (We are not amused!) There's an in-joke that plays on the predominently liberal flavor of our diplomatic corps: new foreign service officers are liberal, but after their first tour interviewing (and adjudicating) visa applicants they're still liberal, but not when it comes to immigration.


"(T)here is a fact on the ground that cannot easily be ignored that American agriculture relies, to a serious extent, on immigrant farm workers coming in to collect the harvests. There is a glib response to that -- "We'll just encourage Americans to take those jobs!" -- and I suppose that's possible, but the American public of 2011 is not the American public of, say, 1932. Whereas once American workers might take a bus to the heartland and work the fields for a season, American workers no longer feel they need to do that, as government unemployment programs don't require them to change jobs or to travel long distances for work. So, in the main, they don't." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


If things got bad enough (and here's hoping they don't), that lack of needful feeling could change drastically. But for now, with the modern welfare state (and the option of moving back home to your parent's house) American citizen labor is unlikely to be quite that mobile.


"(P)art of the reason there aren't any serious immigration reforms -- and I mean on the enforcement side, here -- is because neither side is particularly willing to confront the facts on the ground. Liberals demand an amnesty and citizenship to goose their vote share (and further drain our social welfare finances), which is a non-starter for conservatives. Business-oriented conservatives, however, block real immigration enforcement, because they feel those enforcement efforts don't take into account the fact that many businesses have come to rely on immigrant workers, and would be disrupted by any kind of crackdown that was more than superficial (which is what our current raids mostly are).


To me, the best solution is to permit guest-worker visas but only for those industries that have long relied on immigrant illegal workers (agriculture, mainly), with a smaller pool of visas for industries that have recently begun to rely on such workers (hotels, restaurants), and none at all for industries which are just recently beginning to indulge in illegal hiring.


Then start reducing the visas for the middle category (the hospitality industries), to begin ratcheting this practice down in a slow way, forcing them little by little to stop hiring illegals.
Such guest worker visas should only be generous for the one industry that seems to be historically dependent on seasonal workers (agriculture).


That is, less of a war on illegal immigration, and more of a containment and rollback model."


Ace seems considerably more in touch with public sentiment on this issue, in severe contrast to our elected/appointed leadership which seems bent on expanding categories of worker programs.


"I think our laws do not reflect the reality that immigrants pick crops, and there aren't a huge number of Americans ready and able to step in were they to stop. Businesses will hire them illegally because they have to, and then the political structure will turn a blind eye to all of this because they know it's necessary, and the situation continues, with no support on either side for any kind of actual governing law.


Because there is no majority for any scheme of law here, we've all collectively decided, essentially, to keep the old "law" in place and just ignore the fact it's being broken left and right."


(9/6)

re: "State: Libyan rebels can have the embassy … but not the money"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") was following the money.

Money quote(s):


"The Libyan rebels, who are represented in Washington by former Qaddafi envoy Ali Aujali, have been working out of donated office space in northwest Washington for months. The State Department signed an order last week handing control of the Libyan embassy, located in the Watergate complex, over to the rebels."


The Watergate, as well as being famous as a Nixon administration crime scene and the onetime residence of Monica Lewinsky, is only a relatively short distance from Main State (i.e., "Foggy Bottom") and the rest of official Washington.


"There is probably only about $150 to $200 million of frozen Qaddafi money in U.S. banks, but even that money is affected by the U.N. sanctions. The rest of the $30 billion is held outside the U.S. banking system."


A few hundred million here, a few hundred million there; pretty soon you're talking about real money.


"(T)he State Department continues to communicate privately to the TNC that the investigation into the killing of their military commander, Abdel Fatah Younis, last month is crucial to maintaining the TNC's credibility and reputation.


Publicly, Nuland portrayed the killing and the reorganization of their cabinet as a watershed moment in the TNC's evolution into a functioning, democratic organization ‘So, frankly, while the killing was an awful event, the fact [is] that the TNC has not just stood pat but has really taken this as an opportunity for internal reflection, for renewal," she said.


One of the State Department press corps members responded to her, "I'm not sure I've ever heard a glass-half-full explanation better than that one in a long time." "


Mr. Rogin originally posted this back in August. That's a lifetime (several, actually; especially if your family name is Qadhafi) in terms of the Libyan civil war. Does anyone even remember this particular murder? Does anyone, in light of the late dictator's fate, think the TNC got any valid "lessons learned" from Younis' assassination?


(Other than that they could get away with it?)



(8/9)

re: "An awkward independence day for diplomats in South Sudan"

Edmund Downie at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors Of Foreign Policy") noted a little problem of an ICC warrant being out on one of the invited guests.

Money quote(s):

"The International Criminal Court's March 2009 indictment alleged that Bashir was responsible for war crimes in the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Recent violence in border states Abyei and South Kordofan hasn't endeared him to the international community either. Bashir and rebel leaders pledged in late June to pull troops out of Abyei before the referendum, but Bashir's ambassador to Kenya reaffirmed yesterday the north's claim to the region."



(7/8)

re: "Maybe your country is at war, but not mine"

at Murdoc Online found a paucity of martial ardor in our NATO allies.

Money quote(s):

"There was a time when Murdoc thought that the primacy of the UN as the main international body was over than that an expanding NATO would someday fill its place in global politics. That time is long, long past.

NATO isn’t completely worthless. But it seems to inch closer and closer to that state every day.

Though, to be fair, sometimes (a lot of times?)
it’s hard to tell that America is at war, too."

America isn't at war. America is "at the mall."





(6/26)











Tuesday, November 1, 2011

re: "Obama to reduce Iraq strength to 3,000, lose election… "

Moe Lane at RedState ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") is crystal-balling some crystal-balling.


Money quote(s):


"(S)et up the bank shot in 2016 for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton"


Since this post, the target troop strength for the end of this year has dropped another couple of zeros, to (essentially) nothing. The primary official U.S. presence by 2012 in Iraq will be the State Dept. mission there. This actually would seem to put the "blame line" firmly on Sec. Clinton's desk, should anything not go spectacularly well.


(Does anyone actually, seriously, forecast things going spectularly well in Iraq after our withdrawel?)


This would seem to defeat the purpose in setting up a bank shot for her.


(Unless it was a double bank shot intended to sink her.)


"(T)his would work as a long term strategy. Accept that the election’s lost, set up a disaster for the Republican President to inherit and take the blame for, and put the one brave truth-teller in position to come over in 2016 and save the day. It’s not optimal, but then it’s going to take a couple of years for the Democrats to fix everything that Obama’s done to their party. They might as well sabotage things for the GOP in the meantime."


It's not that political strategists can't/don't plan this far ahead, but this is shading past strategizing into the realm of conspiracy.


(Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity and incompetence.)


(9/6)

re: "RAF Trainer Is Muslim Convert"

Mr. E. Blogger at The Jawa Report ("Sand people, get it?") spotlighted an interesting British character.


Money quote(s):


"A Royal Air Force training college dean, Dr. Joel Hayward, is a Muslim convert who has criticized NATO efforts in Libya, likened Winston Churchill to Mohammad, asserted that fewer Jews were killed by the Nazis than generally thought and said Holocaust gas chambers were British propaganda.


Needless to say, Hayward engenders concern and suspicion on the part of RAF colleagues. He has been dubbed the "Air Force Ayatollah." "


Likening "Winston Churchill to Mohammad"?


(In "a nice way," one presumes.)


"Dr. Hayward reminds me of the alleged Fort Hood shooter, Army Major Nidal Hasan."


There are some particulars in the Jawa Report post excerpted from the Mail (U.K.) article that make this less implausible than it might otherwise seem.



(8/9)

re: "Unhappy Medium: The Perils of Annoyance as Your Strategic Default"

Joseph Fouche at Chicago Boyz discussed some pitfalls of U.S. strategizing.


Money quote(s):


"This policy shift from the mass armies of mid-century America to its smaller and more élite just-in-time replacement assumed a strong ability to accurately see the future. This is understandable: part of any defense plan is building the force you want that lets you do what you want to create the future you want. Unfortunately, the most neglected yet important part of a defense plan is building the force you need to survive what you don’t want to do in a future you don’t want. Building a magic bullet force assumes you’ll always enjoy the luxury of fighting whoever, whatever, wherever, whenever, and however you want, protected by an all-seeing eye so powerful and so pervasive that it provides perfect predictive power. The power of prophecy will free you from the margin of safety supplied by the quantitative outputs of the 20th century with just-in-time margins supplied by the qualitative outputs of the 21st.


If the last decade should have taught Americans anything, it should have taught them that contemporary American can’t predict the future. However, the correct solution (stop treating false prophecy as gospel) has been widely ignored in favor of the wrong solution (bet everything on false prophecy, only this time more aggressively)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


The application of business concepts to military organizations has been a U.S. characteristic since at least the U.S. mass mobilization of World War II. War on an industrial scale invited industrial engineering solutions. The over-influence of corporate business concepts on America's conduct of the Vietnam War need not be further discussed, except when/where lessons-learned are stubbornly resisted.


"In the wars of the 21st century, thousands died and trillions were spent based merely on the authority of prophecy that was little more predictive than the steely glint of Donald Rumsfeld’s bespectacled eyes and the firmness of his jaw. The result was a force that manfully struggled its way to relative operational success despite the obstacles the Pentagon put in its way. The military danced dreadfully close to the edge but escaped operationally unscathed. Strategically, however, the military’s combat forces are depleted by repeat overseas visits, its hospitals are packed with lifelong, and its weaponry has a decade of wear and that will be expensive to replace if it ever is replaced. Such is the fate of a magic bullet force that found itself in wars that were more manpower and resource intensive than anticipated by Pentagon prophets." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)




(7/9)

re: "An Alpine Superpower?"

Baron Bodissey at Gates of Vienna ("At the siege of Vienna in 1683 Islam seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe.We are in a new phase of a very old war.") noted a limited outbreak of rationality in Europe.

Money quote(s):

"The European Union’s lack of military capability has made it somewhat of a joke in recent years. Among the various member states of the EU there are some exceptions — Denmark comes to mind — but, generally speaking, Western Europe lacks the capacity to defend itself without the help of the United States. If the American hegemon were to withdraw or collapse, Europe would become vulnerable to foreign predation long before it could rearm.

Not so Switzerland. The Swiss have a long tradition of muscular self-defense, and are now intent on beefing up the size and strength of their army."

Our NATO allies have continued cashing their peace dividend checks long past the end of actual peace. Witness their limited capabilities in support of whatever their Libyan objectives actually were.

So, while in absolute terms calling Switzerland a "superpower" is a bit of a stretch, in comparison with their neighbors, perhaps not so much of a stretch.

"In defiance of all European trends to saving, there will again be 100,000 soldiers prepared to defend the country."


(6/26)

Monday, October 31, 2011

re: "Re: Who Was Awlaki"

Mario Loyola at The Corner takes it by the numbers.


Money quote(s):


"First, for purposes of combat actions such as the targeted killing of Awlaki, the battleground in our war against al-Qaeda is not “everywhere.” It is in those few countries that either willingly or unwillingly provide significant safe havens for al-Qaeda. Yemen is in the first rank of that group of countries, along with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.


Second, legitimate al-Qaeda targets in each of those countries are subject to attack pursuant to Congress’s 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force after 9/11, which even Vice President Biden has deemed a constitutionally sufficient declaration of war. That disposes of the concern that the executive branch is operating without the imprimatur of Congress. And the president is at all times subject to a variety of laws that constrain his conduct as commander-in-chief. Just because this particular killing is not justiciable (on the facts known to us) does not mean that federal courts cannot hold the president to account for violations of U.S. law.


Finally, to the extent your reference to “checks and balances” goes to due process, our rules of engagement are informed by international law and fall within the regulatory powers of Congress. Nobody is alleging that the rules of engagement were not followed in this case. The Constitution’s due process guarantees for criminal defendants in a civil prosecution are meant to protect private citizens from the power of the state. They have never (at least not until recently) been understood to benefit combatants – U.S. citizens or otherwise — who have taken up arms against the state itself."


He (correctly) draws the following conclusion:


"An al-Qaeda convoy riding along a desert road in Yemen is a legitimate bombing target, period."


(9/30)

re: "Avoiding Armageddon with China"

Dan Blumenthal, Mark Stokes, and Michael Mazza at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") look at changing U.S. perception of China's intentions.


Money quote(s):


"It is good news that James Traub, a highly regarded journalist and writer, may be startled out of his belief that China is a "status quo" power, based in part on a paper we wrote.


We hope that more writers of Traub's caliber will be similarly startled by China's growing menace. The truth is that like every rising power in history (including the United States) China wants to change rules, territorial delineations, and laws written while it was weak."


CAA is by no means a China (or even an "Asia") "hand." Not my speciality. But for any practicioner or student of foreign, military, or intelligence affairs, China is simply too big to ignore.


Like unto Texas, there are (or should be) more than one China. Probably (again like unto Texas), there should be at least five Chinas. And that doesn't even include Formosa in the count.


"Throughout its history, China has lumbered into disaster after disaster, costing untold sums in lives and treasure (e.g. the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Beijing's war with Vietnam). Certainly as China re-emerged as a power it had its chance to "bide its time and hide its capabilities" as Deng Xiaoping instructed. But instead, it decided to build a highly destabilizing military (see the last decade of Department of Defense reports on China's military power, the latest of which is here) and has proceeded to rattle its saber against Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and, most troublingly, the United States. It has now created the conditions for the encirclement is so fears."


There's this concept of imperial overreach. Make no mistake about it, any China larger than one-fifth of its current mass constitutes an empire and may be expected to behave (and misbehave) accordingly.


Hope for the best, but plan for the worst.


"Responding to years of Chinese harassment of U.S., Japanese, Vietnamese, and Philippine ships, last year Clinton broke new ground by declaring at a summit in Hanoi that "The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea." This is a diplomatic way of telling China that we will continue to exercise our forces inside its exclusive economic zone, consistent with international custom, and we will ensure that our partners in Asia are able to resist Chinese bullying.


This brings us to what seem to be Traub's biggest problem with the paper: that doing what Gates and Clinton proclaimed we need to do (respond with our own military programs and ensure freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons) is expensive. True enough. National security is an expensive endeavor. But as our own history shows (pre-Pearl Harbor, pre-Korean War) military weakness in the face of new threats are more expensive still, in lives and in treasure."


Nothing I read in our nation's capital newspaper(s) give me any confidence that we are any less likely to re-commit our interwar and post-WW2 forefathers' mistakes with respect to military preparedness. And as my WW2 veteran grandfather rather chillingly put it to a much younger CAA, young men end up paying for that with "a bayonet in the guts."


"The Cold War is too simple a metaphor to describe Sino-U.S. relations. China is an economic partner, and Washington is deeply engaged in a diplomacy that tries to convince China to peacefully take its place as a great power. At the same time, we are balancing China's power and hedging against a more bellicose China."


Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. China certainly is, expanding its military and naval capabilities at a rapid pace, becoming in fact the peer-competitor that theorists like to pontificate about.


"The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan."


Engagement works both ways. All the economic levers we attempt to work into our engagement with China run right back to us through our own economy and international economic institutions and arrangements. And China's military theorists aren't shy in their theorizing about the multidimensional nature of any future conflict with the U.S. Forewarned isn't necessarily fore-armed, but it's a start.


"(I)t is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends.


This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon."



(9/6)

re: "More on Biden and His Fat Mouth"

Patterico at Patterico's Pontifications ("Harangues that Just Make Sense") is unimpressed by dangerous buffoonery in high office.


Money quote(s):


"The other day I noted how Joe Biden had run his mouth about who killed bin Laden, putting SEAL Team 6 at risk. I said: “there is no way to know whether this was an orchestrated ambush targeting Team 6. But it is an important reminder why it’s not just comedy relief to have cynical glory-seekers and complete buffoons at the highest levels of government.”


Well, the possibility of an orchestrated ambush looks much more likely — as an Afghan official tells the press that’s exactly what happened"


Among professionals, the heart of what makes intelligence information classifiable (i.e., secret, top secret, or confidential) is whether it discloses sources and methods. On the military side, this means not disclosing or publicizing information which reveals to the enemy that which the enemy can use against you. Operational details, procedures, capabilities; if it's public, it gets play. Somewhere. And if it's public somewhere, it's public everywhere. The information superhighway has off-ramps into some very bad neighborhoods, after all.


"In other words, a Taliban no doubt incensed at bin Laden’s death set up an ambush designed to target exactly the sort of forces that would respond to a report of high value targets.


Did the families fear this? You betcha."


Military families have, as they say, "skin in the game." They have an acute appreciation of their loved one's vulnerabilities to this sort of exploitation operation.


"When morons like Biden run their mouths, they put good men at risk. When the Obama administration decided to release all the information about who killed bin Laden, they put good men at risk."


This is why I hate working with amateurs.



(8/6)

re: "A Death in Texas"

DiploMad at The DiploMad 2.0 ("Wracked with angst over the fate of our beloved Republic, now in the hands of Morons who (mis)govern it, the DiploMad has returned to do battle on the world wide web, swearing death to political correctness, and pulling no punches.") shed some light on the Leal execution and the issue of consular notification/access.

Money quote(s):


"Just reading that last night the State of Texas put to death "Mexican" national Humberto Leal Garcia for the 1994 rape and murder of a sixteen-year-old girl. This execution took place despite efforts by the White House, the Government of Mexico, the UN, the OAS, a host of NGOs, and others to halt the execution because Leal had not been notified at the time of his arrest that he had the right to consult the Mexican consulate. He reportedly died yelling, "Viva Mexico!"


I agree that the execution of Leal last night is an outrage. He should have been executed about fifteen years ago.


In the course of my career I have had to deal with stories such as the Leal case. Almost always they involve somebody here illegally who commits a heinous crime, and is not even particularly aware that he has the right to contact his consul. In many cases, the Leal case seems to be one, the criminal is not even aware that he is the national of another country, as he has been in the US for many, many years."


On the one hand, you have arrestees who are unaware of (or actively concealing) their (illegal) alien status from law enforcement officers.


On the other hand you have law enforcement officers who are actively investigating a rape/murder case and who (justifiably) might view an inquiry into a suspect's nationality and/or immigration status to be either/both an investigative dead-end or a waste of limited manpower.


"The access to the consul issue only arises late in the process when slick appeals attorneys, looking for anything to save a murdering scum client, discover the matter of the consular access. This is a bogus issue. Some Texas sheriff does not have the obligation to advise a detainee that he has the right to his nation's consul. That is something for which the detainee needs to ask: IF he asks, then the police have the obligation to pass along the request to the appropriate embassy or consulate. There is no evidence that Leal asked, and, of course, none that Texas law enforcement denied his request to see a Mexican official. Should the police notify the German, Irish, or Italian Embassy every time somebody with a German, Irish, or Italian name is arrested? Should they automatically assume that anybody arrested who "looks" Mexican is a Mexican? Anybody with a Jewish name should have the Israeli Embassy notified? Can you see the law suits over racial profiling? Lawyers would get rich (er)!"


In our border states, where the otherwise (deliberately) misleading "we didn't cross the border, the border crossed us!" slogan actually might have some validity, dialing up the local Mexican consulate every time someone who might have Mexican nationality is a non-starter. As industrious as the Mexican consular officials of my own acquaintance have been, there's a lot more Texas (and Arizona, and New Mexico, and California) cops than there are of them.



(7/8)

re: "Marginally More Serious Fare"

The Diplogeek ("FSO Geekery") shared some of his life on "the line."


Money quote(s):


"So I’m aware that I don’t talk about the nitty-gritty of work all that often on this blog, beyond things like the vast numbers of applicants showing up in our waiting room and the fact that I work with a very cool group of people (well, cool in that slightly Type A, geeky way unique to quiz bowl teams and the Foreign Service). Part of this is because in all honesty, barring a uniquely awesome/not-remotely-awesome applicant, most days are kind of the same; I go to work, check my e-mail, sit at an interviewing window and interview people until there are no more people left to interview. The next day, I do it again. That’s not to hate on the job, by the way; it’s way more intellectually taxing than I would have initially thought. But short of detailing the stories of individual applicants, there’s not a ton to tell, and I’m not going to delve into particular applicants here because really, would I want some visa officer at the… I don’t know, Turkmeni Embassy laughing on the (very public) internets at my loser-ness? Probably not."


DG is a good (albeit new) officer. He's conscientious, self (and publicly) aware, and clearly maximizing the opportunities of his current assignment. He may go far in the (consular) business.


"(A)ccording to the law, we couldn’t issue. The applicant was understandably devastated and wept in the window for a good ten minutes. The whole thing was pretty horrible, and not what I would call one of my proudest moments, despite having followed the law, which is, after all, my job. This is, as one of my coworkers put it, why we get paid the big bucks."


This part sucks. Crying at the window. The U.S. does not, so far as I'm aware, intentionally hire heartless automatons to be vice consuls. Quite the opposite. But, as I've noted previously, we implement the law as it's written, not as we'd necessarily have written it ourselves. That is, indeed, why we get "paid the big bucks."


(An aside: in the current economy, the salary and benefits package for an FSO, at least when contrasted against unemployment benefits, may appear to be "big bucks." It's also, like all government salaries, currently frozen. And I haven't heard anybody on this side of the payroll actually complain about that. We all have family and friends who are not federal employees and we get it.


For actual "big bucks," however, one would do well to complete one's probationary period, be promoted into the mid-grade ranks, and, eventually, "cross the threshold" into the Senior Foreign Service.)


I used to tell my vice consuls, when they were a little depressed from having to deliver bad news like DG did, that they should expect to have someone cry at least once a week; and that at "visa mill" posts that would be daily. (More experienced officers will quickly learn about "crocodile tears.")


I also used to tell my vice consuls, when disappointed visa applicants threatened to complain to their supervisors, that dealing with complaints was part of my responsibility, why I got the "big bucks" and that if they were doing their jobs and applying immigration law correctly they didn't need to worry.


(Of course, if they weren't doing their jobs and were applying immigration law incorrectly, that was also my responsibility.)


Every visa refusal (plus a percentage of mostly randomly-selected issuances) gets reviewed by a more senior consular official. Daily. Them's the rules. Part of a consular managers job is to train line officers how to write their case notes so that it's clear to the reviewing official exactly what led them to make the refusal/issue decision they reached. If there's an error of law or if there's some additional or overlooked information about a decision that the manager thinks the adjudicator should consider, then the manager brings that to the line officer's attention. Ideally, it's a daily series of what I like to call "learnable moments."


(I find the term "teachable moment" to be annoying in the extreme.)


"(E)ven if I’m refusing someone a visa or telling them that I can’t give them what they want very badly, I can at least do so in a compassionate and respectful way. When you’re interviewing upwards of a hundred and fifty people a day, it’s easy to lose sight of that, I think, and get impatient and frustrated.


Anyway, that’s me processing. Clearly, it’s a good thing that it’s my visa adjudication that’s bringing in the (alleged) big bucks and not my Torah scholarship. And I promise more cheerful content next time, but I do think it’s worthwhile for anyone reading this who’s thinking of joining the Foreign Service to understand what it can mean, sometimes, agreeing to uphold these laws and interests of ours. Most of the time, the law and my feelings on a particular case coincide, but when they don’t, it can be a difficult thing to rationalize."


It's important to be professional in dealing with the public, even when "the public" is just one single individual on the other side of a bullet-resistant interview/transaction window. After all, on our side of the transaction window, we're the U.S. Embassy, the "G," in all its awful majesty. So courtesy is essential. Even when you're delivering bad news, you deliver it sincerely and respectfully.



(6/26)

Friday, October 14, 2011

Bidding Hiatus II

Today marks a milestone in this season's bidding process: the day bids are due.

For the next couple of weeks, the various bureaus will be sorting and consorting and deciding which jobs to offer "handshakes" to which officers. Officially, no "handshakes" can be offered until Nov. 4. At that point, things can get pretty interesting and intense.

CAA is interested in some more, you guessed it, consular work. And feels pretty confident he'll find some. The thing is, in consular work, even when you're not looking for it, it finds you.

Cheers!

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Bidding Hiatus

Sadly, sometime next year my tenure as Our-Man-In-Port Plaisance must come to a conclusion as I begin the next phase of my career involving "worldwide availability."

The Foreign Service has a, er, wonderful (yes, THAT's the word!) process by which FSOs find their next job(s). And I'm in the middle of it. And since the lobbying and bidding process itself is somewhat attention intensive, I needs must let things slide a touch in the CAA wing of the manse. Elsewise I may find myself Our-Man-In-A-Yurt (or worse).

So I expect to resume posting here at CAA after the middle of October, sometime.

_____

The average FSO spends, on average, about two-thirds of his/her/its career posted abroad (or "deployed," as it is sometimes appropriately termed) and the other third in a domestic assignment, about 90 percent of which are in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

Some positions are available in various other domestic locations, primarily such things as passport centers (Bureau of Consular Affairs), field and resident offices (Bureau of Diplomatic Security), or in administrative, payroll, or logistic support facilities as in Charleston, S.C., and Miami, Fl.

There are also a number of outside-the-Department training, educational, broadening, or academic fellowship opportunities in places like Capitol Hill, the various DoD colleges and universities, and some civilian universities (Princeton, GWU, &tc.).

So it's not like there aren't jobs out there, although the supply/demand can flex a bit from year to year in terms of the available jobs.

Some plum jobs I'm considering:

PAO in Absurdsvanj*
NIV Unit Chief in Krasnya**
Staff Assistant to the Special Envoy to Harzia
Commercial Officer, Al-Alemand
Consular Chief, St. Nicholas
Political Officer, Franistan
Charge d'Affaires for Equatorial Kundu
Deputy Principal Officer, Grand Fenwick
ACS Unit Chief, Port Royal***
GSO, Loompaland****
Management Officer, Lower Slobbovia
Visa Chief, Macho Grande
Economics Officer, Centralia
Protocol Officer, Ohtar
Deputy Principal Officer, APP Qwghlm*****
Motor Pool Officer, Tijata
Fraud Prevention Chief, Varina
Cultural Affairs Officer, Zamunda
Post Security Officer, Zembala

and

Deputy Chief of Mission, Flyville******

Some domestic possibilities include:

Desk Officer for Berzerkistan
Desk Officer for Ecuarico
Post Management Officer for Kinakuta
Desk Officer for Malaguay
Refugee Affairs Officer for Mypos

_____

Cheers!


_____
* PAO = Public Affairs Officer
** NIV = Non-Immigrant Visa
*** ACS = American Citizens Services
**** GSO = General Services Officer
***** APP = American Presence Post
****** Bonus points for anyone who can correctly identify the source of this name.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

re: "Integration, immigration and Islam-related problems: 23 suggestions for laws"

Nicolai Sennels at Jihad Watch ("dedicated to bringing public attention to the role that jihad theology and ideology plays in the modern world, and to correcting popular misconceptions about the role of jihad and religion in modern-day conflicts") has some legislative suggestions.


Some of them are, in not so few words, already on the books, but enforcement is either spotty or sabotaged.


Others await some distopian scenario such as envisioned in Kratman's Caliphate.



Saturday, September 24, 2011

re: "Busy. Oh, But I'm Thinking A Lot About Blogging. State-Blogging, To Be Specific."

Donna at Email From The Embassy ("After three years in Beijing, we're headed to Amman, Jordan. For family and friends who want to follow our adventures, this is it...") posts some commonsensical rules for diplobloggers.


Money quote(s):


"(V)arious factions in State seems to have worked themselves into a swivet over a few of my blogging pals. What gives, State? It might be time to put some specifics in the FAM, so people know what the rules are, sort of the way we know about cost constructing travel to CONUS and applying for special needs allowances. We could use some rules! As Diplopundit pointed out today, the letter writer in this month's FSJ suggested that we all go back to writing in diaries and stuffing them under our pillows (ummm... not recommended in China, I hope!), or apply for jobs with the Huffington Post (wouldn't THAT get people's attention, if all of us State bloggers suddenly picked up that sized audience!). I get it: the writer doesn't like blogs. But to try to pretend he doesn't want to ban them outright, and then offer those flippant suggestions as replacements, is a bit disingenuous."


The aforementioned letter writer in the FSJ is a senior-ish, and well-respected, consular officer. Not yours truly, you understand: more respectable than ichmo.


"We've built this community, and we turn to each other for advice and support and laughter. (Also, pictures of nasty gigantic spiders lurking in bathtubs - you know who you are....). Many of us, myself included, started our blogs as a way to keep far-flung family members in the loop. So not only do these blogs tie us into our communities, but they help us keep our ties to our families back home. We're not going away, even if the Huffington Post does come calling."


There are several broad categories within the U.S. diploblogging "community." One of them encompasses Donna's web log; it's about family and FS life and helps keep our far-flung community a little bit more close-knit than distance used to allow. Yay technology!


Here are Donna's suggested rules:


"First: Don't Bite The Hand That Pays You. We are all of us, employees, spouses and children alike, representing the United States government every time we walk out our doors. I might be "just" a spouse with a spouse job and not much say-so in the Embassy, but when I'm here, to many of my neighbors out in the wide world, I AM the US government. So as a blogger, I am not allowed to criticize the work that the Department of State is doing, in Jordan, in the region, in the world, even. That's not my place. I won't do it at a dinner party, and I certainly won't do it on my blog. Doesn't matter what I think of our position on Palestine: if it differs from the USG-position, I can't put it on my blog. Even if it's the same as the USG-position, I'm likely going to avoid discussing it, anyway. This is a personal blog, after all, not a government-sanctioned one, so those types of discussions really don't belong here."


Some of us don't quite color within the lines on this one; I brush up against them myself quite often. But most often, I'm only reporting on what others have said and commenting thereupon.


"Second: Use the Past Tense. If you're going somewhere tonight, don't tell me about it until tomorrow. It doesn't make sense to advertise your whereabouts to complete strangers, through your blog or any other means. It's like cancelling your newspaper before you go on vacation, so no one realizes you're gone. It's just safer that way."


This is a very good and common sense suggestion that promotes operational security. Don't publish your future movements or schedule. That makes it too easy for those who may chose to do you, or your colleagues and/or loved ones, harm.


"Third: Limit the Details. I might tell you my street is narrow and crowded and full of Land Rovers, but I won't tell you if it is three streets up from the Embassy, right side, next to the Mexican restaurant. That's too much detail. I'll show you pictures of my house (assuming it's presentable), but only from the inside. You won't see the front of my house. You won't see pictures of my alarm system. You won't see any of the measures that keep me safe here at post. And speaking of pictures:"


Again, just helping make it a little more difficult for dangerous amateurs to do you harm.


"Fourth: No Pictures Without Permission. Don't post pictures of non-family members without their permission! If your colleagues don't permit you to post their pictures, don't do it. And don't post their names, either. First names, I think, are generally okay, but again, with permission! If you're not sure if they'd like it, don't put it out there."


This is also good advice for FS Facebook users.


"Fifth: No Gossip. About those colleagues: watch what you say about them. I, for one, have had the privilege of working with some smart, talented, funny people over the years. There are some seriously smart people working on your behalf at most Embassies around the world. (Also some odd ones, but hey: you'll find those strange birds in any profession. Just don't call them out on your blog!) But, really, even if what you want to say about someone is a compliment, you really ought not talk them up without permission. There are loads of people who agree with our FSJ letter writer that blogs are scary things, and you don't want to draw attention to those types of people, or to your blog, by posting details about such colleagues."


There's an "Old Army" rule about all the men being brave and all the ladies virtuous. The internet is tailor-made for spreading gossip, some of it even having a little bit of truth at the core of it. Just don't. Even if you're mad at something, or someone, that seems senseless, that's vexing you at your post, because as often as not you don't have all the facts about it anyways.


It does no one any good to post about who's incompetent or lazy, drinks too much or has an eye for the ladies (or lads). If it rises to the level of a problem, then it's the post's RSO or DCM who needs to be put into the loop, not the entire internet.


"(I)f no one will make the rules for us, maybe we need to make them ourselves. It should be basic common sense, in most cases. But your ability to blog should not and cannot depend upon the kindness of your boss. If you are following the rules, you shouldn't get slammed simply because your new boss doesn't approve of blogging. They cannot tell you that posting a picture of your baby at a doctor's appointment is a violation of your child's medical privacy rights, because that's simply not true (trust me: I asked a lawyer). But they can restrict things you want to say if those things contradict the work of the Department. Of course they can. They do it in the private sector, too."


This new media stuff is still something of a frontier, at least it is for not-new organizations like State. So diplobloggers are a sort of pioneer, which can be a good thing if handled right.


"Don't discuss policy; don't endanger yourself or others by posting details of upcoming events; don't post pictures that show the front of your house, or the school, or the car; don't talk about colleagues; don't post photos of colleagues without permission."


Nice summary and it probably belongs on the sidebar of every diploblog.

Friday, September 23, 2011

re: "Foreign Policy Technique"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("This website makes available to the general public interesting episodes and insights from Charles Crawford's eventful diplomatic career, and aims to explain in a open-minded, reasonable way how diplomacy works in practice.") tells you more of what you need to understand about diplomatic realities and engagement.


Money quote(s):


"Over at Commentator is my latest piece on UK engagement with Libya, in which I argue that what happened in recent years was principled, smart and mainly effective."


The following is a short passage from the longer excerpt he provided.



"there are only two basic choices available to democracies when it comes to dealing with odious regimes: Isolation, or Engagement. And that both can have perverse consequences, because it is impossible to deal with perverse regimes without some perverse outcomes"


Pithy, and to the point.


"(T)aking for granted that a 'Western' democratic system with a strong legal system is just 'better' than a cruel torturing dictatorship. What should the democracy do about the dictatorship?


One option is to do nothing. Faraway wicked foreigners oppress each other - what's new?


That option is in fact quite often used, even if there is a busy pretence of 'doing something'. Saudi Arabia is the classic example of a system which in most respects imposes odious unfair apartheid-like restrictions on its citizens, and which we studiously treat as a 'factor of stability'. Communist China used to be far worse, murdering millions. As did the USSR.



In all these cases the hard fact that these systems are powerful, ruthless and/or rich compels a certain caution. But does the fact that we 'tolerate' (say) the Saudi system demolish any claim by us to moral superiority? Double standards, they shriek.


No. Any good policy has to be realistic as well as consistent. If you can't stop all killers, it's right to stop those you can stop. To that extent there is solid intellectual and moral territory between 'double standards' and 'no standards'." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


You can only do what you can do; which doesn't mean you can't do anything, just that you can't do everything.


"The default position of Western democracies these days is that change should be 'peaceful'. The implication of this position (never discussed) is that enslaved people are better off if their slave-drivers reform slavery gradually, rather than get abruptly toppled even at the cost of many human lives. Slave-drivers need dialogue! A lot of dubious moral philosophy lurking behind that proposition.

What if we think that there are possibilities for more or less peaceful change? Egypt in some ways is a good current example. NB South Africa is always presented as a triumph for peaceful change but of course wasn't.


Libya might have been too, had the Gaddafi elite not reverted to stupidity instead of using its new improved relations with Western democracies to negotiate ." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


We tend to forget, at a distance of more than two centuries, just how bloody our own two revolutions (if you count the American Civil War as a second revolution, the one that liberated the rest of us) were. For the British, their bloody revolutions are even more distant, with less dramatic (to us) conclusions.


"In each individual case the options range far and wide, as does the prospect of getting allies and building successful coalitions for change.


Let's not forget too that Western political leaders' main focus is what their voters want. And voters (with rare exceptions) do not put changing the ways of revolting foreign regimes far up their priorities list. Or much taxpayers' money to be spent on the problem."


Some voters. Others are quite willing for their government to very meddlesome, with the treasure and blood coming from their fellow citizens.


"So in the real world of foreign policy it makes no sense to take a stark 'no compromise' position of substance with dictatorships. They exist, they have UN and other votes, they can export trouble, they probably have Ambassadors in London. Your aircraft may need to fly over their territory, or they may agree with you on various international technical issues. It's complicated.


You almost always end up with some form of 'engagement'. But the fact of matter-of-fact exchanges and opportunistically looking for areas to build some common ground is not the same thing as having a policy of Engagement aimed at deliberately using a range of options (openly or otherwise) to bring out reforms." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


In the real world, you make compromises. You make the best ones you can, but they're still compromises. Americans were cautioned early in their history against going abroad in search of dragons needing slaying.


Which doesn't mean you don't ever take fire and branch overseas to put an end to some odious regime which takes the ill-considered trouble of making themselves your enemy, just that you don't go looking for trouble.


(Which doesn't exactly jibe with this new-fangled "responsibility to protect" doctrine begin shopped around currently.)


"My point today is simple. British foreign policy and leadership can make positive changes in unpropitious foreign situations. But simply wanting to make a difference does not get results. Making that happen requires a powerful combination of strong policy determination, operational nimbleness and fine professional technique, an area where the FCO obviously declined under Labour. Plus some money." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


Airbrush out the specifically British elements in that last and you've got some bood advice worthy of wide application by a democracy seeking to use its diplomatic strengths wisely and justly.